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iAbstract
Matching problems involve a set of participants, where each participant has a capacity
and a subset of the participants rank a subset of the others in order of preference (strictly
or with ties). Matching problems are motivated in practice by large-scale applications,
such as automated matching schemes, which assign participants together based on their
preferences over one another.
This thesis focuses on bipartite matching problems in which there are two disjoint sets
of participants (such as medical students and hospitals). We present a range of efficient
algorithms for finding various types of optimal matchings in the context of these prob-
lems. Our optimality criteria involve a diverse range of concepts that are alternatives to
classical stability. Examples include so-called popular and Pareto optimal matchings, and
also matchings that are optimal with respect to their profile (the number of participants
obtaining their first choice, second choice and so on).
The first optimality criterion that we study is the notion of a Pareto optimal match-
ing, a criterion that economists regard as a fundamental property to be satisfied by an
optimal matching. We present the first algorithmic results on Pareto optimality for the
Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA), which is a many-to-one variant of the
classical House Allocation problem, as well as for the Hospitals-Residents problem (HR),
a generalisation of the classical Stable Marriage problem. For each of these problems,
we obtain a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings, and then use this to obtain a
polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching.
The next optimality criterion that we study is the notion of a popular matching. We
study popular matchings in CHA and present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a
maximum popular matching or reporting that none exists, given any instance of CHA.
We extend our findings to the case in CHA where preferences may contain ties (CHAT)
by proving the extension of a well-known result in matching theory to the capacitated
bipartite graph case, and using this to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a
maximum popular matching, or reporting that none exists.
We next study popular matchings in the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation prob-
lem (WCHA), which is a variant of CHA where the agents have weights assigned to them.
We identify a structure in the underlying graph of the problem that singles out those edges
that cannot belong to a popular matching. We then use this to construct a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding a maximum popular matching or reporting that none exists, for
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the case where preferences are strict.
We then study popular matchings in a variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem
with Ties and Incomplete preference lists (SMTI), where preference lists are symmetric.
Here, we provide the first characterisation results on popular matchings in the bipartite
setting where preferences are two-sided, which can either lead to a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for solving the problem or help establish that it is NP-complete. We also provide
the first algorithm for testing if a matching is popular in such a setting.
The remaining optimality criteria that we study involve profile-based optimal match-
ings. We define three versions of what it means for a matching to be optimal based on its
profile, namely so-called greedy maximum, rank-maximal and generous maximum match-
ings. We study each of these in the context of CHAT and the Hospitals-Residents problem
with Ties (HRT). For each problem model, we give polynomial-time algorithms for finding
a greedy maximum, a rank-maximal and a generous maximum matching.
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Chapter 1
A selective review of the literature
1.1 Motivation
Matching problems are motivated in practice by large-scale applications, such as auto-
mated matching schemes, which assign participants together based on their preferences
over one another. In Scotland [27] and the USA [49] for example, centralised automated
matching schemes, such as the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) and the Na-
tional Resident Matching Program (NRMP) respectively, annually construct allocations of
graduating medical students to hospital posts. In Singapore, a centralised matching mech-
anism is used to assign primary school students to secondary schools [61]. In Romania [36],
the Netherlands [11] and the USA [52–55], systematic programs have been established for
managing kidney exchange. Additionally, there are many other examples of centralised
matching schemes in various countries, in educational, vocational and medical contexts.
Matching problems involve a set of participants, where each participant has a capacity
and a subset of the participants rank a subset of the others in order of preference (strictly
or with ties). The term matching implies the attempt to assign each participant to one or
more acceptable partner(s) in some way to meet some specified criterion without exceeding
the capacities of the participants. Given the large number of participants typically involved
in the types of matching schemes discussed above, constructing matchings manually is
time-consuming, error-prone and infeasible for large instances. Algorithms automate the
process and again, given the typical sizes of input datasets, it is vital to ensure that
algorithms for matching problems are as efficient as possible. In its broadest sense, the
notion of efficiency involves all the various computing resources needed for executing an
algorithm. The measure of efficiency that will be the prime focus of this research is the time
1
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requirement of a given algorithm because it is often the dominant factor that determines
whether or not a particular algorithm is useful in practice, regardless of potential increases
in processing power [21].
Furthermore, given the applications of matching problems, and the implications of a
participant’s allocation in a matching for their quality of life, it is of paramount importance
that the matching algorithms that drive such applications should optimise in some sense,
and insofar as is possible, the satisfaction of the participants according to their preferences.
There are many ways to classify matching problems and a convenient distinction can
be made between a bipartite matching model in which there are two disjoint sets of par-
ticipants, and a non-bipartite model in which there is only a single set of participants.
Three-dimensional matching problems (in which there are three disjoint sets of partici-
pants) have also been considered but a number of variants have been shown to be NP-
complete [21,45,58]; thus it is unlikely that there exist efficient algorithms for the solution
of such problems. In addition, matching problems may be further sub-divided according
to the types of preference lists that are involved (two-sided or one-sided) as well as the
kind of mapping that is being sought in order to assign the members of one side to the
other, so that it is possible to classify these problems as follows:
1. Bipartite matching problems
(a) One-sided preference lists
i. One-one mapping, e.g., House Allocation problem
ii. Many-one mapping, e.g., Capacitated House Allocation problem
(b) Two-sided preference lists
i. One-one mapping, e.g., Stable Marriage problem
ii. Many-one mapping, e.g., Hospitals-Residents problem
2. Non-bipartite matching problems
(a) One-one mapping, e.g., Stable Roommates problem
For bipartite matching problems with preferences, an extensively studied problem is
the classical Stable Marriage Problem (SM) [17], in which the participants consist of
two disjoint sets of agents, say n men and n women, each of whom ranks all members
of the opposite sex in order of preference and a matching is just a one-one mapping
2
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between the two sets. Note that we henceforth use the term agents to refer to those
participants in matching problems who have preference lists. Hence, the agents in an
SM instance are the men and women. Alternatively, bipartite matchings can also involve
many-one mappings. For example, in the context of the Hospitals-Residents problem
(HR) [17, 22], the participants are residents (graduating medical students) and hospitals,
with each member of the latter set having some fixed number of “posts”(its capacity).
All participants are agents since each resident ranks a subset of hospitals in order of
preference and vice versa. A matching is an assignment of residents to hospitals so that no
hospital exceeds its capacity. These are examples of bipartite matching problems where
the preference lists are two-sided.
Alternatively, preference lists for bipartite matching problems can be one-sided. An
example of this type of problem is the House Allocation problem (HA) [1, 3], where an
attempt is made to allocate a set H of objects (e.g., houses, posts etc) using a one-one
mapping among a set A of agents, each of whom ranks a subset of H in order of preference.
The Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA) is a generalisation of HA in which
a many-one mapping of A to H is sought instead. In addition to bipartite matching
problems, non-bipartite matching problems are also widely studied. In the classical Stable
Roommates problem (SR) [17, 25], the participants consist of a single set of agents each
of whom ranks the others in order of preference, and a matching is a partition of the set
into disjoint pairs of roommates.
The focus of this research will be the bipartite matching model which underpins most of
the aforementioned matching schemes. We explore a diverse range of optimality concepts
that are applicable to many new and also well-studied bipartite matching problems, and
find efficient algorithms for constructing matchings that are optimal according to these
criteria. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we give a
brief overview of several important results from matching theory in bipartite graphs; some
of these will subsequently be used by the algorithms that we will describe for the bipartite
matching problems considered in this thesis. Reviews of previous results on bipartite
matching problems with one-sided preferences, bipartite matching problems with two-
sided preferences and non-bipartite problems are then contained in Sections 1.3, 1.4 and
1.5 respectively.
3
Chapter 1. A selective review of the literature
1.2 Theory of matching in bipartite graphs
1.2.1 Unweighted Graphs
Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph with n1 vertices in U , n2 vertices in W and m
edges. Also, let n = n1 + n2. A matching M of G is a subset of E such that no two edges
in M share a common vertex. We say that an edge e ∈ E is matched if e ∈M ; otherwise,
e is unmatched. Similarly, we say that a vertex v ∈ U ∪W is matched in M if it is incident
to an edge in M or unmatched otherwise. We define the cardinality of the matching M ,
denoted by |M |, to be the number of edges in M . A matching M is maximal if M is not a
proper subset of any other matching in G. A matching M is maximum if M contains the
largest possible number of edges. Note that every maximum matching must be maximal,
but the converse need not be true. A matching M is perfect if every vertex in U ∪W is
matched in M . Given an arbitrary matching M , an alternating path is a path P in which
the edges of P are alternatively in M , and not in M . An augmenting path with respect to
M is an alternating path whose end vertices are unmatched. The following theorem due
to Berge gives one of the most fundamental results underpinning matching theory.
Theorem 1.2.1 (Berge [8]). Let M be an arbitrary matching in G. Then, M has maxi-
mum cardinality if and only if there is no augmenting path with respect to M .
This theorem gives rise to the classical augmenting path algorithm for finding a max-
imum matching in any bipartite graph G [46], as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
runs in stages where a search for an augmenting path is conducted in each stage.
Starting from the unmatched vertices in U , it is straightforward to see that the search
for an augmenting path relative to M can be organised as a restricted breadth-first search
in which only edges not matched in M are followed from vertices in U and only edges
matched in M are followed from vertices in W , to ensure alternation. If any augmenting
path exists, then it is clear to see that this search will find one, which we denote by P .
The algorithm then augments the current matchingM with P by inverting the matched
edges in P , i.e. the matched edges in P become unmatched, and vice versa, so that we
increase the cardinality of M by 1. If an augmenting path does not exist, then M is
maximum by Theorem 1.2.1. It is easy to see that a search for an augmenting path using
the method described above takes O(n + m) time. Since there are at most O(n) such
searches, it follows that the classical augmenting path algorithm can thus be made to run
in O(n(n+m)) time.
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Algorithm 1 Classical augmenting path algorithm
1: M := ∅;
2: while G admits an augmenting path P with respect to M do
3: M :=M ⊕ P ;
4: return M ;
However, faster algorithms for finding a maximum matching in a given bipartite graph
exist, and the best known algorithm is due to Hopcroft and Karp [23]. Their approach
is similar to the classical augmenting path algorithm but in each stage, a maximal set
of vertex disjoint augmenting paths of shortest length is found and used to augment the
matching instead of a single augmenting path. The importance of this is that the number
of searches is reduced to at most O(
√
n), and the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm thus runs in
O(
√
nm) time. Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.2.2 (Hopcroft and Karp [23]). Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph,
with n vertices in U ∪W and m edges in E. Then, a maximum matching in G can be
found in O(
√
nm) time.
1.2.1.1 Capacitated graphs
Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph in which each vertex vi ∈ U ∪W has an associated
capacity ci ≥ 1. We refer to G as a capacitated bipartite graph and a matching M of G is a
subset of E such that for each vi ∈ U ∪W , |e ∈M : vi ∈ e| ≤ ci. Note that in this thesis,
we are concerned only with capacitated bipartite graphs in which the vertices in U have a
capacity equal to 1 (and the vertices in W can have non-unitary capacity). The problem
of finding a maximum matching in G is also referred to in the literature as the maximum
cardinality degree-constrained subgraph problem or maximum cardinality DCS in short,
and Gabow’s algorithm [15] provides the fastest way to solve this, taking O(
√
Cm) time,
where C =
∑n2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the vertices in W .
1.2.2 Weighted Graphs
Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph where each edge e ∈ E has an associated weight
wt(e) ∈ N. We define the weight of a matching M of G as wt(M) = ∑e∈M wt(e). A
common problem, given any weighted bipartite graph G, is to find a maximum weight
matching of G. This is also known as the Assignment problem [46].
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For the case where all vertices have capacity 1, the running time of the best algo-
rithm is usually stated as O(nm + n2 log n) [14]. For the capacitated bipartite graph,
the fastest time to solve the problem is due to Gabow’s algorithm for the maximum
weight degree-constrained subgraph problem, or maximum weight DCS in short, which
takes O(Cmin(m log n, n2)) time [15].
1.2.3 Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
Let G be some bipartite graph where all the vertices have capacity 1. The Edmonds-
Gallai Decomposition (see [4,35,47]) is a well-known result in matching theory that gives
an important characterisation of maximum matchings in G. That is, letM be a maximum
matching in G. Then, the vertices of G can be partitioned into three disjoint sets: E , O,
and U . Vertices in E , O, and U are called even, odd and unreachable respectively. A
vertex v is even (odd) if there exists an alternating path of even (odd) length from a
vertex that is unmatched in M to v. If no such alternating path exists, v is unreachable.
We henceforth refer to this vertex labelling as an EOU labelling. The fundamental results
of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition are summarised in the following lemma, the proof
of which can be obtained explicitly from [4].
Lemma 1.2.1. Let E, O, and U be the vertex sets defined by G and M above. Then,
(a) The sets E, O and U are pairwise disjoint. Every maximum matching in G partitions
the vertices into the same sets of even, odd and unreachable vertices.
(b) Every maximum matching M in G satisfies the following properties:
(i) every vertex in O and every vertex in U is matched;
(ii) every vertex in O is matched to a vertex in E;
(iii) every vertex in U is matched to another in U ;
(iv) |M | = |O|+ |U|/2.
(c) No maximum matching in G contains an edge between two vertices in O or a vertex
in O with a vertex in U . There is no edge in G connecting a vertex in E with a
vertex in U , or between two vertices of E.
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1.3 Bipartite matching problems, one-sided preference lists
1.3.1 House Allocation Problem
Bipartite matching problems involving two sets of participants, namely a set of agents and
a set of objects, are commonly referred to as House Allocation problems [1–3, 16, 19, 24].
These problems have been widely studied not only due to their theoretical interest, but also
in view of their practical importance. Widespread applications occur in real-life resource
allocation problems such as campus housing allocation in US universities [1], hence the
problem name; in assigning probationary teachers to their first posts in Scotland; and in
Amazon’s DVD rental service.
An instance I of the House Allocation problem (HA) comprises two disjoint sets A
and H, where A = {a1, a2, ..., an1} is the set of agents and H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} is the set
of houses. Each agent ai ∈ A ranks in strict order a subset of those houses in H giving
rise to his preference list. If ai ranks a house hj ∈ H in his preference list, we say that ai
finds hj acceptable. An agent ai prefers one house hj to another house hl if hj precedes
hl in ai’s preference list. We define the underlying graph of I to be the bipartite graph
G = (A,H,E), where E is the set of edges in G representing the acceptable houses of the
agents. We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
Given an agent ai ∈ A and an acceptable house hj ∈ H for ai, we define rankai(hj)
to be the number of agents that ai prefers to hj plus 1. If rankai(hj) = k, we say that
hj is the kth choice of ai. Let (ai, hj) ∈ E be any edge. Then, we define the rank of
(ai, hj) to be r(ai, hj) = rankai(hj). Let z ≤ n2 be the maximum length of any agent’s
preference list in I. Clearly, z corresponds to the largest rank of a house taken over all
agents’ preference lists in I. We assume that no agent has an empty preference list and
each house is acceptable to at least one agent, i.e., m ≥ max {n1, n2}.
An assignment M is a subset of A × H such that (ai, hj) ∈ M only if ai finds hj
acceptable. If (ai, hj) ∈ M , we say that ai and hj are assigned to each other, and we
call ai and hj partners in M . A matching is an assignment M such that (i) each agent is
assigned to at most one house in M , and (ii) each house hj ∈ H is assigned to at most one
agent inM . If a participant p ∈ A∪H is assigned inM , we denote byM(p) the participant
that p is assigned to in M . If p is not assigned in M , we say that p is unassigned. Given
two matchings M and M ′ in G, we say that an agent ai prefers M ′ to M if either (i) ai is
assigned in M ′ and unassigned in M , or (ii) ai is assigned in both M ′ and M and prefers
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M ′(ai) to M(ai). We use M to denote the set of all matchings in I.
Several variants of HA may be formulated as follows.
1.3.1.1 Variants of HA
First of all, we can have a straightforward extension of HA by allowing ties in the agents’
preference lists. A tie between two houses hj and hl occurs in an agent ai’s preference
list when rankai(hj) = rankai(hl), and we say that the agent ai is indifferent between hj
and hl. The problem then becomes known as the House Allocation problem with Ties, or
HAT for short.
We can have a variant ofHA in which each agent a has an assigned positive weight w(a)
that indicates his priority (which may be based on such objective criteria relevant to the
matching application). This is known as the Weighted House Allocation problem, denoted
by WHA, or WHAT if ties are present. If the houses are allowed to have non-unitary
capacity, we then have a generalisation of HA that is known as the Capacitated House
Allocation problem, denoted by CHA, or CHAT if ties are present. A third possible
variant of HA combines WHA and CHA by letting the agents have a positive weight
to indicate their priority, and allowing the houses to have non-unitary capacity. This is
known as the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation problem, denoted by WCHA, or
WCHAT if ties are present.
We remark that all the notations and terminology that were defined for HA in Section
1.3.1 carry over directly to each of its variants with the exception of some terms that we
will require to define separately. We henceforth assume these definitions in any variant of
HA in the rest of this thesis and explicitly define relevant concepts only where we need to
adapt them to the context of the variant.
In each of CHA, CHAT, WCHA and WCHAT, we require to redefine a matching
since each house hj may now have a non-unitary capacity cj ≥ 1, and a many-one mapping
of the agents and houses is sought in these contexts instead. Here, we define a matching
to be an assignment M such that (i) each agent is assigned to at most one house in M ,
and (ii) each house hj ∈ H is assigned to at most cj agents in M . Consequently, M(hj)
refers to the set of agents assigned to hj in M (which could be empty) in these contexts.
If |M(hj)| < cj , we say that hj is undersubscribed in M ; otherwise hj is full in M . We
also let C =
∑n2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the houses.
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1.3.2 Optimality criteria for bipartite matching problems
For bipartite matching problems with one-sided preferences, various criteria as to what
constitutes an “optimal” matching have been considered. In this section, we give a review
of the optimality criteria that are considered in this thesis.
1.3.2.1 Pareto optimal matchings
One solution concept that has received much attention, particularly from the Economics
community is Pareto optimality [1–3, 7, 51, 56, 57], because it is regarded by Economists
as a fundamental property to be satisfied in the context of matching problems. Let I be
an instance of HA or any or its variants. Then, we may define a relation ≺ on M based
on the preference of agents over matchings in I (as defined above): that is, given any two
matchings M and M ′, M ′ ≺ M if and only if no agent prefers M to M ′, and some agent
prefers M ′ to M . A matching M is defined to be Pareto optimal if and only if there is no
other matching M ′ such that M ′ ≺M .
Various algorithms exist for finding a Pareto optimal matching in any given instance of
HA, the most straightforward being a greedy algorithm known as the serial dictatorship
mechanism [1, 56] which considers each agent a in turn, and gives a his most preferred
vacant house (if such a house exists). However, such an algorithm may fail to find a
Pareto optimal matching of maximum cardinality (henceforth a maximum Pareto optimal
matching), which is undesirable in applications that seek to assign as many agents as
possible (see Chapter 2 for further details).
Abraham et al. [3] gives the fastest algorithm, which takes O(
√
nm) time, for finding a
maximum Pareto optimal matching given an HA instance. In this thesis, we extend their
results to the capacitated bipartite graph case in Chapter 2 by constructing an O(
√
Cm)
time algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching given any instance of
CHA. Since the definition of a Pareto optimal matching inWCHA is identical to that in
CHA, this algorithm can also be used for the analogous problem in the weighted capaci-
tated bipartite graph case.
1.3.2.2 Popular matchings
Another important solution concept is that of a popular matching. Let I be an instance
of CHAT. Also, let M and M ′ be two arbitrary matchings in I and let P (M,M ′) denote
the set of agents who prefer M to M ′. We say that M is more popular than M ′ if
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|P (M,M ′)| > |P (M ′,M)|, i.e. the number of agents who prefer M to M ′ is greater than
the number of agents who prefer M ′ to M . A matching M in I is popular if there is no
other matching M ′ in I that is more popular than M .
We remark that the definition of a popular matching can be extended toWCHAT in
the following way. First of all, given any two matchings M and M ′ in a weighted setting,
we define the satisfaction ofM with respect toM ′ to be sat(M,M ′) =
∑
a∈P (M,M ′)w(a)−∑
a∈P (M ′,M)w(a). We then say that M is more popular than M
′ if sat(M,M ′) > 0. A
matching M is defined to be popular if there is no other matching in the problem instance
that is more popular than M .
Ga¨rdenfors [20] first introduced the notion of a popular matching (referring to this con-
cept as a majority assignment) in the context of voting theory. We remark that the more
popular than concept can be traced back even further to the Condorcet voting protocol.
Popular matchings were then considered by Abraham et al. [4] in the context of HA. They
showed that popular matchings need not exist, given an instance of HA, and also noted
that popular matchings can have different cardinalities. The same authors described an
O(n +m) algorithm for finding a maximum cardinality popular matching (henceforth a
maximum popular matching) if one exists, given an instance of HA. They also described
an O(
√
nm) counterpart for HAT.
Mahdian [37] showed that a popular matching exists with high probability given an
instance of HAT when (i) preference lists are random, and (ii) the number of houses is a
small multiplicative factor larger than the number of agents. To cope with the possible non-
existence of a popular matching, McCutchen [40] defined two notions of a matching that
are, in some sense, “as popular as possible”, namely a least-unpopularity-factor matching
and a least-unpopularity-margin matching. McCutchen proved that computing either type
of matching is NP-hard. Abraham and Kavitha [5] considered voting paths in relation to
popular matchings in a dynamic matching market in which agents and houses can enter
and leave the market. Mestre [43] then described an O(n + m) algorithm for finding a
maximum popular matching if one exists, given an instance of WHA. He also described
an O(min(k
√
n, n)m) counterpart for WHAT, where k is the maximum priority of any
agent.
In Chapter 4, we consider popular matchings in CHAT. For the case where preference
lists are strict, we give an O(
√
Cn1 + m) time algorithm to find a maximum popular
matching, or to report that none exists. We then show how to extend Lemma 1.2.1, an
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important result in matching theory, to the capacitated bipartite graph case, and use this
result to construct an O(
√
Cm) time algorithm to find a maximum popular matching
or report that none exists in a given CHAT instance. We also consider the analogous
problem in WCHA in Chapter 5. There, we identify a structure in the underlying graph
of the problem that singles out those edges that cannot belong to a popular matching. We
then use this to construct a O(
√
Cn1 +m) time algorithm that finds a maximum popular
matching, or reports that none exists in a given WCHA instance.
1.3.2.3 Profile-based optimal matchings
Finally, let I be an instance of HAT or any of its variants. Recall that z is the largest
rank of a house taken over all agents’ preference lists in I. Define the profile ρ(M) of a
matching M in I to be the z-tuple (x1, x2, ..., xz) where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ z), xi is the
number of agents who are assigned in M with one of their ith choice houses. Then, it is
possible to define at least three versions of what it means for a matching to be optimal
based on its profile.
Informally, a greedy maximum matching is a matching that has lexicographically max-
imum profile taken over all maximum matchings. On the other hand, a rank-maximal
matching is a matching that has lexicographically maximum profile taken over all match-
ings. Finally, a generous maximum matching is a matching whose reverse profile is lex-
icographically minimum taken over all maximum matchings. We remark that each of a
rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a generous maximum matching must be Pareto
optimal; however, they are not necessarily popular.
The fastest combinatorial approach for finding a rank-maximal matching given an
HAT instance is described by Irving et al. [29], and this takes O(min(z∗
√
n, n + z∗)m)
time where z∗ is the maximal rank of an edge in an optimal solution. Kavitha and Shah [33]
studied rank-maximal matchings inWHAT and described an O(min(z∗
√
n, n+z∗)m) time
algorithm for solving the problem. In an unpublished manuscript [28], Irving describes
an approach based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm to find greedy maximum and generous
maximum matchings in HAT.
In Chapter 7, we consider the individual problems of finding a rank-maximal, a greedy
maximum and a generous maximum matching in the context of CHAT. For the case of
finding a rank-maximal matching, we construct an O(min(z∗
√
C,C+z∗)m) time algorithm
for solving the problem. For each of the cases of finding a greedy maximum and a generous
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maximum matching, we explore two alternative solutions for the problem, the faster of
which (in most practical applications as we shall show) takes O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time.
1.4 Bipartite matching problems, two-sided preference lists
1.4.1 One-one mapping: the classical Stable Marriage Problem
The classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) is a widely studied example of a combinatorial
problem in the category indicated by this subsection. An instance I of SM involves two dis-
joint sets U and W where U = {u1, u2, ..., un} is the set of men, and W = {w1, w2, ..., wn}
is the set of women. Each person p ∈ U ∪W ranks all members of the opposite sex in strict
order of preference giving rise to his/her preference list. We say that person p prefers q to
r if q precedes r on p’s preference list.
An assignment M is a subset of U ×W such that (ui, wj) ∈M only if ui and wj find
each other acceptable. If (ui, wj) ∈M , we say that ui and wj are assigned to each other.
A matching in I is an assignment M such that (i) each man is assigned to at most one
woman in M , and (ii) each woman is assigned to at most one man in M . If (ui, wj) ∈M ,
ui and wj are called partners in M . A blocking pair for M is a (man,woman) pair (ui, wj)
such that ui prefers wj to M(ui) and wj prefers ui to M(wj), where M(q) denotes q’s
partner in M for any person q in I. A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to
be stable.
Stable matching problems were first studied by Gale and Shapley [17] in their seminal
paper “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”. There they gave an algorithm,
now widely known as the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, that always finds a stable matching
for any instance of SM in O(n2) time [34]. Very briefly, the algorithm involves a sequence
of “proposals” from members of one sex to members of the opposite sex and it terminates
when everyone becomes engaged. If the men were the proposers, then we obtain the man-
oriented version of the GS algorithm, otherwise the algorithm is known as woman-oriented.
The algorithm is inherently non-deterministic in that the order in which the proposals take
place is of no consequence to the result [22].
Gale and Shapley [17] observed that the man-oriented version of the GS algorithm
always gives the man-optimal stable matching, in which each man has the best partner
that he can have in any stable matching. The man-optimal stable matching is also woman-
pessimal, for each woman has the worst partner that she can have in any stable matching
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[41]. If the woman-oriented version of the GS algorithm is used, then this gives analogous
results: we obtain the woman-optimal stable matching which is man-pessimal. Gusfield
and Irving [22] gave an extended version of the man-orientedGS algorithm which simplifies
the process by deleting from a woman w’s preference list every man u′ who succeeds a
man u from whom she has received a proposal. This is because no such pair (u′, w) can
be part of any stable matching.
Several variants of the Stable Marriage problem exist and have been widely studied as
follows.
1.4.1.1 Incomplete lists
A natural variant of SM occurs when each person p in an SM instance I need not rank
all members of the opposite sex. Then the preference list for each person p contains a
subset of members of the opposite sex such that person p finds q acceptable if and only
if q appears in p’s preference list. We henceforth assume in all contexts where all the
participants are agents, that if an agent a ranks another agent b in a’s preference list, then
b also ranks a in b’s preference list. Furthermore, the numbers of men and women need not
be equal. We say that these preference lists are incomplete and use SMI (Stable Marriage
with Incomplete Lists) to denote this version of SM.
In this setting, a man ui and a woman wj are assigned to each other in a matching M
only if ui and wj are acceptable to one another. Thus, matchings need not be complete,
i.e. not all members of either sex need be assigned in a given matching in this setting.
Here, a (man,woman) pair (ui, wj) constitutes a blocking pair for M whenever (i) ui and
wj find each other acceptable, (ii) ui is either unassigned in M or prefers wj to M(ui),
and (iii) wj is either unassigned in M or prefers ui to M(wj). A matching in an instance
of SMI is stable if it admits no such blocking pair. Every SMI instance admits a stable
matching [17], and Gusfield and Irving [22] showed that the extended GS algorithm can
be used to find a stable matching, given an SMI instance. Furthermore, for any matching
M in an instance of SMI, some agents may be unassigned in M , but the same agents are
unassigned in all stable matchings and as a consequence, all stable matchings in I have
the same cardinality [18].
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1.4.1.2 Ties
Another variant of SM occurs when the preference list of each person is allowed to contain
ties. We say that a person p is indifferent between q and r if q and r appear in a tie in
p’s preference list, and use SMT (Stable Marriage with Ties) to denote this variant of
SM. The introduction of ties in a person’s preference list gives rise to three definitions of
stability, namely weak stability, strong stability and super-stability [26].
A matching M is defined to be weakly stable if there does not exist any blocking pair
(ui, wj) such that ui and wj prefer each other to their partners in M . On the other hand,
a matching M is strongly stable if there does not exist any blocking pair (ui, wj) such
that either (i) ui prefers wj to M(ui), and wj either prefers ui to M(wj) or is indifferent
between them, or (ii) wj prefers ui to M(wj), and ui either prefers wj to M(ui) or is
indifferent between them. We define a matching M to be super-stable if there does not
exist any blocking pair (ui, wj) such that ui either prefers wj to M(ui) or is indifferent
between them, and wj either prefers ui to M(wj) or is indifferent between them.
A weakly stable matching can always be found for an instance of SMT by simply
breaking the ties arbitrarily and then applying the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm to
the derived instance. This guarantees to produce a matching that is weakly stable in the
original instance with ties [22]. Also, all weakly stable matchings have the same cardinality
in this context. We remark that strongly stable matchings and super-stable matchings need
not exist for a given instance of SMT; hence, we do not devote any more attention to the
results concerning these versions of stability and refer the reader to [26] for more details.
1.4.1.3 Ties and Incomplete lists
SMT and SMI can be combined to give the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and
Incomplete lists, or SMTI in short. That is, a given preference list in SMTI can be
incomplete and can contain ties. In addition, the definition of weak stability can be
extended from SMT to SMTI in a natural way. A weakly stable matching may be found
using the same algorithm described for the corresponding problem in SMT. Unlike the
case in SMT, weakly stable matchings can have different cardinalities, and Manlove et
al. [39] shows that the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching
given an instance of SMTI is NP-hard, even if the ties are at the tails of the lists and on
one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length two.
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1.4.2 One-many mapping: the Hospitals-Residents Problem
The Hospitals-Residents problem is a many-one extension of SM that was first considered
by Gale and Shapley [17] and referred to in that paper as the College Admissions problem.
This problem has since invariably been known as the Hospitals-Residents problem mainly
because of its applications in the medical matching context such as the SFAS and NRMP
as mentioned in Section 1.1.
An instance I of the Hospitals-Residents problem (HR) comprises two disjoint sets R
and H, where R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} is the set of residents and H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} is the
set of hospitals. Each resident ri ∈ R ranks a subset of the hospitals in H in strict order
of preference giving rise to his preference list. Similarly, each hospital hj ∈ H ranks a
subset of the residents in R in strict order, giving rise to its preference list. If ri and hj
rank each other in their preference lists, we say that they find each other acceptable, and
ri and hj are each an acceptable partner for one another. We say that a resident ri prefers
one hospital hj to another hk if hj precedes hk in ri’s preference list. Similarly, we define
the preferences of hospitals over residents. Each hospital hj ∈ H has a capacity cj which
indicates the maximum number of posts it may fill. We define the underlying graph of I
to be the bipartite graph G = (R,H,E), where E is the set of edges in G representing the
acceptable hospitals of the residents. Let C =
∑n2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities
of the hospitals. We also let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
An assignment M is a subset of R × H such that (ri, hj) ∈ M only if ri finds hj
acceptable and vice versa. If (ri, hj) ∈ M , we say that ri and hj are assigned to each
other. A matching in I is an assignment M such that (i) each resident is assigned to at
most one hospital in M , and (ii) each hospital hj ∈ H is assigned to at most cj residents
in M . If a resident ri ∈ R is assigned in M , we denote by M(ri) the hospital that ri is
assigned to in M . We define M(hj) to be the set of residents assigned to hj in M (thus
M(hj) could be empty). We say that a hospital hj ∈ H is full in M if |M(hj)| = cj , and
undersubscribed in M if |M(hj)| < cj .
A blocking pair for M is a (resident,hospital) pair (ri, hj) such that
• ri and hj find each other acceptable
• either ri is unassigned in M , or ri prefers hj to M(ri)
• either hj is undersubscribed in M , or hj prefers ri to its worst assigned resident in
M(hj)
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A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable, and every instance of
HR admits a stable matching [22]. Note that SMI is a special case of HR in which
cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H. Furthermore, we can extend the definition of a man-optimal and a
woman-optimal stable matching in SMI to a resident-optimal and a hospital-optimal stable
matching respectively in HR (see Section 1.6 of [22]). For any given instance I of HR,
efficient algorithms exist to find such stable matchings of I [22]. An HR instance can have
more than one stable matching. However, all stable matchings have the same cardinality,
and the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings [18, 49]. Furthermore, any
hospital that is undersubscribed in one stable matching is assigned with exactly the same
residents in all stable matchings [50]. Collectively, these results are known as the Rural
Hospitals Theorem because of their historical significance relating to the problems that
rural hospitals face when recruiting interns in the NRMP [22].
Given two matchings M and M ′, we say that a resident ri prefers M ′ to M if either
(i) ri is assigned in M ′ and unassigned in M , or (ii) ri is assigned in both M ′ and M and
prefers M ′(ri) to M(ri). Unlike the case for residents, it is less straightforward to define
the preference of a hospital hj over two matchings since hj may have non-unitary capacity.
Given that the primary goal of many practical matching applications is to maximise the
number of agents assigned, as well as to optimise the satisfaction of the agents according
to their preference lists, we give what may be viewed as a definition of a hospital hj ’s
preference over matchings in I as follows.
Definition 1.4.1. We say that the hospital hj prefers one matching M ′ to another M if
1. |M ′(hj)| > |M(hj)|, or
2. |M ′(hj)| = |M(hj)| and hj prefers the worst resident assigned to it in M ′ to the
worst resident assigned to it in M .
Note that even though there are no ties in hj ’s preference list, Definition 1.4.1 allows
a hospital hj to be indifferent between two matchings M and M ′ if |M(hj)| = |M ′(hj)|,
the worst resident assigned to hj is the same in both M and M ′ but hj has different sets
of residents assigned to it in M and M ′. If hj does not prefer M ′ to M , and also does not
prefer M to M ′, we say that hj is indifferent between M and M ′.
As is the case in SMI, we can permit ties in the preference lists in this context, and use
HRT (Hospital-Residents problem with Ties) to denote this variant of HR. The definition
of weak stability carries over from SMTI to HRT in an analogous way to the extension of
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the definition of classical stability from SMI to HR. Since SMTI is a special case of HRT,
it follows that the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching is
also NP-hard in HRT.
We remark that each of the concepts of a Pareto optimal matching, a popular matching
and a profile-based optimal matching, can be defined in SM, HR, and their respective
variants in the same way as the respective concepts were defined in the context of HA and
its variants in Section 1.3.2. Given that stable matchings sometimes do not satisfy the
key requirement in many practical matching contexts, which is to maximise the number
of agents assigned in any given matching (as we shall show), we thus also apply these
optimality criteria to SM and HR and some of their variants, and obtain new results as
follows.
In Chapter 3, we study the problem of finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching
given an instance of HR, and describe an O(
√
Cm) time algorithm for its solution. We
also show how this algorithm can be adapted to solve the analogous problem given an
instance of SMI in O(
√
nm) time. We then consider the structure of popular matchings in
SMTI-SYM, a special case of SMTI where preference lists are symmetric, in Chapter 6.
Little is known about how to find a maximum popular matching, or to determine that none
exists, in the bipartite setting where all the participants are agents (i.e. all participants
have preferences). A first step in this direction is presented by our characterisation results
of popular matchings in SMTI-SYM in Chapter 6. There, we also give an O(
√
nm) time
algorithm for testing if a matching in a given SMTI-SYM instance is popular. We also
consider the individual problems of finding a rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a
generous maximum matching in the context of HRT in Chapter 8. For each problem, we
explore two alternative algorithms for its solution, the faster of which (in most practical
applications as we shall show) takes O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time. We also show how this
algorithm can be adapted to solve the analogous problem given an instance of SMTI in
O(z(nm+ n2 log n)) time.
1.5 Non-bipartite matching problems
1.5.1 Stable Roommates Problem
In an instance of the Stable Roommates (SR) problem, first introduced by Gale and
Shapley [17], there is a set of n agents where n is even. Each agent ranks the n− 1 others
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in strict order of preference. A matching M is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint
pairs. A blocking pair for M is a pair of agents {x, y} /∈M such that x prefers y to M(x)
and y prefers x toM(y) whereM(q) denotes q’s partner inM for any agent q. A matching
is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
It is well-known that SM is just a special case of SR, since the set of stable matchings is
unchanged if we reduce an SM instance I into an SR instance by appending to the very end
of each agent’s preference list all the other agents that are of the same sex in I [22]. Not all
SR instances admit a stable matching [17], and Knuth [34] posed the question of whether
the problem of determining the solvability of SR instances might be NP-complete. This
question was answered by Irving [25], who gave an O(n2) algorithm for finding a stable
matching or reporting that no such matching exists. Alternative approaches for finding a
stable matching if one exists, given an SR instance have since been described [12,13,58–60].
As with SM, we may formulate an extension of SR where preference lists may include
ties and be incomplete (SRTI). In such a setting, the definition of a weakly stable matching
may be extended from the SMTI context in a natural way given an SRTI instance, and
weakly stable matchings, if they exist, can have different cardinalities. The problem of
finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching given an SRTI instance is NP-
hard [30,48].
We remark that, as in SM, HR and their respective variants, each of the concepts of a
Pareto optimal matching, a popular matching and a profile-based optimal matching, can
be defined similarly in SR and its variants as they were defined in Section 1.3.2. Pareto
optimal matchings in SR was recently studied by Abraham and Manlove [7]. There,
the authors gave an O(
√
nα(m,n)mlog3/2n) time algorithm for the problem of finding a
maximum Pareto optimal matching in an SR instance I, where n is the number of agents,
m is the total length of the preference lists in I and α is the inverse Ackermann function.
Chung [10] considered popular matchings in instances of SR and noted that a stable
matching is popular; however, the same need not be true in the presence of ties. Abraham
et al. [6] studied rank-maximal matchings in a special case of SR in which roommate pairs
are ranked globally, and gave an O(min(z∗
√
n, z∗+n)m) time algorithm for the solution to
the problem. Little is known about the individual problems of finding a popular matching
(if one exists) and finding profile-based optimal matchings, given the general case of SR.
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Pareto optimal matchings in CHA
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Section 1.3.2, Pareto optimality is a solution concept that has received
much attention from the Economics community in the context of matching problems since
it is regarded as a fundamental solution concept. Pareto optimality interests us from the
point of view of this research because most of the associated algorithmic questions have
not, on the other hand, been considered extensively in the literature.
In this chapter, we study the problem of finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching
in the context of CHA, a general case of bipartite matching problems with one-sided
preferences. The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. We
give some terminology and preliminary results on Pareto optimal matchings in CHA in
Section 2.2. We then give a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in CHA in
Section 2.3, which we subsequently use in Section 2.4 to construct an O(
√
Cm) time
algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching given an instance I of CHA
where C is the total capacity of the houses and m is the total length of preference lists
in I respectively. Note that we reuse most of the terminology and notation from HA as
defined in Section 1.3.1, and we explicitly define relevant concepts only where we need to
adapt them to CHA.
2.2 Basic terminology and preliminary results
Let I be an instance of CHA, and let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying bipartite graph of
I as defined in Section 1.3.1. Each house hj ∈ H has a capacity cj ≥ 1 which indicates the
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maximum number of agents that may be assigned to it. Recall from Section 1.3.1 that an
assignment M is a subset of A×H such that (ai, hj) ∈ M only if ai finds hj acceptable.
Furthermore, if (ai, hj) ∈M , we say that ai and hj are assigned to each other, and we call
ai and hj partners in M . A matching M in an instance I of CHA is an assignment such
that (i) each agent is assigned to at most one house in M , and (ii) each house hj ∈ H is
assigned to at most cj agents in M . If an agent ai ∈ A is assigned in M , we denote by
M(ai) the house that ai is assigned to in M . We define M(hj) to be the set of agents
assigned to hj in M (thus M(hj) could be empty). We say that a house hj ∈ H is full in
M if |M(hj)| = cj , and undersubscribed in M if |M(hj)| < cj . We assume that no agent
has an empty preference list and each house is acceptable to at least one agent so that
m ≥ max {n1, n2}. Let C =
∑n2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the houses.
2.3 Characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings
Let M be a matching in I. We say that M is maximal if there is no agent ai ∈ A and
house hj ∈ H such that ai is unassigned in M , hj is undersubscribed in M and ai finds
hj acceptable. Also, M is trade-in-free if there is no (agent,house) pair (ai, hj) such that
ai is assigned in M , hj is undersubscribed in M and ai prefers hj to M(ai).
A cyclic coalition with respect to M is a sequence of distinct assigned agents C =
〈a0, a1, . . . , ar−1〉, for some r ≥ 2, such that ai prefers M(ai+1) to M(ai) for each i (0 ≤
i ≤ r−1). Henceforth, all subscripts are taken modulo r when reasoning about coalitions.
Given a cyclic coalition C, the matching
M ′ = (M\{(ai,M(ai)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}) ∪ {(ai,M(ai+1)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}
is defined to be the matching obtained from M by satisfying C. We say that M is cyclic-
coalition-free if M admits no cyclic coalition. The following lemma gives a necessary and
sufficient condition for a matching to be Pareto optimal.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let M be a matching in a given instance I of CHA. Then M is Pareto
optimal if and only if M is maximal, trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-free.
Proof. Let M be a Pareto optimal matching. Suppose for a contradiction that M is not
maximal. It follows that there exist an agent ai and a house hj such that ai is unassigned in
M , hj is undersubscribed inM and ai finds hj acceptable. LetM ′ =M∪{(ai, hj)}. Then,
M ′ ≺ M , a contradiction. Now, suppose for a contradiction that M is not trade-in-free.
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It follows that there exist an agent ai and a house hj such that ai is assigned in M , hj is
undersubscribed inM , and ai prefers hj toM(ai). LetM ′ = (M\ {(ai,M(ai))}∪{(ai, hj)}.
Then, M ′ ≺M , a contradiction. Finally, suppose that M admits some cyclic coalition C.
LetM ′ be the matching obtained by satisfying C. Clearly then, M ′ ≺M , a contradiction.
Conversely, let M be a matching that is maximal, trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-
free. Let us suppose for a contradiction that M is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists
some matching M ′ such that M ′ ≺ M . Let G be the underlying graph of I. We clone G
to obtain a cloned graph C(G) as follows. We replace every house hj ∈ H with the clones
h1j , h
2
j , . . . , h
cj
j . We then divide the capacity of each house among its clones by allowing
each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if (ai, hj) ∈ G, then we add (ai, hpj ) to C(G)
for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj). Let us then adapt the matching M in G to obtain its clone C(M)
in C(G) as follows. If a house hj in G is assigned to xj agents a1, ...axj in M , then we add
(ap, h
p
j ) to C(M) for 1 ≤ p ≤ xj , so that |C(M)| = |M |. We repeat a similar process for
M ′ to obtain its clone C(M ′) in C(G).
Let us consider X = C(M) ⊕ C(M ′) and let C be a connected component of X. It
follows that C is a path or cycle whose edges alternate between C(M) and C(M ′). Now,
C cannot be an even-length alternating path that has more agents than houses or an an
odd-length alternating path whose end edges are in C(M), for otherwise we have an agent
who is assigned in M but unassigned in M ′, a contradiction since M ′ ≺ M . In addition,
C cannot be an even-length alternating path that has more houses than agents or an
odd-length alternating path whose end edges are in C(M ′) because there then exists an
agent ai in C who becomes assigned in M ′ to a house hj which is undersubscribed in M .
Now, since there are no ties in preference lists, ai must prefer hj to M(ai) for otherwise
M ′ 6≺ M . However, M is then not trade-in-free, a contradiction. Hence, C must be a
cycle. Here, each agent ai in C is assigned in both M and M ′ and since M ′ ≺M , each ai
prefersM ′ toM . However, C is then a cyclic coalition with respect toM , a contradiction.
It follows that M ′ 6≺M and M is Pareto optimal.
Henceforth we will establish the Pareto optimality of a given matchingM in an instance
I of CHA by showing that M is maximal, trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-free. We now
show that Lemma 2.3.1 leads to an O(m) algorithm for testing M for Pareto optimality.
Let G be the underlying graph of I. Then, we can check ifM is maximal and trade-in-free
in O(m) time by a traversal of the edges in G. To check if M is cyclic-coalition-free, we
construct the envy graph [3] of M as follows. We form a directed graph GM of M by
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA
1: M := ∅;
2: for each agent ai in turn do
3: if there exists some undersubscribed house in ai’s preference list then
4: let hj be the most-preferred such house;
5: M :=M ∪ {(ai, hj)};
letting GM consist of one vertex for each agent assigned in M . We then construct an
edge from an agent ai to another agent aj in GM if ai prefers M(aj) to M(ai). It follows
that M is cyclic-coalition-free if and only if GM is acyclic. Note that even though M is a
matching of a CHA instance, all vertices in GM have only unitary capacity (being agent
vertices). It follows that a depth-first search suffices to detect any cycles in O(m) time so
that these observations lead us to the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.2. Let M be a matching in a given instance of CHA. Then we may check
whether M is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
Now, given an instance I of CHA, a greedy approach using the serial dictatorship
mechanism of [1] gives us a straightforward algorithm, Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA as shown
in Algorithm 2, for finding a Pareto optimal matching M in I. Here, we consider each
agent ai in turn and give ai his most preferred house that is currently undersubscribed in
the matching built so far. The following lemma shows that the matching constructed by
the algorithm must be Pareto optimal.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let M be the matching returned by an execution of Algorithm Greedy-
PaCHA. Then, M is Pareto optimal.
Proof. For, suppose not. For each ai ∈ A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses
for ai. Consider an agent ai who is unassigned in M . It follows that Ai contains no
undersubscribed house hj , otherwise (ai, hj) would have been added toM , a contradiction.
Hence, M is maximal. If M is not trade-in-free, then there exists an agent ai who prefers
some undersubscribed house hj to M(ai). This is a contradiction, since hj must be full
at the point when we assign ai to M(ai). If M is not cyclic-coalition-free, let us then
consider the coalition C = 〈a0, a1, ..., ar−1〉 which exists with respect to M . It follows that
there exists some agent ai (0 ≤ i ≤ r− 1) in C who was considered first by the algorithm.
By definition of C, ai prefers M(ai+1) to M(ai). Now, ai+1 must be considered by the
algorithm after ai. However, it follows thatM(ai+1) must then have had at least one place
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Agent Pref list House Capacity
a1: h1 h2 h1 : 1
a2: h1 h2 : 1
Figure 2.1: An instance I1 of CHA
free when ai was assigned to M(ai), a contradiction to the fact that the algorithm gives
each agent his most preferred undersubscribed house. Hence, M is Pareto optimal.
The main drawback of Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA is that a given CHA instance may
admit Pareto optimal matchings of different cardinalities but Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA
may fail to find a Pareto optimal matching of maximum cardinality. For example, Figure
2.1 shows a given CHA instance in which Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA returns a Pareto
optimal matching M1 = {(a1, h1)} of cardinality 1, given the agent ordering 〈a1, a2〉, and
constructs the maximum Pareto optimal matching M2 = {(a1, h2), (a2, h1)} of cardinality
2 given the agent ordering 〈a2, a1〉. It follows that the order in which the agents are
considered can have a consequence on the cardinality of the outcome. This is significant
from a practical point of view, given that a prime objective in many matching applications
is to assign as many agents as possible.
We remark that a straightforward way to find a maximum Pareto optimal match-
ing given a CHA instance I is by constructing a maximum cardinality minimum weight
matching as follows. For each edge (ai, hj) in the underlying graph G of I, we assign a
weight wt(ai, hj) to the edge by letting wt(ai, hj) = rankai(hj) where rankai(hj) denotes
the rank of hj in ai’s preference list. Call this weighted graph G′. We then construct a
maximum cardinality minimum weight matching in G′. The following lemma shows that
such a matching must be a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let M be a maximum cardinality minimum weight matching in G′. Then,
M is a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I.
Proof. Suppose not. Since M is a maximum matching, it follows that M is maximal.
Now, if M is not trade-in-free, then there exists a (agent,house) pair (ai, hj) such that
ai is assigned in M , hj is undersubscribed in M and ai prefers hj to M(ai). Consider
the matching M ′ = (M\(ai,M(ai))) ∪ (ai, hj). It is clear that |M ′| = |M | and so M ′ is
another maximum cardinality matching of G′. However, since ai prefers hj to M(ai), the
weight of M ′ must be smaller than the weight of M , a contradiction.
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Hence, suppose that M admits some cyclic coalition C = 〈a0, a1, ..., ar−1〉. Let M ′ be
the matching obtained by satisfying C. Then, it is clear that |M ′| = |M | again. Moreover,
since each ai prefers M(ai) to M ′(ai) for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, the weight of M ′ is again smaller
than the weight of M , a contradiction.
Note that the above lemma also indicates that a maximum Pareto optimal matching
in I has the same cardinality as a maximum matching in G and any maximum cardinality
minimum weight matching of G′ gives us a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I.
A well known transformation in matching theory (described in [42]) allows us to trans-
form the problem of finding a maximum cardinality minimum weight matching into the
Assignment problem. Recall from Section 1.2 that we can solve the Assignment problem
in the capacitated bipartite graph in O(Cmin(m log n, n2)) time [15], so this allows us to
find a maximum Pareto optimal matching in the same time complexity. However, since the
problem of finding a maximum matching in the capacitated bipartite graph takes O(
√
Cm)
time (as mentioned in Section 1.2), it is of interest to consider whether faster algorithms
for finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching in CHA exist.
2.4 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we describe a three-phase algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in CHA by satisfying the necessary and sufficient conditions in Lemma 2.3.1.
Let I be an instance of CHA and G be its underlying graph. The problem of finding a
maximum matching in G can be viewed as an instance of maximum cardinality DCS [15]
as described in Section 1.2 (the two problems are essentially the same, except that agents
have no explicit preferences in the DCS case; the definition of a matching is unchanged).
Hence, Phase 1 of the algorithm uses Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a maximum
matching M in G. This phase guarantees that M is maximal and takes O(
√
Cm) time.
The next two phases ensure that M is trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-free respectively
as detailed below.
2.4.1 Phase 2 of the algorithm
In this phase, we transform M into a trade-in-free matching by conducting a repeated
search for (agent,house) pairs (ai, hj) such that hj is undersubscribed in M and ai prefers
hj to M(ai). Whenever such a pair is found, the algorithm breaks the existing assignment
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Algorithm 3 Phase 2 loop
1: while S 6= ∅ do
2: hj := S.pop();
3: (ai, r) := Lj .removeHead();
4: if r < currai then
5: h′j :=M(ai);
6: M := (M\{(ai, h′j)}) ∪ {(ai, hj)};
7: currai := r;
8: if |M(hj)| < cj and Lj 6= ∅ then
9: S.push(hj);
10: hj := h′j ;
11: if Lj 6= ∅ and hj /∈ S then
12: S.push(hj);
between ai and M(ai), and promotes ai to hj . It follows that a space in M(ai) becomes
freed in the process, which may consequently be assigned to some assigned agent ak who
prefers M(ai) to M(ak). Note that if hj remains undersubscribed after such a step, it
may also be assigned to some assigned agent al who prefers hj to M(al). We show how
to obtain a trade-in-free matching from M by using a slight modification of the Phase 2
loop of the algorithm described by Abraham et al. [3] to find a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in HA.
For each house hj , we maintain a linked list Lj of pairs (ai, r) where ai is an assigned
agent who prefers to be assigned to hj than M(ai) at the start of Phase 2, and r is the
rank of hj in ai’s preference list. Note that the pairs in Lj may subsequently contain an
agent ai who prefersM(ai) to hj ifM(ai) is no longer the house that ai was assigned to at
the start of Phase 2 as a result of promotions executed over the course of the algorithm.
We will maintain a stack S of all undersubscribed houses hj where Lj is non-empty. Also,
for each house hj , we assume that we store a counter for |M(hj)|. For each assigned agent
ai, let currai be a variable which stores the rank of M(ai) in ai’s preference list.
Let us now consider the pseudocode of the Phase 2 loop as shown in Algorithm 3.
During each iteration of the main while loop, we pop an undersubscribed house hj from S
and remove the first pair (ai, r) from Lj (which must be non-empty). Now, if r < currai ,
it follows that ai prefers hj to M(ai) so we promote ai from h′j = M(ai) to hj and we
update M and currai in the process. Now, if hj remains undersubscribed at the end of
this step, then we push hj back onto S if Lj is non-empty. We also push h′j onto S if Lh′j
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is non-empty and if h′j is not already in S. Otherwise, if r ≥ currai , we push hj back onto
S if Lj is non-empty.
Now, the algorithm must terminate, for each iteration of the main while loop removes a
pair from a list Lj but no new pair is ever added to any list during a loop iteration. Hence,
the algorithm terminates when S is empty. It must be the case that when this happens no
assigned agent ai prefers an undersubscribed house to M(ai), so that M is trade-in-free
as a result. Moreover, since each agent assigned at the end of Phase 1 is also assigned
at the end of Phase 2, M remains a maximum matching. Let us then consider the time
complexity of Phase 2. We can initialise all variables used in the Phase 2 loop in O(m) time
using a single traversal of the agents’ preference lists. The number of iterations of the main
while loop is bounded above by the total length of preference lists. It is straightforward to
verify that each operation within the while loop takes constant time (with a suitable choice
of data structures such as those described later in Section 2.4.3). Hence, the algorithm
runs in O(m) time, giving us the following result.
Lemma 2.4.1. Given a maximum matching M in an instance of CHA, the Phase 2 loop
ensures that M is trade-in-free in O(m) time.
2.4.2 Phase 3 of the algorithm
In this phase, we transformM into a matchingM ′ that admits no cyclic coalition by using
a modification of the linear-time extension [3] of Gale’s Top Trading Cycles Method [57].
This phase consists of a pre-processing step which we will describe in detail, and then the
main Phase 3 loop shown in Algorithm 5. Throughout Phase 3, we maintain a stack of
agents P which will help us to identify cyclic coalitions. The matching M ′ and the stack
P are empty at the start of Phase 3. For each agent ai, we maintain a pointer p(ai) to the
first house on ai’s preference list, and subsequently p(ai) traverses left to right over the
course of execution of Phase 3. We will also maintain a queue of agents Q, each of whom
is an agent ai waiting to be assigned to p(ai) in M ′. In addition, for each house hj , we
will use M0(hj) to store those agents who are assigned to hj in M but who are unassigned
in M ′ so far in the execution of Phase 3. Initially, M0(hj) will contain all those agents
assigned to hj in M . As we assign agents in M0(hj) to houses in M ′, we will remove these
agents fromM0(hj). Finally, we also maintain a linked list Lj for each house hj containing
agents such that if ai is an agent in Lj , then ai prefers hj to M(ai).
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Algorithm 4 Process (Q)
1: while Q 6= ∅ do
2: ai := Q.removeHead();
3: hj := p(ai);
4: hk :=M(ai); {// possibly hj = hk}
5: M ′ :=M ′ ∪ {(ai, hj)};
6: label ai;
7: if ai ∈ P then
8: remove ai from P ;
9: M0(hk) :=M0(hk)\ {ai};
10: if |M ′(hj)| = cj then
11: for each unlabelled a′i ∈ Lj do
12: delete hj from the preference list of a′i;
13: if p(a′i) =M(a
′
i) then
14: Q.add(a′i);
2.4.2.1 Pre-processing step
Let us now introduce the pre-processing step which helps to reduce the number of
iterations of the Top Trading Cycles Method in the main Phase 3 loop. This step makes
use of the observation (as in [3]) that no agent ai assigned to his first choice house hj inM
can be involved in a cyclic coalition. At the outset of Phase 3, we check if p(ai) = M(ai)
for each agent ai and add every such ai to Q.
If Q is non-empty, then we run the sub-routine Process(Q), shown in Algorithm 4, as
the pre-processing step. Note that this usage of Process(Q) is prior to the main Phase
3 loop starting, but it will be used again in general during the main Phase 3 loop. This
sub-routine considers each agent ai in Q in turn, by removing ai from Q and then adding
the edge (ai, hj) to M ′. Every such ai is then labelled to differentiate ai from those agents
unassigned inM ′ so far in the execution of the algorithm (all agents are initially unlabelled
at the outset of Phase 3). Now, P must be empty during pre-processing. However, this
may not be true during a subsequent execution of Process(Q) by the main Phase 3 loop.
Hence, Process(Q) checks if ai lies in P , and if so, removes ai from P so as to remove the
agent from further consideration by the main Phase 3 loop, since ai has just been assigned
in M ′. Let p(ai) = hj . Now, if |M ′(hj)| = cj after the assignment of ai to hj , then we
remove hj from the preference lists of the remaining agents since such a house that is full
inM ′ could not subsequently be involved in a cyclic coalition. We refer to those preference
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lists in which houses have been removed as reduced preference lists. We then apply the
observation made at the start of this subsection recursively to the reduced preference lists
of the remaining agents until either (i) no agents remain unassigned in M ′, or (ii) at least
one agent is not assigned to his reduced first choice in M ′ by Process(Q). In case (i), each
agent is assigned to his reduced first choice (i.e. the first choice on his reduced preference
list) in M ′ and so cannot be involved in any cyclic coalition as Lemma 2.4.4 on page 31
will establish. The following lemma shows that when case (ii) happens at the end of the
pre-processing step, a cyclic coalition must exist with respect to M .
Lemma 2.4.2. Suppose that pre-processing terminates, and there exists an agent1 who is
unassigned in M ′. Then a cyclic coalition must exist with respect to M .
Proof. Let a0 be an agent who is not assigned in M ′ to his reduced first choice p(a0)
at the end of pre-processing. Hence, a0 is an unlabelled agent and p(a0) 6= M(a0). It
follows that p(a0) must be full in M for otherwise M is not trade-in-free, a contradiction.
However, p(a0) cannot be full in M ′ for otherwise p(a0) would have been removed from
a0’s preference list by pre-processing and cannot be the reduced first-choice house of a0.
Hence, there exists some agent a1 ∈M(p(a0))\M ′(p(a0)) because if an agent a is assigned
in M ′ by Process(Q) in pre-processing, it must be the case that a must be assigned in
M ′ to M(a). It follows immediately that a1 must be unassigned in M ′. Furthermore,
p(a1) 6= M(a1) (or else a1 /∈ M(p(a0))\M ′(p(a0))) so that p(a0) 6= p(a1). By reusing the
same argument, it follows that we can trace a sequence of agents S = 〈a0, a1, ...〉 such that
ai is assigned inM but unassigned inM ′ and p(ai) =M(ai+1) for i ≥ 0. Since the number
of agents is finite, there must be some r such that ar = ax for some 0 ≤ x < r − 1, where
without loss of generality ax, ax+1, ..., ar−1 are distinct agents. However, the substring
of agents C = 〈ax, ax+1, ..., ar−1〉 within S must then constitute a cyclic coalition with
respect to M .
Now, it is clear that an (unlabelled) agent ai can only be added to Q when the last
house that ai prefers to M(ai) gets removed from his preference list so that p(ai) becomes
equal toM(ai), and this happens only once in pre-processing. Since no agent is added to Q
twice, the while loop of process(Q) is bound to terminate. As a result, the pre-processing
step must also terminate.
1in fact, if there exists one such agent, then this lemma proves that there will be at least two such
agents
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Algorithm 5 Main Phase 3 loop
1: for each unlabelled agent ai do
2: P := {ai}; {// P is a stack of agents}
3: c(ai) := 1; {// counter record the number of times an agent is in P}
4: while P 6= ∅ do
5: a′i := P.pop();
6: if c(a′i) = 2 then
7: a′′i := a
′
i;
8: repeat
9: Q.add(a′′i );
10: a′′i := P.pop();
11: until a′′i = a
′
i
12: call Process(Q);
13: else
14: P.push(a′i);
15: choose any a′′i ∈M0(p(a′i));
16: c(a′′i ) := c(a
′′
i ) + 1;
17: P.push(a′′i );
2.4.2.2 Phase 3 loop
We then make use of the algorithm in the main Phase 3 loop, as shown in Algorithm 5 to
construct the envy graph in order to detect and satisfy cyclic coalitions. For each agent ai
who is not assigned to his reduced first-choice in M , we repeatedly build a path of agents
(represented by P ) starting from ai in the main while loop and check if P cycles. To do
so, we initialise a counter c(ai) to 0 for each agent ai.
Now, if c(a′i) 6= 2 for some agent a′i in P during an iteration of the while loop, then we
extend P by following the reduced first-choice edge of a′i in line 15. Let p(a
′
i) = hj and let
a′′i be any member of M0(hj). Note that M0(hj) must be non-empty. For, suppose not.
Since a′i prefers hj to M(a
′
i), hj must be full in M (or else M is not trade-in-free). Each
agent ak assigned to hj in M either becomes assigned to hj again in M ′ if p(ak) =M(ak),
or to some other house via the satisfaction of some cyclic coalition. In the latter case, this
causes some agent al to be assigned to hj in M ′ in ak’s place. Since hj is not full in M ′ by
definition of p(a′i) = hj , it follows that there exists some agent belonging to M(hj) who is
currently unassigned in M ′. Hence, M0(hj) must be non-empty.
Otherwise if c(a′i) = 2, it follows that we have a cyclic coalition in P starting from a
′
i.
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We satisfy C by popping each agent a′′i in C from P until we remove C, and add each a
′′
i
to Q. We then call Process(Q) to assign each a′′i to p(a
′′
i ) in M
′, to label each a′′i in order
to remove the agent from further consideration by the algorithm, as well as to remove
M ′(a′′i ) from the preference lists of the remaining unlabelled agents if the house becomes
full in M ′.
2.4.2.3 Correctness of Phase 3 loop
If there are unlabelled agents at the start of the main Phase 3 loop, there must exist at
least one cyclic coalition with respect to M involving a subset of these agents by Lemma
2.4.2. The following lemma strengthens this result by showing that if there exist any
unlabelled agents at any point of time in the execution of Phase 3, then a cyclic coalition
must exist.
Lemma 2.4.3. Consider a given iteration of the for loop in Phase 3. If there exists an
agent who remains unlabelled, then a cyclic coalition must exist with respect to M .
Proof. Let a0 be an agent who is unlabelled during a given iteration of the for loop of Phase
3. Then, a0 is not assigned in M ′ to his reduced first choice p(a0). It follows that p(a0) 6=
M(a0). Now, p(a0) must be full inM for otherwiseM is not trade-in-free, a contradiction.
However, p(a0) cannot be full in M ′ for otherwise p(a0) would have been removed from
a0’s preference list by Process(Q) and cannot be the reduced first-choice house of a0. Now,
each agent a′ ∈ A becomes assigned in M ′ to either M(a′) when M(a′) = p(a′), or to p(a′)
when we satisfy a cyclic coalition involving a′. Since p(a0) is currently undersubscribed in
M ′, it follows that there exists a non-empty subset of agents As such that each agent a
in As belongs to M(p(a0))\M ′(p(a0)) and a is currently unassigned in M ′. Let a1 ∈ As.
It must be the case that p(a1) 6= M(a1) and hence, p(a1) 6= p(a0). By reusing the same
argument, it follows that we can trace a sequence of agents S = 〈a0, a1, ...〉 such that ai is
assigned in M but unassigned in M ′ and p(ai) = M(ai+1) for i ≥ 0. Since the number of
agents is finite, there must be some r such that ax = ar for some 0 ≤ x < r − 1, where
without loss of generality ax, ax+1, ..., ar−1 are distinct agents. However, the substring
of agents C = 〈ax, ax+1, ..., ar−1〉 within S must then constitute a cyclic coalition with
respect to M .
The next lemma shows that when all agents are assigned in M ′, we then obtain a
cyclic-coalition-free matching.
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Lemma 2.4.4. If no unlabelled agents remain at any stage of Phase 3, then M ′ is cyclic-
coalition-free.
Proof. If there does not exist any unlabelled agents, then every agent is assigned in M ′.
Let a0 be an arbitrary agent. Suppose that there is a cyclic coalition C = 〈a0, a1, ..., ar−1〉
with respect to M ′ involving a0. Let M ′(a0) = hj and let M ′(a1) = hk. By definition of
C, a0 must prefer hk to hj . Since a0 was assigned to hj instead of hk in M ′, it follows
that hk must have been full in M ′ at the time that a0 was assigned to hj in M ′. It must
then be the case that a1 was considered by Phase 3 before a0 or else M ′(a1) 6= hk. Now,
by applying the same argument to the remaining agents in C, we can establish that ar−1
must have been considered by Phase 3 before a0. Let M ′(ar−1) = hl. It follows that ar−1
must prefer hj to hl. Now, it must be the case that at the time that ar−1 was assigned in
M ′, hj must have been undersubscribed for otherwise a0 could not have been assigned to
hj later on. However, this gives a contradiction for ar−1 prefers hj to hl and should then
be assigned to hj by Phase 3 instead.
Suppose that the envy graph involves the sequence of agents S = 〈a0, a1, ..., ar−1〉 and
suppose that only a substring of these agents C = 〈ai, ai+1, ..., ar−1〉 constitute a cyclic
coalition where 0 ≤ i < r − 1. Let us call the agents in the substring 〈a0, a1, ..., ai−1〉 the
tail of C. Now, if certain houses become full in M ′ as a result of satisfying C, thereby
causing M(ai−1) to become the reduced first choice house for the agent ai−1, then ai−1
gets added to Q and assigned to M(ai−1) in M ′ subsequently by Process(Q). Note that
this can cause an unwinding effect in the tail in which each agent ak (0 ≤ k ≤ i − 2),
such that M(ak) lies immediately after p(ak) in ak’s reduced preference list, gets added
to Q and assigned to M(ak) in M ′ by Process(Q) in descending agent subscript order
until either we reach an agent ak−1 such that there exists a house between p(ak−1) and
M(ak−1) in ak−1’s reduced preference list or the tail becomes empty as a result. In the
former case, the main Phase 3 loop then extends P by following the reduced first-choice
edge of ak−1. In the latter case, the main Phase 3 loop tries to extend P by following the
reduced first-choice edge of the next unlabelled agent, if one exists.
It is straightforward to see that the labelling of agents and the maintenance of c(ai)
for each agent ai ensures that no agent ai is added more than twice to P in Phase 3.
Clearly, if P is non-empty, P must cycle at some point of time in the execution of Phase
3 (as observed by Lemma 2.4.3). Since each agent ai that we add to P belongs to a cyclic
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coalition or to the tail of a cyclic coalition, we are bound to remove ai from P as a result.
It also follows by the labelling of agents that any agent added to Q by the for loop in the
main Phase 3 loop is not added to Q again by Process(Q) and vice versa. Hence, no agent
gets added to Q twice.
Hence, Phase 3 must terminate when no unlabelled agents remain. When this happens,
it follows by Lemma 2.4.4 thatM ′ must be a cyclic-coalition-free matching. We next show
that each agent ai assigned in M at the end of Phase 2 must also be assigned in M ′ at
the end of Phase 3.
Lemma 2.4.5. Each agent ai assigned in M at the end of Phase 2 is also assigned in M ′
at the end of Phase 3.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, let ai be an agent who is unassigned in M ′. Let M(ai) = hj .
Then, ai ∈ M(hj)\M ′(hj). It follows that hj cannot have been the first house on ai’s
preference list, or else pre-processing would have assigned M ′(ai) to be hj . Hence, there
exists at least one house that ai prefers to hj . Now, if ai is not assigned in M ′ to any of
these houses, then the pointer p(ai) should move across ai’s preference list until it points at
hj . When this happens, ai should then be assigned to hj in M ′. However, ai is unassigned
in M ′ so that hj must have been removed from ai’s preference list prior to this as a result
of it becoming full in M ′. Now, if hj is full in M ′, then for every ak ∈ M ′(hj), either
ak ∈M(hj) or there exists a unique al ∈M(hj)\M ′(hj) such that ak and al belong to the
same cyclic coalition. However, this implies that cj + 1 agents were assigned to hj in M ,
a contradiction.
Since M is a matching that is also maximum, it follows by Lemma 2.4.5 that M ′ is
also a maximum matching.
2.4.3 Implementation and analysis
The time complexity of Phase 3 depends on how efficiently we can implement Process(Q)
and the main Phase 3 loop. Let us consider briefly the data structures required.
First of all, let us assume that we represent the stack P as a doubly linked list emdedded
within an array. We let P contain n1 elements and we indicate the presence or absence
of an agent in P by a 1 or 0 respectively. We maintain a pointer to the top of the stack
in addition to previous and next pointers between agents in P at any point of time. We
implement Q as a straightforward linked list. We also represent the preference list prefai
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of each agent ai as a doubly linked list embedded within an array. Each element in position
j of prefai stores the house lying in the corresponding position in ai’s preference list. Also,
for each house h in prefai , we maintain a pointer each to the house preceding and following
h on ai’s preference list respectively. We let p(ai) point to the first house in prefai , i.e. ai’s
(reduced) first choice house. Note that as with any doubly linked list, p(ai) gets updated
as part of the deletion operation whenever the (reduced) first choice house in prefai is to
be deleted from prefai . We then build a rank array rankai for each agent ai which stores
the position of each house hj on ai’s preference list, i.e. rankai [j] gives the position of hj
on prefai .
For each house hj , we represent M0(hj) also as a doubly linked list embedded within
an array. There are n1 entries in each M0(hj) indexed according to agent subscript, but
we maintain previous and next pointers for at most cj of these entries, i.e. previous and
next pointers exist between consecutive agents in M0(hj) only if these agents belong to
M(hj) but are currently unassigned in M ′. It is straightforward to see that Lj for each hj
can be implemented as a linked list. We also maintain a counter |M ′(hj)| for each house
hj to keep track of the number of agents assigned to it in M ′ so far in the execution of
Phase 3.
Note that for each doubly linked list that we use, we let the previous pointer of the
first element and the next pointer of the last element to each point to null. Now, if we
use virtual initialisation (described in [9, p.149]) for the initialisation of P , it is clear that
it takes only a single traversal of the agents’ preference lists in agent subscript order to
initialise the rest of the data structures.
To illustrate the use of these data structures, suppose firstly that we pop an agent
ai from Q. It is straightforward to see if ai belongs to P by checking if P [i] is 1 or 0.
To remove ai from P , we set P [i] = 0 and update the previous and next pointers of
P [i]’s predecessor and successor, as well as the pointer to the top of P if necessary. Let
hk = M(ai). To remove ai from M0(hk), we update the next and previous pointers of
M0(hk)[i]’s predecessor and successor respectively. Let p(ai) = hj . If hj becomes full in
M ′ as a result of assigning ai to hj , i.e. |M ′(hj)| = cj , we want to remove hj from the
preference lists of those unlabelled agents in Lj . It is clear that it takes only time linear
in the size of Lj to find these agents. Let al be such an agent. Then, rankal [j] enables
us to look up the position of hj on al’s preference list in constant time. We then delete
hj from prefal by updating the pointers of hj ’s predecessor and successor in prefal . In
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this way, p(al) always points to the head of al’s preference list (which must be currently
undersubscribed in M ′).
Let us then consider the time complexity of Phase 3 by looking at the entire execution
of the main Phase 3 loop and Process(Q) taken over the algorithm’s execution. It has
already been observed that each agent can be added to P no more than twice and added
to Q at most once. Now, lines 8-11 of the main Phase 3 loop are executed at most once
for each agent in P . All other operations in the main Phase 3 loop are just O(1) stack
operations or simple manipulation of data structures. In Process(Q), all operations apart
from those in lines 11-14 can be implemented to run in O(1) time for each agent that is
added to or removed from Q. Finally, it is clear that lines 11-14 are executed at most once
for each house, and hence, the total number of iterations of the for loop is O(m), taken
over all calls to Process(Q). It follows that Phase 3 takes O(m) time overall, giving us the
following result.
Lemma 2.4.6. Given a maximal trade-in-free matching M in an instance of CHA, Phase
3 constructs a cyclic-coalition-free matching M ′ from M in O(m) time.
Since Phase 1 dominates the overall complexity of the algorithm to find a maximum
Pareto optimal matching in an instance of CHA, we have the following result.
Theorem 2.4.1. Given an instance I of CHA, we can find a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in I in O(
√
Cm) time.
Recall that an alternative approach to finding a Pareto optimal matching given an
CHA instance I involves obtaining a weighted graph G′ of I and then finding a maximum
cardinality minimum weight matching of I. This takes Ω(Cmin(m log n, n2)) time. If
m log n ≤ n2, then it follows that our algorithm is faster by a factor of Ω(√C log n).
Otherwise, m log n > n2 and our algorithm is faster by a factor of Ω(
√
Cn2/m).
2.5 Open problem
We conclude with the following open problem.
The problem model of CHA defined in Section 2.2 can be generalized by permitting
agents to contain ties in their preference lists, i.e. CHAT. In this context, the definition
of the relation ≺ is the same as that given in Section 1.3.2.1, and hence the definition
of Pareto optimality remains unchanged. A maximum Pareto optimal matching can be
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found in O(Cmin(m log n, n2)) time [15] by transformation to the Assignment problem as
described in Section 2.3. However, is the problem of finding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching also solvable in O(
√
Cm) time in the presence of ties?
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Pareto optimal matchings in HR
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our study of Pareto optimal matchings from Chapter 2 to
the bipartite model with two-sided preferences. We focus our attention on the Hospitals-
Residents problem without ties (HR), which was introduced in Section 1.4.2.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. We give some
terminology and preliminary results on Pareto optimal matchings in HR in Section 3.2.
We then give a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in HR in Section 3.3, which
we subsequently use in Section 3.4 to construct an O(
√
Cm) time algorithm for finding
a maximum Pareto optimal matching given an instance I of HR, where C is the total
capacity of the hospitals and m is the total length of preference lists in I. Finally, in
Section 3.5, we show how to adapt our algorithm for HR to obtain a faster O(
√
nm) time
algorithm to solve the analogous problem given an instance of SMI, a special case of HR,
where n is the total number of men and women.
3.2 Basic terminology and preliminary results
Let I be an instance of HR. We reuse the notations and terminology for HR as defined in
Section 1.4.2, and also provide some additional definitions as follows.
Given a resident ri ∈ R and an acceptable hospital hj for ri, we define rankri(hj) to
be the number of hospitals that ri prefers to hj plus 1. If rankri(hj) = k, we say that hj
is the kth choice of ri. In a similar way, we define rankhj (ri) and the kth choice of hj .
We assume that no resident has an empty preference list and each hospital is acceptable
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to at least one resident so that m ≥ max {n1, n2}. Also, let M be a matching in I. We
define a vertex v in G to be exposed with respect to M if either (i) v is a resident vertex
that is unassigned in M , or (ii) v is a hospital vertex that is undersubscribed in M . An
augmenting path in G is an alternating path, both of whose end vertices are exposed.
Let M ′ be another matching in I. Recall from Section 1.4.2 that a resident ri prefers
M to M ′ if either (i) ri is assigned in M and unassigned in M ′, or (ii) ri is assigned in
both M and M ′ and prefers M(ri) to M ′(ri). Furthermore, a hospital hj prefers M to
M ′ if
• |M(hj)| > |M ′(hj)|, or
• |M(hj)| = |M ′(hj)| and hj prefers the worst resident assigned to it inM to the worst
resident assigned to it in M ′.
Unlike the case for residents where it is necessary for ties to be present in the preference
lists in order for a resident to be indifferent between any two matchings M and M ′,
a hospital hj may be indifferent between M and M ′ if |M(hj)| = |M ′(hj)|, the worst
resident assigned to hj is the same in both M and M ′ but hj has different sets of residents
assigned to it in M and M ′.
Given these definitions, we may define a relation ≺ on the set of all matchings in I as
in Section 1.3.2.1: that is, M ≺ M ′ if and only if no agent prefers M ′ to M , and some
agent prefers M to M ′. A matching M is defined to be Pareto optimal if and only if it is
≺-minimal. In other words, a matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching
M ′ such that M ′ ≺M .
3.3 Characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in HR
Let M be a matching in I. The following defines a necessary and sufficient condition for
M to be Pareto optimal in I.
Definition 3.3.1. An improving coalition with respect to M is a sequence of agents C =
〈r0, h0, r1, h1, ..., rk−1, hk−1〉, for some k ≥ 1, such that the residents are distinct and:
1. (ri, hi−1) ∈M (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1),
2. Either
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(a) r0 is unassigned in M and finds h0 acceptable, and hk−1 is undersubscribed in
M and finds rk−1 acceptable, or
(b) k ≥ 2, and (r0, hk−1) ∈M .
3. ri prefers hi to hi−1 for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k−1), and r0 prefers h0 to hk−1 if Condition
2(b) holds,
4. hi prefers M ′ to M or is indifferent between the matchings for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ k−1)
where M ′ =M ⊕ C.
If M admits no improving coalition, we say that M is improving coalition-free.
If C satisfies Condition 2(a), we also refer to C as an augmenting coalition, otherwise we
also refer to C as a cyclic coalition. We define the size of C to be 2k, and henceforth, all
subscripts are taken modulo k when reasoning about improving coalitions. The matching
M ′ obtained by M ′ =M ⊕C is defined to be the matching obtained from M by satisfying
C. Note that the hospitals may be repeated in C in view of their non-unitary capacities.
A matching M is maximal in G if M ∪{e} is not a matching for any e ∈ E\M where E is
the edge set in I. By Definition 3.3.1, M is maximal if and only if M admits no improving
coalition of size 2. The following lemma gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a
matching in HR to be Pareto optimal.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let M be a matching in a given instance I of HR. Then M is Pareto
optimal if and only if M is improving coalition-free.
Proof. Let M be a Pareto optimal matching. If M admits some improving coalition C,
let M ′ be the matching obtained by satisfying C. By Definition 3.3.1, each resident in C
prefers M ′ to M and each hospital in C either prefers M ′ to M or is indifferent between
the two matchings. However, this implies that M ′ ≺M , a contradiction.
Conversely, let M be a matching that is improving coalition-free, and suppose for a
contradiction that M is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists some matching M ′ such
that M ′ ≺M . Let X =M ⊕M ′ and let C be a connected component of X. We consider
three cases according to the form of C.
– Case (i): C is an alternating path with an even number of edges. However, this
implies that either there exists a resident ri who is assigned in M but who becomes
unassigned in M ′, or there exists a hospital hj such that |M ′(hj)| < |M(hj)|. Both
possibilities contradict the fact that M ′ ≺M .
38
Chapter 3. Pareto optimal matchings in HR
– Case (ii): C is an alternating path with an odd number of edges. Clearly, the end
edges of C cannot be in M for otherwise we can obtain a similar contradiction as in Case
(i). Hence, the end edges of C are in M ′. Let ri be the exposed resident vertex in C.
Clearly, ri prefers M ′ to M . For each resident rj 6= ri in C, it must be the case that
rj prefers M ′(rj) to M(rj) since M ′ ≺ M . Hence, every resident in C prefers M ′ to
M . Let hx be the exposed hospital vertex in C. Clearly, |M ′(hx)| > |M(hx)| so that hx
prefers M ′ to M by Definition 1.4.1(i). For each hospital hy 6= hx in C, it is clear that
|M ′(hy)| = |M(hy)|. Furthermore, hy must either preferM ′ toM or is indifferent between
the matchings according to Definition 1.4.1(ii), or else it cannot be the case that M ′ ≺M .
However, C is then an augmenting coalition with respect to M .
– Case (iii): C is an alternating cycle. Clearly, each resident ri in C is assigned in
both M and M ′. Since M ′ ≺M , it must be the case that each ri prefers M ′(ri) to M(ri).
For each hospital hj in C, it is clear that |M ′(hj)| = |M(hj)|. Furthermore, hj must either
prefer M ′ to M or is indifferent between the matchings according to Definition 1.4.1(ii),
or else it cannot be the case that M ′ ≺ M . However, C is then a cyclic coalition with
respect to M , a contradiction.
Henceforth we will establish the Pareto optimality of a given matchingM in an instance
I of HR by showing that M is improving coalition-free. We now show that Lemma 3.3.1
leads to an O(m) algorithm for testing a given matching in an HR instance for Pareto
optimality. Let M be a matching in an HR instance I and let G be the underlying graph
of I. We first perform the following transformation to the preference lists of agents. That
is, for every resident ri ∈ R, we remove the hospital hj from the preference list of ri, and
remove ri from the preference list of hj if hj is a hospital that lies after M(ri) in ri’s
preference list, i.e. rankri(hj) > rankri(M(ri)). For each hospital hk, let rp be the worst
resident assigned to it in M . We then remove each resident rq from the preference list of
hk and remove hk from the preference list of rq whenever rankhj (rq) > rankhj (rp). The
effect of these truncations is that each agent is assigned in M to a “worst choice” partner.
Let us call the instance with truncated preference lists I ′, and its underlying graph G′, i.e.
G′ contain only those edges representing the truncated preference lists of the agents. It is
straightforward to see that it takes O(m) time to construct G′.
By Lemma 3.3.1, M is Pareto optimal if it admits no augmenting coalition or cyclic
coalition. We can check for the former structure by testing for an augmenting path in
G′. We use a similar form of restricted breadth-first search as described in Section 1.2, in
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Resident Pref Hospital Pref Hospital Capacity
r1: h2 h1 h1: r1 h1 : 1
r2: h2 h2: r1 r2 h2 : 1
Figure 3.1: An instance I1 of HR
which only edges not in M are followed from vertices in R and edges of M are followed
from vertices in H. If an augmenting path P is found in G′, then by augmenting along
P , we obtain a new matching M ′ such that each resident ri prefers M ′(ri) to M(ri), and
each hospital hj either prefers M ′ to M or is indifferent between the two matchings as a
result of the preference list truncations. Hence, M is not Pareto optimal if G′ admits an
augmenting path. It is straightforward that this takes O(m) time.
To test for a cyclic coalition, we form a directed graph GC with respect toM by letting
GC consist of one vertex for each assigned resident in I ′. We then construct an edge from
a resident ri to another resident rj in GC if ri prefers M(rj) to M(ri) in I ′. By a similar
argument to the above, it follows thatM is cyclic-coalition-free if and only if GC is acyclic.
Note that even though M is a matching of a HR instance, all vertices in GC have only
unitary capacity (being resident vertices). It follows that a depth-first search suffices to
detect any cycles in O(m) time so that these observations lead us to the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let M be a matching in a given instance of HR. Then we may check
whether M is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
Figure 3.1 shows us an HR instance I1. Note that the unique stable matching M =
{(r1, h2)} has cardinality 1 here, but the maximum Pareto optimal matching M ′ =
{(r1, h1), (r2, h2)} has cardinality 2. Hence, Pareto optimality is a criterion that can give
rise to larger matchings than stability. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that by
creating p copies of J , we may construct an HR instance Jp with 4p agents which admits
a stable matching Mp = {(r2i+1, h2i+2) : 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1} of size p and a Pareto optimal
matching M ′p = ({r2i+1, h2i+1), (r2i+2, h2i+2) : 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1} of size 2p. It follows that we
can have an infinite family of HR instances for which the cardinality of a stable matching
is half the size of a maximum Pareto optimal matching.
Hence, given any HR instance I, we are also interested in considering the problem of
finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I as an alternative optimality criterion.
The next section presents an efficient algorithm for solving this.
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3.4 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings in HR
In this section, we describe a two-phase algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in an instance I of HR by satisfying the necessary and sufficient conditions
of Lemma 3.3.1. Phase 1 of the algorithm uses Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a
maximum matching M in the underlying graph G. This phase guarantees that M admits
no augmenting coalition and takes O(
√
Cm) time. Phase 2 transforms M into a matching
that admits no cyclic coalition in the following way.
Let us construct a graph G′ from G by repeating the truncation of preference lists
as described in the aforementioned methods for testing a given matching in I for Pareto
optimality. Hence, all agents are assigned to a worst-choice partner in G′. It thus follows
as a result that the residents always improve and the hospitals either improve or remain
indifferent even if we satisfy any cyclic coalition with respect to M by considering pref-
erence lists on only one side. This allows us to obtain a cyclic-coalition-free matching
in G′ from M by considering the problem from only the point of view of the residents’
truncated preference lists, which effectively transforms the problem in I to an instance of
the analogous problem for the Capacitated House Allocation problem.
Hence, this allows the Phase 3 algorithm, described in Chapter 2 for finding a maximum
Pareto optimal matching given a CHA instance, to be reused from the residents’ point of
view in order to obtain a matching M ′ from M that is cyclic-coalition-free in G. We note
that M ′ must be cyclic-coalition-free by the correctness proof presented in Section 2.4.2.3.
Furthermore, the correctness proof also shows thatM ′ remains a maximum matching since
each resident who was assigned at the end of Phase 1 remains assigned after the execution
of the Phase 3 algorithm. With the use of suitable data structures such as those described
in Section 2.4.3, the Phase 3 algorithm is guaranteed to run in O(m) time. Hence, it takes
O(m) time for Phase 2 of our algorithm to find a maximum Pareto optimal matching given
a HR instance. It follows that Phase 1 dominates the overall complexity of our two-phase
algorithm for HR, giving us the following result.
Theorem 3.4.1. A maximum Pareto optimal matching in an instance I of HR can be
found in O(
√
Cm) time.
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3.5 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings in SMI
Since SMI is a special case of HR, it follows that Lemma 3.3.1 also gives a necessary and
sufficient condition for a matching in an SMI instance J to be Pareto optimal.
We first show how to test a given matching M in J for Pareto optimality. Let G′ be
the underlying graph of J and let m be the number of edges in G′. We form a subgraph
GM of G′ by letting GM contain only those edges in M ∪ bp(M) where bp(M) is the set
of blocking pairs with respect to M . It is clear that GM can be constructed in O(m) time
by considering the edges of G. By Lemma 3.3.1, M is Pareto optimal in J if and only
if M admits no augmenting path or alternating cycle in GM . Clearly, we can test for an
augmenting path in GM in O(m) time using restricted breadth-first search as described in
Section 1.2. In order to test for an alternating cycle, we remove any unmatched vertices
and their incident edges from GM . Any cycle in GM that remains is an even-length
alternating cycle, so that a depth-first search suffices to detect this. Hence, we can check
if a matching in J is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
We next show how the algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching
in HR can be easily modified for the analogous problem in SMI. First of all, we use
the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm for finding a maximum matching M in Phase 1 instead of
Gabow’s algorithm. Then, this step takes O(
√
nm) time where n is the total number of
men and women. Using a similar form of preference list truncation to that for HR as
described above, we can then transform the problem in J to the House Allocation problem
(HA).
Hence, this allows Phase 3 of the implementation of the Top Trading Cycles Method
in [3] to be reused from the men’s point of view in order to obtain a matching M ′ from
M that is cyclic-coalition-free in G. We note that M ′ must be cyclic-coalition-free by the
correctness of the Top Trading Cycles Method [57]. Furthermore M ′ remains a maximum
matching since the algorithm in [3] ensures that each man and woman who is assigned at
the end of Phase 1 of our algorithm is also assigned when it completes execution. With
the use of suitable data structures such as doubly linked lists or arrays, we can ensure that
the initialisation and subsequent deletion of entries from the preference lists takes O(m)
time. Since the nested loops in Phase 3 of the implementation in [3] are guaranteed to
run in O(m) time, Phase 2 of our algorithm also runs in O(m) time. This gives us the
following result.
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Theorem 3.5.1. A maximum Pareto optimal matching in an instance J of SMI can be
found in O(
√
nm) time.
It follows that it is generally faster to find a maximum Pareto optimal matching in an
SMI instance using the techniques described in this section as opposed to the algorithm
for HR described in Section 3.4.
3.6 Open problems
In this chapter, we presented efficient algorithms for finding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching given an instance of HR or SMI. A number of open problems remain. For
example,
• The problem of finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching given an instance
of HR or SMI can be generalised by permitting agents to contain ties in their
preference lists, i.e. HRT or SMTI respectively. As with CHA, the definition of the
relation ≺ remains unchanged in the context of ties. For SMTI, we remark that a
maximum Pareto optimal matching can be found in O(nm + n2 log n) time [14] by
transformation to the Assignment problem in an analogous way to that described in
Section 2.2 for the case of CHA. However, it is open as to whether a similar form of
transformation exists to solve the problem in HRT. It is also open as to whether the
problem of finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching, given an instance of HRT
or SMTI, is also solvable in the same time complexity as its counterpart in the case
of strict preferences?
• [7] shows that the problem of finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching in an
instance of SRI is solvable in O(
√
nα(m,n)m log3/2 n) time. However, it remains to
consider whether a maximum Pareto optimal matching in SRI can be constructed
in O(
√
nm) time, which is the complexity of the fastest current algorithm for finding
a maximum matching in a general graph [44].
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Popular matchings in CHAT
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching given an
instance of CHA or CHAT. As noted in Section 1.3.2.2, many recent papers have focused
on popular matchings, given the importance of voting to many economic decisions, and also
given the viability of popular matchings as an optimality criterion for matching problems
with one-sided preferences. Here, we present the first algorithmic results for computing
popular matchings in a capacitated bipartite graph. The main results of this chapter, and
their organisation are as follows.
In Section 4.2, we first develop a characterisation of popular matchings in a CHA
instance I. We then use this characterisation to construct an O(
√
Cn1+m) algorithm for
finding a maximum popular matching in I or reporting that none exists, where C is the
total capacity of the houses, n1 is the total number of agents and m is the total length of
the preference lists in I respectively. In Section 4.3, we provide the first extension of the
Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition to the case of a capacitated bipartite graph. Using this,
we build a new characterisation of popular matchings in a CHAT instance J , and then
use it to construct an O(
√
Cm) algorithm for finding a maximum popular matching in J
or reporting that none exists. We finally remark that a straightforward solution to each
of the problems of finding a maximum popular matching, given an instance I of CHA
or CHAT, may be to use “cloning”. Informally, this entails creating cj clones for each
house hj , to obtain an instance C(I) of HAT (i.e. each house has capacity 1), and then
applying the algorithms of [4] to C(I). However, we will show in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 that
this method in general leads to slower algorithms than the direct approach that we will
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be using in each case.
4.2 Popular matchings in CHA
4.2.1 Characterising popular matchings
Let I be an instance of CHA, and let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying graph of I, where
A = {a1, a2, ..., an1} is the set of agents, H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} is the set of houses and E is
the set of edges in G representing the acceptable houses of the agents. We assume all the
notations and terminology that have been defined for CHA in Chapters 1 and 2. Recall
that, given two matchings M and M ′ in I, we say that an agent ai prefers M ′ to M if
either (i) ai is assigned in M ′ and unassigned in M , or (ii) ai is assigned in both M ′ and
M and prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). Let P (M ′,M) denote the set of agents who prefer M ′
to M . Then, M ′ is more popular than M if |P (M ′,M)| > |P (M,M ′)|, i.e. the number of
agents who prefer M ′ to M is greater than the number of agents who prefer M to M ′.
Furthermore, a matching M in I is popular if there is no other matching M ′ in I that is
more popular than M .
For each agent ai ∈ A, let f(ai) denote the first-ranked house on ai’s preference list.
Any such house hj is called an f-house. For each hj ∈ H, let f(hj) = {ai ∈ A : f(ai) = hj}
and fj = |f(hj)| (possibly fj = 0). We create a unique last resort house l(ai) with capacity
1 for each agent ai ∈ A, and append l(ai) to ai’s preference list. We also henceforth assume
thatG contains the vertex l(ai) and the edge (ai, l(ai)) for each ai ∈ A, and thatH contains
the respective last resort houses. We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
The following lemma is a vital first step in characterising popular matchings in I.
Lemma 4.2.1. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then for every f-house hj, |M(hj) ∩
f(hj)| = min {cj , fj}.
Proof. We consider the following two cases.
– Case (i): Suppose fj ≤ cj . We will show that f(hj) ⊆ M(hj). For, suppose not.
Then choose any ar ∈ f(hj)\M(hj). We consider the subcases that (a) hj is undersub-
scribed and (b) hj is full. In subcase (a), promote ar to hj to obtain a more popular
matching than M . In subcase (b), choose any as ∈ M(hj)\f(hj). Let hk = f(as). Then
hk 6= hj . If hk is undersubscribed, promote ar to hj and promote as to hk to obtain
a more popular matching than M . Otherwise, choose any at ∈ M(hk). If ar = at, we
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then promote ar to hj and promote as to hk to obtain a more popular matching than M .
Otherwise, we then promote ar to hj , promote as to hk and demote at to l(at) to obtain
a more popular matching than M .
– Case (ii): Suppose fj > cj . If hj is undersubscribed, then f(hj) 6⊆ M(hj) so
there exists some ar ∈ f(hj)\M(hj) that we can promote to hj to obtain a more popular
matching as in Case (i)(a). Hence, hj is full. Now, suppose for a contradiction that
M(hj) 6⊆ f(hj). Then there exists some as ∈ M(hj)\f(hj). As fj > cj , it follows that
f(hj) 6⊆ M(hj) so there exists some ar ∈ f(hj)\M(hj). The remainder of the argument
follows Case (i)(b).
Hence the following properties hold for the new matching. If fj ≤ cj , then f(hj) ⊆
M(hj). Otherwise,M(hj) ⊆ f(hj) and |M(hj)| = cj . Thus, the condition in the statement
of the lemma is now satisfied.
For each agent ai, we next define s(ai) to be the most-preferred house hj on ai’s
preference list such that either (i) hj is a not an f -house, or (ii) hj is an f -house such that
hj 6= f(ai) and fj < cj . Note that s(ai) must exist in view of l(ai). We refer to such a
house hj as an s-house. We remark that the set of f -houses need not be disjoint from the
set of s-houses. It may be shown that a popular matching M will only assign an agent ai
to either f(ai) or s(ai), as indicated by the next two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house between f(ai) and s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Suppose that ai is assigned to a house hk between f(ai) and s(ai). Then hk is an f -
house and fk ≥ ck, for otherwise s(ai) = hk. As fk ≥ ck, by Lemma 4.2.1, M(hk) ⊆ f(hk).
However, f(ai) 6= hk, thus ai /∈ f(hk). Hence, ai cannot be assigned to hk.
Lemma 4.2.3. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house worse than s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Let hj = s(ai). If hj is undersubscribed, then we can promote ai to hj , a contra-
diction. Hence, hj is full. We consider two cases.
– Case (i): hj is an f -house. By definition of an s-house, fj < cj , so there exists some
ar ∈ M(hj)\f(hj). Let hk = f(ar). Then hk 6= hj . As ck ≥ 1 and fk ≥ 1, it follows by
Lemma 4.2.1 that M(hk) 6= ∅. Let as ∈ M(hk). Now, if ai = as, we can then promote ai
to hj and promote ar to hk to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction.
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Otherwise, we can then promote ai to hj , promote ar to hk, and demote as to l(as) to
obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction.
– Case (ii): hj is not an f -house. Let ar ∈ M(hj). Then ar /∈ f(hj). The remainder
of the proof of this case proceeds as in Case (i).
Recall that G is the underlying graph of I. We form a subgraph G′ of G by letting G′
contain only two edges for each agent ai, that is, one to f(ai) and the other to s(ai). We
say that a matching M is agent-complete in a given graph if it assigns all agents in the
graph. It follows that, in view of last resort houses, all popular matchings must be agent-
complete in G′. However, G′ need not admit an agent-complete matching if s(ai) 6= l(ai)
for some agent ai. In conjunction with Lemmas 4.2.1-4.2.3, the graph G′ gives rise to the
following characterisation of popular matchings in I.
Theorem 4.2.1. A matching M is popular in I if and only if
1. for every f-house hj,
(a) if fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆M(hj);
(b) if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj and M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
2. M is an agent-complete matching in the reduced graph G′.
Proof. By Lemmas 4.2.1-4.2.3, any popular matching necessarily satisfies Conditions 1
and 2. We now show that these conditions are sufficient.
Let M by any matching satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 and suppose for a contradiction
that M ′ is a matching that is more popular than M . Let ai be any agent that prefers
M ′ to M and let hk = M ′(ai). Since M is an agent-complete matching in G′, and since
G′ contains only edges from ai to f(ai) and s(ai), then M(ai) = s(ai). Hence either (i)
hk = f(ai) or (ii) hk is an f -house such that hk 6= f(ai) and fk ≥ ck, by definition of s(ai).
In Case (i), if fk < ck then by Condition 1(a), ai ∈ M(hk), a contradiction. Hence in
both Cases (i) and (ii), fk ≥ ck. In each of the cases that fk = ck and fk > ck, it follows
by Conditions 1(a) and 1(b) that |M(hk)| = ck and M(hk) ⊆ f(hk). Since hk is full in
M , it follows that |M(hk)\M ′(hk)| ≥ |M ′(hk)\M(hk)|. Hence for every ai who prefers
M ′(ai) = hk to M(ai), there is a unique aj ∈ M(hk)\M ′(hk). But as aj ∈ M(hk), it
follows that hk = f(aj). Hence aj prefers M(aj) to M ′(aj). Therefore, M is popular in
I.
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Algorithm 6 Algorithm Popular-CHA
1: M := ∅;
2: for each f -house hj do
3: c′j := cj ;
4: if fj ≤ cj then
5: for each ai ∈ f(hj) do
6: M :=M ∪ {(ai, hj)};
7: delete ai and its incident edges from G′;
8: c′j := cj − fj ;
9: remove all isolated and full houses, and their incident edges, from G′;
10: compute a maximum matching M ′ in G′ using capacities c′j ;
11: if M ′ is not agent-complete in G′ then
12: output “no popular matching exists”
13: else
14: M :=M ∪M ′;
15: for each ai ∈ A do
16: hj := f(ai);
17: if fj > cj and |M(hj)| < cj and hj 6=M(ai) then
18: promote ai from M(ai) to hj in M ;
4.2.2 Finding a popular matching
Theorem 4.2.1 leads to Algorithm Popular-CHA for finding a popular matching in a CHA
instance I, or reporting that none exists, as shown in Algorithm 6. The algorithm begins
by using a pre-processing step (lines 2-9) on G′ that assigns agents to their first-choice
house hj whenever fj ≤ cj , so as to satisfy Condition 1(a) of Theorem 4.2.1.
Our next step computes a maximum matching M ′ in G′, according to the adjusted
house capacities c′j that are defined following pre-processing. We use Gabow’s algorithm
[15] to computeM ′ in G′ and then test whetherM ′ is agent-complete. The pre-allocations
are then added to M ′ to give M . As a last step, we ensure that M also meets Condition
1(b) of Theorem 4.2.1. For, suppose that hj ∈ H is an f -house such that fj > cj . Then
by definition, hj cannot be an s-house. Thus if ak ∈ M(hj) prior to the third for loop,
it follows that ak ∈ f(hj). At this stage, if hj is undersubscribed in M , we repeatedly
promote any agent ai ∈ f(hj)\M(hj) from M(ai) (note that M(ai) must be s(ai) and
hence cannot be an f -house hl such that fl > cl) to hj until hj is full, ensuring that
M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
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It is clear that the reduced graph G′ of G can be constructed in O(m) time. The
graph G′ has O(n1) edges since each agent has degree 2 in G′. It is straightforward to see
that each of the pre- and post-processing steps involving the three for loop phases takes
O(n1 + n2) time. The complexity of Gabow’s algorithm [15] for computing M ′ in G′ is
O(
√
Cn1). Hence we obtain the following result concerning the complexity of Algorithm
Popular-CHA.
Lemma 4.2.4. Given an instance of CHA, we can find a popular matching, or determine
that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 +m) time.
4.2.3 Finding a maximum popular matching
It remains to consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in I. We
begin by dividing the set of all agents into disjoint sets. Let A1 be the set of all agents
such that if ai is an agent in A1, then s(ai) = l(ai). Also, let A2 = A − A1. We aim to
find a matching M that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.2.1, and that minimises the
number of A1-agents who are assigned to their last resort house.
We begin by constructing G′, and carrying out the pre-processing step in lines 2-9
of Algorithm Popular-CHA on all agents in A1 ∪ A2. We then try to find a maximum
matching M ′ in G′ that only involves the A2-agents that remain after pre-processing
and their incident edges. If M ′ is not an agent-complete matching of the agents in A2
that remain after pre-processing, then G admits no popular matching by Theorem 4.2.1.
Otherwise, we remove all edges in G′ that are incident to a last resort house, and try to
assign A1-agents to their first-choice houses. At each step, we try to assign an additional
A1-agent to his first-choice house by finding an augmenting path with respect to M ′ using
Gabow’s algorithm [15], so that we have a maximum matching of agents in A1 ∪ A2 in
G′ at the end of this process. If any A1-agent remains unassigned, we simply assign him
to his last resort house, to obtain an agent-complete matching in G′. We also ensure
that Condition 1(b) of Theorem 4.2.1 is met by executing the third for loop in Algorithm
Popular-CHA. It follows that the matching so obtained, together with the pre-assignments
from earlier, is a maximum popular matching, giving the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2. Given an instance of CHA, we can find a maximum popular matching,
or determine that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 +m) time.
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4.2.4 “Cloning” verus our direct approach
An alternative approach to our algorithm may be to use cloning. Given an instance I
of CHA, we may obtain an instance J of HAT by creating cj clones h1j , h
2
j , ..., h
cj
j of
each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each
occurrence of hj in a given agent’s preference list with the sequence h1j , h
2
j , ..., h
cj
j , the
elements of which are listed in a single tie at the point where hj appears. We may then
apply the O(
√
nm) algorithm for HAT given by [4] to J in order to find a maximum
popular matching in I.
We now compare the worst-case complexity of the above cloning approach with that
of our direct algorithm. The underlying graph GJ of J contains n′ = n1 + C vertices.
Let cmin = min{cj : hj ∈ H}, and for ai ∈ A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses
for ai. Then the number of edges in GJ is m′ =
∑
ai∈A
∑
hj∈Ai cj ≥ mcmin. Hence the
complexity of applying the algorithm given by [4] to J is Ω(
√
n1 + Cmcmin). Recall that
the complexity of Algorithm Popular-CHA is O(
√
Cn1 +m). It follows that the cloning
method is slower by a factor of Ω(
√
n1 + Ccmin) or Ω(mcmin/n1) (note that m ≥ n1 and
cmin ≥ 1) according as
√
Cn1 ≤ m or
√
Cn1 > m respectively.
4.3 Popular matchings in CHAT
In this section, we generalise the characterisation of popular matchings together with
Algorithm Popular-CHA as given in the previous section to the case where we are given
an instance of CHAT.
4.3.1 Characterising popular matchings
Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of CHAT. For each agent ai ∈ A, let
f(ai) denote the set of first-ranked houses on ai’s preference list (clearly it is possible that
|f(ai)| > 1 in view of ties in the preference lists). We refer to all such houses hj as f-houses
and we let f(hj) = {ai ∈ A : hj ∈ f(ai)}. Let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying graph of I.
Define E1 = {(ai, hj) : ai ∈ A ∧ hj ∈ f(ai)} to be the set of first-choice edges. We define
the first-choice graph of G as G1 = (A,H,E1).
Given a CHAT instance I, since it is possible for an agent to have greater than one
f -house, Lemma 4.2.1 no longer holds in general. For example, it is possible for an f -house
hj such that fj = cj to not be assigned to all the agents in f(hj) in a popular matching
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if there are more f -houses than agents in I. This makes hj eligible to be the s-house
of some agent not in f(hj) in I whereas this would not have been possible in any given
CHA instance. Hence, we will work towards a new definition of s-houses in the context of
CHAT in this subsection. For instances with strict preference lists, Lemma 4.2.1 implies
that M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1. As the next lemma indicates, this latter
condition also extends to the CHAT case.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then M ∩E1 is a maximum matching
in G1.
Proof. LetM1 =M∩E1. Suppose for a contradiction thatM1 is not a maximum matching
in G1. Then M1 admits an augmenting path P = 〈a1, h1, ..., ak, hk〉 with respect to G1.
Now, in view of last resort houses, a1 must be assigned inM . It follows thatM(a1) /∈ f(a1),
for otherwiseM(a1) ∈ P . We letM ′ =M\ {(a1,M(a1))}. We consider the following cases
for hk.
– Case (i): hk is undersubscribed in M ′. As a1 is unassigned in M ′, h1 ∈ f(a1), and
|M ′(hk)| < ck, we can augment M ′ with P to obtain a new matching M ′′. Then, a1 is
assigned with h1 in M ′′. Furthermore, as all edges in G′ are first-choice edges, all other
agents in P become assigned in M ′′ to one of their other first-choice houses. However, M ′′
is more popular than M , a contradiction.
– Case (ii): |M ′(hk)| = ck. Choose any as ∈ M ′(hk)\f(hk). Note that such an as
must exist, for hk is full in M ′ but undersubscribed in M1. Clearly, as 6= ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Choose any ht ∈ f(as). Now, ht cannot be a house in P for suppose not. Without loss of
generality, let ht = hj where 1 ≤ j < k. Let C = 〈hj , aj+1, hj+1, ..., ak, hk, as〉. Let also
M ′′ =M ′ ⊕C. It follows that each agent ax 6= as in C becomes assigned in M ′′ to one of
their other first-choice houses while as improves by becoming assigned in M ′′ to one of his
first-choice house. However then, M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction. Hence,
ht does not belong to P . Now, if ht is undersubscribed in M ′, we can then augment M ′
with P so that a1 improves and the other agents in P are indifferent, and promote as to
ht to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction. Otherwise, choose any
au ∈ M ′(ht). Since ht /∈ P and a1 is unassigned in M ′, au is a distinct agent from any
agent in P . However, we can then augment M ′ with P so that a1 improves and the other
agents in P are indifferent, promote as to ht and demote au to l(au) to obtain a more
popular matching than M , a contradiction.
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We now work towards a definition of s-houses by using the Edmonds-Gallai Decompo-
sition. Let M be a maximum matching in some bipartite graph G where all vertices have
capacity 1. According to Lemma 1.2.1, the vertices of G can be partitioned into three
disjoint sets: E , O and U . Vertices in E , O and U are called even, odd, and unreachable re-
spectively. A vertex v is even (odd) if there exists an alternating path of even (odd) length
from an unassigned vertex in G to v. If no such alternating path exists, v is unreachable.
As noted in Section 1.2, this vertex labelling is also known as the EOU labelling. Our aim
is to obtain an EOU labelling of G1 relative to a maximum matchingM1 of G1 (as obtained
by Gabow’s algorithm [15], for example). However Lemma 1.2.1 applies directly only to
the case where each vertex in the given bipartite graph has capacity 1. We will show that
the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition also holds in the case of a capacitated bipartite graph
as follows.
Let G = (U,W,E) be a capacitated bipartite graph. Also, let M be a maximum
matching of G. Let C(G) be a cloned graph of G by replacing every vertex wj ∈ W with
the clones w1j , w
2
j , . . . , w
cj
j where cj is the capacity of wj . We then divide the capacity
of each vertex wj ∈ W among its clones by allowing each clone to have capacity 1. In
addition, if (ui, wj) belongs to G, then we add (ui, wkj ) to C(G) for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ cj).
We then adapt the maximum matching M in G to obtain a matching C(M) in C(G),
as follows. If a vertex wj ∈ W in G is assigned to xj vertices u1, ...uxj in M , then we
add (uk, wkj ) to C(M) for 1 ≤ k ≤ xj , so that |C(M)| = |M | and C(M) is a maximum
matching in C(G). It follows that C(G) is a bipartite graph in which all of its vertices on
the right hand side have capacity 1.
Let us now clone C(G) to obtain a bipartite graph C(G)′ in which all of its vertices
have capacity 1 by repeating the above steps for the vertices in U . That is, we replace
every vertex ui ∈ U with the clones u1i , u2i , . . . , ucii where ci is the capacity of ui. We then
divide the capacity of each vertex ui ∈ U among its clones by allowing each clone to have
capacity 1. In addition, if (ui, wkj ) belongs to C(G), then we add (u
l
i, w
k
j ) to C(G) for all
l (1 ≤ l ≤ ci) where wkj is a clone of wj ∈ W in C(G). We then adapt the maximum
matching C(M) in C(G) to obtain a matching C(M)′ in C(G)′ as follows. If a vertex
ui ∈ U in G is assigned to yi vertices w′1, ...w′yi in C(M), then we add (uki , w′k) to C(M)′
for 1 ≤ k ≤ yi where without loss of generality, w′k is a clone of the vertex wk ∈ W in
C(G). It follows that |C(M)′| = |M | and C(M)′ is a maximum matching in C(G)′. It
also follows that C(G)′ is a bipartite graph in which all of its vertices have capacity 1.
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Suppose that we are given an EOU labelling of the vertices in C(G)′ with respect to
C(M)′ based on Lemma 1.2.1. The next lemma shows that the clones corresponding to
each vertex vj ∈ U ∪W in G have the same EOU label in C(G)′.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let G be a capacitated bipartite graph and let M be a maximum matching
in G. Define the cloned graph C(G)′ and its corresponding maximum matching C(M)′ as
above. Then, given any vertex vj ∈ U ∪W , any two clones of vj in C(G)′ have the same
EOU label.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let vj be a vertex wj belonging to the vertex set W ;
analogous results can be proven if vj ∈ U . Let wxj and wyj be two clones corresponding to
wj . We consider the cases where (1) wxj is even, (2) w
x
j is odd, and (3) w
x
j is unreachable.
Case (1): If wxj is even, then we consider the subcases where (a) w
x
j is assigned in
C(M)′, and (b) wxj is unassigned in C(M)
′. In subcase (a), if wyj is unassigned in C(M)
′,
then it follows immediately that wyj is also even. Hence, suppose that w
y
j is also assigned
in C(M)′. As wxj is even, there exists an even length alternating path P to w
x
j in C(G)
′
from an unassigned vertex clone belonging to W . Let upi be the vertex that precedes w
x
j
on P where upi is a clone vertex of ui in C(G)
′. It follows that (upi , w
x
j ) ∈ C(M)′ from our
definition of the path P . As wyj is also assigned in C(M)
′, let (uqk, w
y
j ) ∈ C(M)′ where uqk
is a clone vertex of uk in C(G)′ and (uk, wj) ∈M . Then, it follows that (uqk, wxj ) must be
an edge in C(G)′. As wxj is even, u
q
k is odd. As a result, w
y
j is even. In subcase (b), if
wyj is also unassigned in C(M)
′, then it is again immediate that wyj is also even. Hence,
suppose that wyj is assigned in C(M)
′, to upi say, where u
p
i is a clone vertex of ui in C(G)
′
and (ui, wj) ∈ M . Now (upi , wxj ) is also an edge in C(G)′. As wxj is even, upi is odd, and
hence wyj is even.
Case (2): If wxj is odd, then there must exist an odd-length alternating path from an
unassigned vertex upi to w
x
j where u
p
i is a clone of ui ∈ U in C(G)′. It follows that wxj
cannot be unassigned for otherwise C(M)′ admits an augmenting path, a contradiction.
Hence, wxj is assigned in C(M)
′ to uqk, say, where u
q
k is a clone of uk ∈ U in C(G)′ and
(uk, wj) ∈M . Then, uqk is even. However, (uqk, wyj ) is an edge in C(G)′, so it follows that
wyj is odd.
Case (3): Now, wyj must also be unreachable. For, suppose not. If w
y
j is even, then w
x
j
is also even by Case (1), a contradiction. If wyj is odd, then w
x
j is also odd by Case (2), a
contradiction.
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In view of Lemma 4.3.2, it follows that the clones corresponding to each vertex vj ∈
U∪W have the same EOU label in C(G)′, thereby giving us a well-defined characterisation
of EOU labels of all vertices in G. That is, if the clones of the vertex vj are even, odd or
unreachable in C(G)′, we can correspondingly label vj as even, odd or unreachable in G.
Suppose that we now have an EOU labelling of the vertices in G as described above. The
next result is a consequence of Lemma 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let G = (U,W,E) be a capacitated bipartite graph and let M be a
maximum matching in G. Then every odd or unreachable vertex vj ∈ U ∪ W satisfies
|M(vj)| = cj.
Proof. Let vj ∈ U ∪W be any vertex that is odd (or unreachable) in G. By Lemma 4.3.2,
all clones of vj will also be odd (or unreachable) in C(G)′. It follows that vj must be full
in M , for otherwise, at least one of its clones vxj will be unassigned in C(M)
′. However,
vxj will then be even, a contradiction.
Hence, Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.3 give rise to the first extension of the Edmonds-
Gallai Decomposition to the capacitated bipartite graph as follows.
Lemma 4.3.4. Let G = (U,W,E) be a capacitated bipartite graph and let M be a maxi-
mum matching in G. Define E, O and U to be the vertex sets corresponding to even, odd
and unreachable vertices in an EOU labelling of G with respect to M . Then:
(a) The sets E, O and U are pairwise disjoint. Every maximum matching in G partitions
the vertices into the same sets of even, odd and unreachable vertices.
(b) Every maximum matching M in G satisfies the following properties:
(i) every vertex in O and every vertex in U is full in M ;
(ii) every vertex in O is assigned only to vertices in E in M ;
(iii) every vertex in U is assigned only to vertices in U in M ;
(iv) |M | =∑ui∈OU ci+∑wj∈OW cj +∑ui∈UU ci where OU is the set of odd vertices
in U , OW is the set of odd vertices in W , and UU is the set of unreachable
vertices in U .
(c) No maximum matching in G contains an edge between two vertices in O or a vertex
in O with a vertex in U . There is no edge in G connecting a vertex in E with a
vertex in U , or between two vertices of E.
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It follows that Lemma 4.3.4 enables us to obtain an EOU labelling of G1 relative to a
maximum matching M1 of G1. The following corollary is a result of Lemma 4.3.4.
Corollary 4.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then every odd or unreachable
house hj ∈ H satisfies M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
Proof. Let G1 = (A,H,E1) be the first-choice graph of I. Then, M1 = M ∩ E1 is a
maximum matching in G1 by Lemma 4.3.1. Let hj ∈ H be any house that is odd (or
unreachable) in G1. By Lemma 4.3.4, hj is full in M1. Since C(G1) contains only first-
choice edges, it follows that M1(hj) ⊆ f(hj), and hence M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
We are now in a position to define s(ai), the set of houses such that, in a popular
matching M , if ai ∈ A is assigned in M and M(ai) /∈ f(ai), then M(ai) ∈ s(ai). We will
ensure that any odd or unreachable house hj is not a member of s(ai), since |M(hj)| = cj
and M(hj) ⊆ f(hj) by Lemma 4.3.4 and Corollary 4.3.1. Hence, we define s(ai) to be the
set of highest-ranking houses in ai’s preference list that are even in G1. Any such house is
called an s-house. Clearly, it is possible that |s(ai)| > 1, however, ai is indifferent between
all houses in s(ai). Furthermore, s(ai) 6= ∅ due to the existence of last resort houses which
are of degree 0 in G1 (and thus even). However, f(ai) and s(ai) need not be disjoint, i.e.
either f(ai) = s(ai) or ai prefers all members of f(ai) to s(ai). It turns out that Lemmas
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 also extend to CHAT as established by the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.5. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house between f(ai) and s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Suppose that ai is assigned to a house hj strictly between f(ai) and s(ai). Then,
ai must prefer hj to all houses in s(ai). Hence, hj must be an odd or unreachable house
in G1, as s(ai) contains the highest-ranking even houses in G1 in ai’s preference list. By
Corollary 4.3.1, M(hj) ⊆ f(hj). However, this is a contradiction as hj /∈ f(ai).
Lemma 4.3.6. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house worse than s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Suppose that ai is assigned to a house worse than s(ai). Let hj be any house in
s(ai). Now, if |M(hj)| < cj , we can promote ai to hj to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, suppose that |M(hj)| = cj . Let ak ∈M(hj). We consider two cases for hj .
– Case (i): hj /∈ f(ak). We then choose any hl ∈ f(ak). If |M(hl)| < cl, we promote
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ai to hj and promote ak to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M . Otherwise,
|M(hl)| = cl so we let am ∈ M(hl). If am = ai, we can promote ai to hj and promote
ak to hl. If am 6= ai, we promote ai to hj , promote ak to hl and demote am to l(am) to
obtain a more popular matching than M .
– Case (ii): hj ∈ f(ak). As hj ∈ s(ai), hj must be an even vertex by our definition of an
s-house. Let G1 be the first-choice graph of I as previously defined. Let M1 = M ∩ E1.
Then M1 is a maximum matching in G1 by Lemma 4.3.1. Furthermore, there exists an
alternating path P of even length to hj in G1, with respect to M1, from some (even)
house hl, which is undersubscribed in M1. Let M ′ = M\ {(ai,M(ai))}. We consider the
subcases that (a) hl is undersubscribed inM ′ or (b) hl is full inM ′. In subcase (a), we can
reuse the proof of Case (i) in Lemma 4.3.1 to obtain a matching M ′′ by matching ai with
hj , and then matching all other agents in P with one of their other first-choice houses in
P by augmenting along P . It follows that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction.
In subcase (b), we can always find an agent am ∈ M ′(hl)\f(hl). The remainder of our
proof then follows a similar argument to that used in Case (ii) of Lemma 4.3.1 where we
can obtain a matching M ′′ that is more popular than M , a contradiction.
As was the case with CHA, we can also define a subgraph G′ for the CHAT instance
I by this time letting G′ contain only edges from each agent ai to houses in f(ai) ∪ s(ai).
Now, all popular matchings must be agent-complete in G′ in view of last resort houses.
However, an agent-complete matching need not exist if s(ai) 6= {l(ai)} for some agent
ai. Lemmas 4.3.1, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 give rise to the following characterisation of popular
matchings in I.
Theorem 4.3.1. A matching M is popular in I if and only if
1. M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1, and
2. M is an agent-complete matching in the subgraph G′.
Proof. By Lemmas 4.3.1, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6, any popular matching necessarily satisfies Con-
ditions 1 and 2. We now show that these conditions are sufficient.
Let M be any matching satisfying Conditions 1 and 2. Suppose for a contradiction
that M ′ is a matching that is more popular than M . Let ai be any agent that prefers M ′
to M . Since ai prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai), M is an agent-complete matching in G′, and G′
only contains edges from ai to f(ai) ∪ s(ai), it follows that M(ai) ∈ s(ai), and f(ai) and
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s(ai) are disjoint. Hence, M ′(ai) must be an odd or unreachable house in G1, as M(ai) is
an even house of highest rank in ai’s preference list.
Let hj1 =M
′(ai). Since hj1 is odd or unreachable, it follows by Condition 1 and Lemma
4.3.4(b) that |M(hj1)| = cj1 and M(hj1) ⊆ f(hj1). Now since ai ∈M ′(hj1)\M(hj1), there
exists a distinct agent ak1 ∈ M(hj1)\M ′(hj1). If ak1 is unassigned in M ′ or M ′(ak1) /∈
f(ak1), then ak1 prefers M to M
′. Otherwise, suppose M ′(ak1) ∈ f(ak1). Let hj2 =
M ′(ak1). It follows that ak1 is even or unreachable so that hj2 must be odd or unreachable.
It then follows by Condition 1 and Lemma 4.3.4(b) that |M(hj2)| = cj2 and M(hj2) ⊆
f(hj2). Hence, there exists an agent ak2 6= ak1 such that ak2 ∈ M(hj2)\M ′(hj2) and
hj2 ∈ f(ak2). If ak2 is unassigned in M ′ or M ′(ak2) /∈ f(ak2), then ak2 prefers M to M ′.
Otherwise, suppose that M ′(ak2) ∈ f(ak2). Let hj3 = M ′(ak2). Then there exists an
agent ak3 ∈M(hj3)\M ′(hj3) by a similar argument for ak2 . Note that possibly hj3 = hj1 ,
but we must be able to choose ak3 6= ak1 , for otherwise |M ′(hj1)| > |M(hj1)|, which is a
contradiction since |M(hj1)| = cj1 . Thus, ak3 is a distinct agent, so that we can repeat the
above argument to identify an alternating path P in which houses need not be distinct,
but agents are distinct. It follows that P must terminate at some agent akr as the number
of agents are finite. Furthermore, it must be the case that akr is unassigned in M
′ or
M ′(akr) /∈ f(akr) so that for every ai that prefers M ′ to M , there must exist a distinct
akr that prefers M to M
′.
Finally, we note the uniqueness of akr . If there exists another agent a
′
i who prefers M
′
to M , then we can build another alternating path – it is possible that some of the houses
are those already used in previous alternating paths such as P . However, it must be the
case (from our argument that ak3 is a distinct agent) that we are always able to identify
distinct agents not already used in previous alternating paths, as each house on the path
is odd or unreachable, and thus full in M . Hence, M is popular in I.
4.3.2 Finding a popular matching
Theorem 4.3.1 leads to Algorithm Popular-CHAT for finding a popular matching in an
instance I of CHAT or reporting that none exists, as shown in Algorithm 7. The next
lemma is an important step in establishing the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.3.7. Algorithm Popular-CHAT constructs a matching M such that M ∩ E1 is
a maximum matching of G1.
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Algorithm 7 Algorithm Popular-CHAT
1: Build subgraph G1=(A,H,E1), where E1={(ai, hj) : ai ∈ A ∧ hj ∈ f(ai)}.
2: Compute a maximum matching M1 of first-choice edges in G1.
3: Obtain an EOU labelling of G1.
4: Build subgraph G′=(A,H,E′), where E′={(ai, hj) : ai ∈ A ∧ hj ∈ f(ai) ∪ s(ai)}.
5: Delete all edges in G′ connecting two odd vertices, or connecting an odd vertex with an un-
reachable vertex. (This step does not delete an edge of M1.)
6: Find a maximum matching M in the reduced graph G′ by augmenting M1.
7: if M is not agent-complete in G′ then
8: output “No popular matching exists”;
9: else
10: return M as a popular matching in I;
Proof. We firstly claim that G′ does not contain any edges of rank greater than 1 incident
to odd vertices and unreachable houses. Now, it follows by our definition of s-houses, for
any odd or unreachable house hj ∈ H, hj /∈ s(ai) for any agent ai ∈ A. Thus, there exist
only first-choice edges incident to any such hj . By Lemma 4.3.4(b), every odd agent ai in
G1 can only be assigned in any maximum matching of G1 to some even house hk. Since
(ai, hk) is a first-choice edge in G1 and s(ai) defines the highest-ranked even house in ai’s
preference list, it follows that s(ai) ⊆ f(ai). Hence, the claim is established.
Hence by the above claim, it follows that the edges removed from G′ during Step 5
of the algorithm, between two odd vertices or between an odd vertex and an unreachable
vertex, are first-choice edges in G′. However by Lemma 4.3.4(c), no maximum matching
in G1 can contain these edges. Thus, no popular matching can contain these edges by
Lemma 4.3.1. In particular, no edge of M1 is deleted by Step 5.
It also follows by Lemma 4.3.4(c) that there cannot exist any (first-choice) edges in G1
between two even vertices, or between an even and an unreachable vertex. As a result, the
only first-choice edges that remain in G′ after the edge deletions are those edges between
(i) odd agents and even houses, (ii) even agents and odd houses, and (iii) unreachable
agents and unreachable houses. Define a second-choice edge as belonging to the edge
set {(ai, hj) ∈ E′ : hj ∈ s(ai) ∧ s(ai) 6⊆ f(ai)}. Then by the above claim, the only second-
choice edges that remain in G′ are those between even agents and even houses, and between
unreachable agents and even houses.
The matching M is obtained from M1 through successive augmentation in Gabow’s
algorithm. We claim that there does not exist any augmenting path P in which an un-
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reachable agent ai (who is assigned in M1 to some house in f(ai)) becomes worse off, for
suppose otherwise. We trace the path P from the undersubscribed house endpoint. Let ai
be the first unreachable agent to become worse off after we augment along P . Let M b be
the matching before we augmented along P and let Ma be the matching obtained from
satisfying P . Assume that ai is assigned to hj1 inM
b. Then, it follows that hj1 is unreach-
able. Furthermore, we can pick an agent ai1 6= ai assigned to hj1 in Ma but not in M b.
It follows that ai1 must be unreachable because any unreachable house has only incident
edges from unreachable agents in G′ and since any unreachable house does not have any
edge of rank greater than 1 incident to it as established above. If ai1 is unassigned in M
b,
then we have finished tracing the path P . However, this gives a contradiction by Lemma
4.3.4(b). Hence, ai1 must be assigned to some first-choice house hj2 inM
b or else ai cannot
be the first unreachable agent to become worse off. It thus follows that hj2 must also be
unreachable. We can repeat the above argument to trace the path P until we terminate
at some agent air who is assigned to the unreachable house hjr in Ma. It is evident that
air must be unassigned in M b. However, any such air must be unreachable, which is a
contradiction again by Lemma 4.3.4(b).
Now, since all odd agents have only first-choice edges incident to them in G′, they must
remain assigned to first-choice houses in M even if they participated in any augmenting
paths. Moreover, it must be the case that the odd houses, each of which is full inM1, must
be full in M and incident only to first-choice edges in M (since odd houses are incident
only to such edges in G′). Finally, by the above paragraph, unreachable agents cannot
become worse off in M than in M1. Hence, only even agents may become worse off in
M than in M1, but this means that at least |OA| +
∑
hj∈OH cj + |UA| first-choice edges
assigned previously in M1 remain assigned in M . It thus follows by Lemma 4.3.4(b) that
M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching of G1.
Hence if Algorithm Popular-CHAT returns a matching M , then M is both an agent-
complete matching in G′ and M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching of G1 by Lemma 4.3.7.
Hence M is a popular matching in I by Theorem 4.3.1.
We now consider the complexity of Algorithm Popular-CHAT. Let F be the number
of first-choice edges in G. It is straightforward to see that G1 can be constructed in
O(F + n2) time. We use Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a maximum matching M1
in G1 in O(
√
CF ) time. We then obtain an EOU labelling of G1 as follows. We first use
a pre-processing step to label each unassigned agent and each undersubscribed house as
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even. This step takes O(n) time. Next, restricted breadth-first search may be used on
G1 to search for alternating paths with respect to M1, building up odd or even labels for
every vertex encountered. This step labels all odd and even (assigned) agents, and all
odd and even (full) houses and takes O(m) time. Any remaining unlabelled vertices must
be unreachable and we can directly label these vertices in G1 in O(n) time. Thus, the
total time complexity of this step is O(n + m). The EOU labelling of G1 is then used
to construct G′ and to delete certain edges from G′ at Steps 4 and 5 of the algorithm,
both of which take O(m) time overall. Finally, we then use Gabow’s algorithm again to
obtain the maximum matching M in G′ in O(
√
C(F + S)) time, where S is the number
of second-choice edges in G′. The following result gives the overall run-time of Algorithm
Popular-CHAT.
Lemma 4.3.8. Given an instance of CHAT, we can find a popular matching, or determine
that none exists, in O(
√
Cm) time.
4.3.3 Finding a maximum popular matching
It now remains to consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in I.
The aim is to find a matching that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.3.1 and that
minimises the number of agents who are assigned to their last resort houses. We begin by
firstly using Algorithm Popular-CHAT to compute a popular matching M in I, assuming
such a matching exists. Then M ∩E1 is a maximum matching in G1. We remove all edges
in G′ (and thus from M) that are incident to a last resort house. It follows that M still
satisfies the property that M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1, but M need not be
maximum in G′ if agents become unassigned as a result of the edge removals. Thus, we
obtain a new maximum matching M ′ from M by using Gabow’s algorithm on G′ again.
If M ′ is not agent-complete in G′, we simply assign any agent who remains unassigned in
M ′ to their last resort house to obtain an agent-complete matching. Using an argument
similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, it follows thatM ′∩E1 is a maximum matching
of G1. Thus, M ′ is a maximum popular matching in I. Now, it is straightforward to see
that the overall complexity of this approach is as for Algorithm Popular-CHAT, giving the
following result.
Theorem 4.3.2. Given an instance of CHAT, we can find a maximum popular matching,
or report that no such matching exists, in O(
√
Cm) time.
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4.3.4 “Cloning versus our direct approach
We may compare the complexity of our direct approach for CHAT to that obtained using
cloning on I together with the algorithm of [4] on the cloned instance of I. As in Section
4.2, the latter approach takes Ω(
√
n1 + Cm′) time, where m′ =
∑
ai∈A
∑
hj∈Ai cj . It
follows that this is slower than our direct algorithm by a factor of Ω(m′/m).
4.4 Open problem
We conclude this chapter with the following open problem.
Let I be an extension of CHA in which each agent now has a capacity to be assigned to
more than one house simultaneously in any matchingM of I, i.e. a many-many mapping is
sought in any matching of agents to houses in I. We remark that it may be appropriate to
redefine an agent’s preference over matchings to Definition 1.4.1 in this setting. However,
the definition of a popular matching is unchanged. Is the problem of finding a popular
matching (or reporting that none exists) then solvable in polynomial time? It is not
immediately clear if cloning offers a straightforward solution in this context, since both
agents and houses have capacities, so that it would be hard to avoid assigning the same
agent to the same house more than once in any cloning approach. Hence, a direct algorithm
using an approach of the kind in this chapter is likely to be required. This then raises the
question: if a polynomial-time algorithm exists for solving this problem in CHA, can we
extend this to solve the analogous problem in CHAT?
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Popular matchings in WCHA
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our study of popular matchings from Chapter 4 to the Weighted
Capacitated House Allocation problem with no ties (WCHA), a generalisation of CHA
in which each agent has an associated weight that indicates his priority. The assignment
of weights to agents allow us to build up a spectrum of priority levels for agents in the
competition for houses in situations where the total capacity of the houses is less than
the number of agents. In turn, this gives some agents a better chance of “doing well”.
For instance, the assignment of weights can enable DVD rental companies like Amazon
to give priority to those members who have paid more for privileged status whenever a
certain title is limited in stock. Alternatively, weights may be assigned to candidates in job
markets based on objective criteria such as academic results or relevant work experience.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. In Section 5.2,
we first develop necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in a WCHA instance
I. In Section 5.3, we identify a structure in the underlying graph of I that singles out
those edges that cannot belong to a popular matching. We then use these two results in
conjunction to construct a O(
√
Cn1 +m) time algorithm for finding a maximum popular
matching in I or reporting that none exists, where C is the total capacity of the houses,
n1 is the number of agents and m is the total length of preference lists in I. Finally, as for
the case of CHA, a straightforward solution to the problem of finding a maximum popular
matching in I may be to use “cloning”. Informally, this entails creating cj clones for each
house hj to obtain an instance J of WHAT, and then applying the algorithm of [43] to
J . However, we will show in Section 5.3.6 that this approach leads to a slower algorithm
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than the direct approach that we will be using, as was the case for CHA.
5.2 Characterising a popular matching
We remark that all the notations and terminology that were defined for CHA in Chapters
1, 2 and 4 carry over directly toWCHA. We also provide some additional definitions and
redefine certain concepts that we need to adapt to WCHA as follows.
Let I be an instance of WCHA, and let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying graph of I,
where A = {a1, a2, ..., an1} is the set of agents, H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} is the set of houses
and E is the set of edges in G representing the acceptable houses of the agents. As was the
case in CHA, we also create a unique last resort house l(a) for each agent a and append
l(a) to a’s preference list. We henceforth assume that G contains the vertex l(a) and the
edge (a, l(a)) for each a ∈ A. Again, we let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
Every agent a has a positive weight w(a) indicating the priority of the agent, and
we partition A into the sets P1, P2, ..., Pk, such that the weight of agents in Pz is wz,
and w1 > w2 > ... > wk > 0. For each agent a ∈ A, we say that a has priority z if
a ∈ Pz, and we use P (a) to denote the priority of a, that is P (a) = z. We assume that no
agent has an empty preference list and each house is acceptable to at least one agent, i.e.
m ≥ max {n1, n2}. We also assume that cj ≤ n1 for each hj ∈ H. Again, let C =
∑n2
j=1 cj
denote the sum of the capacities of the houses.
As with CHA, given two matchings M and M ′ in I, we say that an agent a prefers
M ′ to M if either (i) a is matched in M ′ and unmatched in M , or (ii) a is matched in
both M ′ and M and prefers M ′(a) to M(a). Let P (M ′,M) denote the set of agents who
preferM ′ toM . Then, in view of the weights assigned to agents, it is appropriate to define
a popular matching in the context of WCHA as follows. Firstly, let the satisfaction of
M ′ with respect to M be defined as sat(M ′,M) =
∑
a∈P (M ′,M)w(a)−
∑
a∈P (M,M ′)w(a).
We then say that M ′ is more popular than M if sat(M ′,M) > 0. A matching M in I is
popular if there is no other matching in I that is more popular than M .
Let us now proceed to obtain a characterisation of popular matchings in I. For each
agent a ∈ A, we introduce the notion of a’s f-house and a’s s-house denoting these by
f(a) and s(a) respectively. Intuitively, f(a) is the most preferred house on a’s preference
list to which a could be assigned in a popular matching. We use Algorithm Label-f shown
in Algorithm 8 to define f(a) precisely.
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Algorithm 8 Algorithm Label-f
1: for each hj ∈ H do
2: for i in 1..k do
3: fi,j := 0;
4: for each a ∈ P1 do
5: f(a) := first-ranked house hj on a’s preference list;
6: f1,j ++;
7: for z in 2..k do
8: for each a ∈ Pz do
9: q := 1;
10: hj := house at position q on a’s preference list;
11: while (
∑z−1
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj) do
12: q ++;
13: hj := house at position q on a’s preference list;
14: f(a) := hj ;
15: fz,j ++;
Here, we will define the f -houses for all the agents in phases, with each phase corre-
sponding to a priority level Pz. Intuitively, during the course of the algorithm’s execution,
fi,j will denote the number of agents with priority i whose f -house is defined and equal
to hj . Initially, fi,j = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2). We then define the
f -house for each agent as follows. For every agent a ∈ P1, we let f(a) be the first-ranked
house hj on a’s preference list, and we call such a house an f1-house. Given 2 ≤ z ≤ k,
for every agent a ∈ Pz, we let f(a) be the most-preferred house hj on a’s preference list
such that
∑z−1
p=1 fp,j < cj – we call hj an fz-house. Clearly, the algorithm must terminate
due to the presence of a unique last resort house at the end of each agent’s preference
list. Once the algorithm has terminated, we let fi(hj) denote the set {a ∈ Pi : f(a) = hj}.
Then, fi,j = |fi(hj)| (possibly fi,j = 0). Here, and henceforth throughout this chapter,
any reference to fi,j refers to the value of this variable upon termination of Algorithm
Label-f.
It is straightforward to verify that Algorithm Label-f runs in O(m) time if we use
virtual initialisation (described in [9, p.149]) for the steps in lines 1-3. The example in
Figure 5.1 gives an illustration of the definition of f -houses. Here, the f -houses of the
agents are as follows: f(a1) = h1, f(a2) = h3, f(a3) = h3, f(a4) = h4, f(a5) = h4 and
f(a6) = h4.
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Agent Priority Weight Pref list House Capacity
a1: 1 7 h1 h2 h3 h1 1
a2: 2 4 h1 h3 h4 h2 2
a3: 2 4 h3 h5 h3 2
a4: 3 2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h4 2
a5: 3 2 h1 h4 h5 h5 1
a6: 3 2 h4 h1 h2
Figure 5.1: An instance I1 of WCHA
Now, for each hj ∈ H, let f(hj) = {a ∈ A : f(a) = hj} and fj = |f(hj)| (possibly
fj = 0), i.e. f(hj) =
⋃k
p=1 fp(hj). Clearly each hj may be an fz-house for more than one
priority level z. For every such hj , let us define dj to denote the priority level such that
dj =
 max {r : 0 ≤ r ≤ k ∧ fr,j 6= 0} , if fj ≤ cj ,max {r : 0 ≤ r ≤ k ∧∑ri=1 fi,j < cj} , if fj > cj .
Note that for every hj such that fj > cj , clearly
⋃k
p=dj+1
fp(hj) 6= ∅. Hence, for every such
hj , we define gj to be the priority level such that gj = max {r : dj < r ≤ k ∧ fr,j 6= 0}. We
refer to Figure 5.1 for illustration. Here, d1 = 1, d3 = 2 and d4 = 2. Note that d2 and
d5 are not defined, for h2 and h5 are not f -houses for any agent. Also, since f4 > c4, it
follows that g4 = 3; however, h4 is the only f -house hj such that fj > cj . We now work
towards obtaining a characterisation of popular matchings inWCHA. We begin with the
following technical lemma.
Lemma 5.2.1. Let M be a matching in any WCHA instance I. Let hj ∈ H be a house,
and let 1 ≤ i ≤ dj. Let a ∈ A be an agent such that a ∈ Pi and a ∈ fi(hj)\M(hj). If hj is
full in M and
⋃i−1
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆M(hj), then there exists some agent in M(hj)\
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj).
Proof. Let F =
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj). Then, it follows that F = (M(hj) ∩ F ) ∪ (F\M(hj)) and
M(hj) = (M(hj) ∩ F ) ∪ (M(hj)\F ). Hence, we have that |F | =
∑i
p=1 fp,j = |M(hj) ∩
F |+ |F\M(hj)| and |M(hj)| = |M(hj) ∩ F |+ |M(hj)\F |. Clearly, |F | ≤
∑dj
p=1 fp,j ≤ cj .
Since a ∈ fi(hj)\M(hj), it follows that |F\M(hj)| > 0. Hence, |M(hj)\F | = |M(hj)| −
|F |+ |F\M(hj)| > 0.
The next three lemmas contribute to the characterisation of popular matchings in
WCHA.
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Lemma 5.2.2. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I and let
a ∈ A be any agent. Then, a cannot be assigned to a house better than f(a) in M .
Proof. Let a be the agent with lowest priority (i.e. greatest weight) such that a is assigned
to house hj in M and suppose that a prefers hj to f(a) = hl. Let a ∈ Pi so that∑i−1
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj by definition of f(a) as a’s f -house. Clearly, there must be no agent a′
such that a′ ∈ Pz where z ≥ i and f(a′) = hj , for otherwise
∑z−1
p=1 fp,j < cj , a contradiction.
Let a′ be any agent with priority level z < i such that a′ ∈ f(hj)\M(hj) – there must
exist such an agent since
⋃k
p=i fp(hj) = ∅ and
∑i−1
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj and a ∈ M(hj). Then, by
choice of a, a′ is assigned in M to a house worse than f(a′). However, this means that we
can promote a′ to f(a′) and demote a to l(a) to obtain a matching whose improvement in
satisfaction is wz − wi > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 5.2.3. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I. Then, for
each hj ∈ H,
⋃dj
i=1 fi(hj) ⊆M(hj).
Proof. Given 1 ≤ i ≤ dj , we will prove by induction on i that fi(hj) ⊆M(hj).
For the base case, let i = 1. Suppose that f1(hj) 6⊆ M(hj). Then, there exists some
agent ar ∈ f1(hj)\M(hj). By definition of an f1-house, hj must be the first house on
ar’s preference list. Hence, ar prefers to be assigned to hj than M(ar). Clearly, if hj is
undersubscribed in M , we can promote ar to hj to obtain a matching more popular than
M , a contradiction. Hence, hj is full in M . Choose any as ∈ M(hj)\f1(hj) (which must
exist by Lemma 5.2.1). Since as /∈ f1(hj), either (i) as has priority > 1, or (ii) as has
priority 1 but f(as) = hl 6= hj . In subcase (i), we can promote ar to hj and demote as to
l(as) to obtain a more popular matching. In subcase (ii), since f(as) = hl, it follows by
Lemma 5.2.2 that as prefers to be assigned to hl than hj . Now, if hl is undersubscribed
in M , we can promote ar to hj and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, hl is full in M . If hl = M(ar), then we can then promote ar to hj and promote
as to hl to obtain a more popular matching. Otherwise, choose any at ∈ M(hl). Clearly,
at 6= ar. We can then promote ar to hj , promote as to hl, and demote at to l(at) to obtain
a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is w1 + w1 − w(at) > 0.
For the inductive case, assume that 2 ≤ i ≤ dj , and if q < i, then fq(hj) ⊆ M(hj)
for all hj ∈ H. Suppose for a contradiction that fi(hj) 6⊆ M(hj). Then, there exists
some ar ∈ fi(hj)\M(hj). Now, since f(ar) = hj , it follows by Lemma 5.2.2 that ar must
prefer to be assigned to hj than M(ar). Thus, if hj is undersubscribed in M , we can
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promote ar to hj to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction. Hence,
hj is full in M . Choose any as ∈ M(hj)\
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj) which must exist by Lemma 5.2.1.
Since as /∈
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj), either (i) as has priority > i, or (ii) as has priority ≤ i but
f(as) = hl 6= hj .
In subcase (i), we can promote ar to hj and demote as to l(as) to obtain a more
popular matching than M , a contradiction. In subcase (ii), suppose that as has priority
z < i. Then hl is an fz-house so that as ∈ fz(hl). However, this is a contradiction since
by the inductive hypothesis fz(hl) ⊆M(hl), but M(as) 6= hl. Thus, as has priority i and
as ∈ fi(hl). Clearly, since f(as) = hl, it follows by Lemma 5.2.2 that as must prefer to
be assigned to hl than hj . Thus, if hl is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to hj and
promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction. Hence hl is
full. If hl =M(ar), then we can promote ar to hj and promote as to hl to obtain a more
popular matching. Otherwise, hl 6=M(ar). We will show how to choose at ∈M(hl). Since
f(as) = hl and 2 ≤ i ≤ k, by our definition of f -houses, hl must be the most preferred
house on as’s preference list such that
∑i−1
p=1 fp,l < cl.
Now, by the inductive hypothesis, it must be the case that
⋃i−1
p=1 fp(hl) ⊆ M(hl).
Since
∑i−1
p=1 fp,l < cl and hl is full, it follows that
⋃i−1
p=1 fp(hl) ⊂ M(hl). Hence, it must
be the case that M(hl)\
⋃i−1
p=1 fp(hl) 6= ∅. It follows that there exists some agent at ∈
M(hl)\
⋃i−1
p=1 fp(hl) and, either (i) at ∈
⋃k
p=i fp(hl) or (ii) at /∈ f(hl). Clearly, in case
(ii), at has priority ≥ i by a similar argument for as. For, if at has priority z < i, then
by the inductive hypothesis, since hm = f(at) is an fz-house and at ∈ fz(hm), it follows
that fz(hm) ⊆ M(hm). However, this gives a contradiction since M(at) 6= hm. Hence,
at has priority ≥ i in both cases (i) and (ii). We can then promote ar to hj , promote as
to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is
wi + wi − w(at) > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 5.2.4. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I. Then, for
each hj ∈ H, if fj > cj, then M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj (hj).
Proof. Clearly, fgj ,j > cj−
∑dj
p=1 fp,j . It follows by Lemma 5.2.3 that
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆M(hj)
so that no matter whether hj is full or undersubscribed, fgj (hj) 6⊆ M(hj). Hence, there
exists some agent ar such that ar ∈ fgj (hj)\M(hj). Note that ar has priority gj . Clearly,
since f(ar) = hj , ar must prefer to be assigned to hj thanM(ar) by Lemma 5.2.2. Hence, if
hj is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to hj to obtain a more popular matching thanM ,
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a contradiction. It follows that hj is full. We will show that M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj (hj)
for all values of dj .
If dj = 0, then it must be the case that f1,j > cj and ar ∈ f1(hj)\M(hj). If M(hj) ⊆
f1(hj), then the result is immediate. Hence, suppose that M(hj) 6⊆ f1(hj). Choose any
as ∈M(hj)\f1(hj). Clearly, either (i) as has priority 1 but f(as) = hl 6= hj or (ii) as has
priority > 1. In case (i), since f(as) = hl, as must prefer to be assigned to hl than hj
by Lemma 5.2.2. Hence, if hl is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to hj and as to hl
to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Thus, hl is full. By Lemma 5.2.3,⋃dl
p=1 fp(hl) ⊆ M(hl). Since as ∈ f1(hl)\M(hl), it follows that dl = 0, i.e. f1,l > cl. Now,
if M(ar) = hl, then we can promote ar to hj and promote as to hl to obtain a more
popular matching. Hence, M(ar) 6= hl. Choose any at ∈ M(hl). We then promote ar to
hj , promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in
satisfaction is w1 + w1 − w(at) > 0. In case (ii), we can promote ar to hj and demote as
to l(as) to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, dj ≥ 1. Suppose for a contradiction that M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) 6⊆ fgj (hj). It
follows that there exists some agent as ∈M(hj)\
⋃gj
p=1 fp(hj). Recall that ar has priority
gj . Clearly, either (i) as has priority ≤ gj but f(as) = hl 6= hj , or (ii) as has priority
> gj . It is immediate in case (ii) that we can promote ar to hj and demote as to l(as) to
obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, case (i) applies. It follows by
Lemma 5.2.2 that as prefers to be assigned to hl than hj , and so, if hl is undersubscribed,
we can then obtain a more popular matching by promoting ar to hj and promoting as to
hl. Hence hl is full. Now, if M(ar) = hl, we can then promote ar to hj and promote as to
hl to obtain a more popular matching. Hence, M(ar) 6= hl.
Let as have priority z1 so that z1 ≤ gj . By our definition of f -houses, since hl = f(as),
if z1 = 1, then hl is the first house on as’s preference list. Since hl is full, then choose
any at ∈ M(hl) and let at have priority z2. We obtain an improvement in satisfaction
of w(ar) + w(as) − w(at) = wgj + w1 − wz2 > 0 by promoting ar to hj , promoting as
to hl and demoting at to l(at). Hence, it follows that z1 > 1. Then, hl must be the
most preferred house on as’s preference list such that
∑z1−1
p=1 fp,l < cl. By definition of
f(as) = hl, z1 ≤ gl. Now, by Lemma 5.2.3,
⋃dl
p=1 fp(hl) ⊆ M(hl). However, as /∈ M(hl).
Hence, it follows that z1 > dl, i.e. z1 = gl. Since
∑z1−1
p=1 fp,l < cl and hl is full, it follows
that
⋃z1−1
p=1 fp(hl) ⊂M(hl). Hence, we have that M(hl)\
⋃z1−1
p=1 fp(hl) 6= ∅. It follows that
there exists some agent at ∈ M(hl)\
⋃z1−1
p=1 fp(hl). Clearly, either (i) at ∈
⋃k
p=z1
fp(hl) or
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(ii) at /∈ f(hl).
Note that since M(ar) 6= hl, at 6= ar. Now, in both case (i) and (ii), if at has priority
z2 ≥ z1, we can then promote ar to hj , promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a
matching whose improvement in satisfaction is w(ar)+w(as)−w(at) = wgj+wz1−w(at) >
0, a contradiction. Hence z2 < z1, and so only case (ii) applies. Let hm = f(at). It is
obvious, by Lemma 5.2.2, that at prefers to be assigned to hm than hl. Furthermore,
hm 6= hj , for suppose not. As z2 < z1 ≤ gj and f(at) is defined, it follows that z2 ≤ dj .
By Lemma 5.2.3,
⋃z2
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) so that at ∈ M(hj). However,
this gives a contradiction since at ∈ M(hl) and hj 6= hl. Clearly also, hm 6= M(ar) for
otherwise, we can promote ar to hj , promote as to hl and promote at to hm to obtain
a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, the houses hm, hl, hj and M(ar) are
distinct. Clearly too, the agents ar, as and at are distinct for z2 < z1 ≤ gj and ar 6= as.
We assume that hm is full, for otherwise we can obtain a contradiction by promoting
ar to hj , promoting as to hl and promoting at to hm. Let au ∈ M(hm). If z2 = 1, then
we can promote ar to hj , promote as to hl, promote at to hm and demote au to l(au) to
obtain a new matching with improvement in satisfaction w(ar)+w(as)+w(at)−w(au) =
wgj +wz1 +w1 −w(au) > 0. Hence, z2 > 1. If we let at and au take the roles of as and at
respectively, then it follows by the argument that we use to define at that we are able to
choose au such that au has priority < z2 and au /∈ f(hm). It follows that au is an agent
distinct from ar, as and at since P (au) < z2.
By continuing this argument, it follows that we obtain a sequence of distinct agents
a0, a1, a2, a3, ... where a0 = ar, a1 = as, a2 = at, and a3 = au. For i ≥ 4, the above
construction indicates that P (ai) < P (ai−1). If this sequence does not terminate as a
result of arriving at a contradiction due to any of the above cases, then we are bound to
ultimately generate an agent ax such that P (ax) < 1, which is impossible.
Lemmas 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 give rise to the following corollary concerning the relation of
f -houses to popular matchings.
Corollary 5.2.1. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I. Then, for
every f-house hj,
1. if fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆M(hj);
2. if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj,
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆M(hj), and
M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj (hj).
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Proof. In Case 1, if fj ≤ cj , it follows by definition of dj that
⋃k
p=dj+1
fp(hj) = ∅. Clearly
then, f(hj) =
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆M(hj) by Lemma 5.2.3. In Case 2, it follows by Lemmas 5.2.3
and 5.2.4 that
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆M(hj), M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj (hj) and |M(hj)| = cj .
We now define the concept of an s-house for each agent. Given a popular matching
M , if M(a) 6= f(a), then as we shall show, M(a) = s(a). Given 1 ≤ z ≤ k, for every agent
a ∈ Pz, we define s(a) to be the most preferred house hj on a’s preference list such that
hj 6= f(a) and
∑z
i=1 fi,j < cj . Note that s(a) may not exist if f(a) = l(a). However, all
such agents will be assigned to their f -houses in any matching since last resort houses are
unique to individual agents.
To illustrate the s-house definition, let us look at Instance I1 in Figure 5.1 again.
We may verify from the definition of s-houses that s(a1) = h2, s(a2) = h4, s(a3) = h5,
s(a4) = h5, s(a5) = h5 and s(a6) = h2. Clearly, the set of fi-houses need not be disjoint
from the set of sj-houses for i 6= j as seen from this example. Now, since the process of
defining s-houses is analogous to the algorithm for defining f -houses, the time complexity
for defining s-houses is also O(m).
Now, it may be shown that a popular matchingM will only assign an agent a to either
f(a) or s(a) as indicated by the next lemma.
Lemma 5.2.5. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I. Then, every
agent a ∈ A is assigned in M to either f(a) or s(a).
Proof. Let a ∈ Pi and let M(a) = hx. Suppose that the statement of this lemma is false.
By Lemma 5.2.2, a cannot be assigned to a house better than f(a). Then, besides f(a) or
s(a), hx can either be (i) a house between f(a) and s(a) or (ii) a house worse than s(a).
In case (i), it follows that hx is an f -house such that
∑i
p=1 fp,x ≥ cx, for otherwise
s(a) = hx. Hence, fx ≥ cx and M(hx) ⊆ f(hx) by Corollary 5.2.1. However, a ∈
M(hx)\f(hx), a contradiction.
In case (ii), let hj = s(a). It follows that a must prefer to be assigned to hj than
M(a) = hx. Clearly, hj is full, for otherwise we can promote a to hj , a contradiction.
It follows by our definition of s-houses that
∑i
p=1 fp,j < cj . Hence, by our definition
of dj , i ≤ dj . Since
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) (by Lemma 5.2.3) and hj is full, it follows
that
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj) ⊂ M(hj) so that M(hj)\
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj) 6= ∅. Hence, there exists some
as ∈M(hj)\
⋃i
p=1 fp(hj). It is obvious that either (i) as ∈
⋃k
p=i+1 fp(hj), or (ii) as /∈ f(hj).
Clearly in case (i), as has priority > i, so we can promote a to hj and demote as to
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l(as) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is wi − w(as) > 0. In case
(ii), let as have priority z1. It follows that z1 ≤ i, for otherwise, we can promote a to hj
and demote as to l(as) to obtain a new matching whose improvement in satisfaction is
wi − wz1 > 0. Let f(as) = hl. Clearly, as must prefer to be assigned to hl than hj by
Lemma 5.2.2. If hl is undersubscribed, we can then promote a to hj and promote as to hl
to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, suppose that hl is full. Let
at ∈M(hl).
If z1 = 1, then we can promote a to hj , promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain
a matching with improvement in satisfaction w(a)+w(as)−w(at) = wi+w1−w(at) > 0.
Hence, suppose that z1 > 1. Clearly, hx 6= hl for suppose otherwise. By Corollary 5.2.1,
hl must be an f -house such that fl > cl by existence of as, for otherwise as ∈ M(hl).
It follows that M(hl) ⊆ f(hl). Now, if hl = hx, then this gives us a contradiction since
a ∈M(hl) but hx 6= f(a) for a prefers s(a) to hx.
Hence, hl 6= hx. Then, at 6= a. It follows that we can reuse arguments from the proof
of Lemma 5.2.4 to obtain a sequence of distinct agents a0, a1, a2, ... where a0 = a, a1 = as,
and a2 = at. For j ≥ 3, the construction of the sequence indicates that P (ai) < P (ai−1).
If this sequence does not terminate as a result of arriving at a contradiction due to any of
the cases outlined in Lemma 5.2.4, then we are bound to ultimately generate an agent ax
such that P (ax) < 1, which is impossible.
Corollary 5.2.1 and Lemma 5.2.5 give rise to the following result.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I.
1. For every f-house hj,
(a) if fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆M(hj);
(b) if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj,
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆M(hj), and
M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj (hj).
2. Every agent a is assigned to either f(a) or s(a).
5.3 Algorithm for finding a popular matching
Let us form a subgraph G′ of G by letting G′ contain only two edges for each agent a ∈ A,
that is, one to f(a) and the other to s(a). It follows that all popular matchings must
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be contained in G′ by Theorem 5.2.1. However, Theorem 5.2.1 only gives us necessary
conditions for a matching to be popular in an instance ofWCHA, since not all matchings
in G′ satisfying these conditions are popular. For, let us consider the example WCHA
instance in Figure 5.1. We have at least two matchings which satisfy Conditions 1 and
2 of Theorem 5.2.1: M1 = {(a1, h1), (a2, h3), (a3, h3), (a4, h5), (a5, h4), (a6, h4)} and M2 =
{(a1, h1), (a2, h3), (a3, h3), (a4, h4), (a5, h5), (a6, h4)}. However, while M1 may be verified
to be a popular matching, M2 is not popular because there exists another matching M3 =
{(a2, h1), (a3, h3), (a4, h3), (a5, h4), (a6, h4)} which gives an improvement in satisfaction of
w(a2) + w(a4) + w(a5) − w(a1) = 4 + 2 + 2 − 7 > 0 over M2. Hence, we will “enforce”
the sufficiency of the conditions by removing certain edges in G′ that cannot form part of
any popular matching in I. We show how to do this by first introducing the notion of a
potential improvement path or PIP in short, which generalises the concept of a promotion
path from [43] to WCHA.
5.3.1 Potential improvement paths
Let us now define a matching M that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 5.2.1 to be
well-formed. Then, a PIP leading out of some f -house h0 with respect to a well-formed
matching M is an alternating path Π = 〈h0, a0, h1, a1, ..., hx, ax〉 such that hi = f(ai) and
(ai, hi) ∈ M for 0 ≤ i ≤ x, and ai prefers hi+1 to hi for i < x. A PIP leading out of h0
always exists, which can be seen as follows. Since h0 is an f -house and c0 ≥ 1, there exists
some agent a′0 ∈ f(h0) ∩M(h0) by Theorem 5.2.1. Then, by definition, 〈h0, a′0〉 is a PIP
leading out of h0. The next lemma shows that any PIP leading out of h0 must contain a
sequence of agents with strictly decreasing priorities. Hence, the sequence of agents in Π
must be distinct since the priority of agents is strictly decreasing.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let M be a well-formed matching. Let Π = 〈h0, a0, ..., hx, ax〉 be a PIP
with respect to M leading out of h0 as defined above. Then, P (ai+1) < P (ai) for 0 ≤ i < x.
Proof. Let a0 have priority z1. If x = 0, then a0 is the last (only) agent in the path.
Otherwise, x > 0 and it follows by definition of Π that h0 is not the first house on a0’s
preference list as h1 is a house that a0 prefers to h0. Hence, it must be that h1 is an
f -house such that
∑z1−1
p=1 fp,1 ≥ c1 by definition of f(a0) = h0.
Since M is well-formed and f1 ≥ c1, it follows by Theorem 5.2.1 that |M(h1)| = c1
and M(h1) ⊆ f(h1). Now, if
∑z1−1
p=1 fp,1 = c1, then by definition of an f -house, fp,1 = 0
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for z1 ≤ p ≤ k. Hence, d1 ≤ z1 − 1. Since f1 = c1, it follows that M(h1) ⊆
⋃z1−1
p=1 fp(h1)
by Theorem 5.2.1. On the other hand, if
∑z1−1
p=1 fp,1 > c1, then f1 > c1 and g1 ≤ z1− 1. It
follows by Theorem 5.2.1 again that M(h1) ⊆
⋃z1−1
p=1 fp(h1). Clearly as a result, M(h1) ⊆⋃z1−1
p=1 fp(h1) in all cases.
Since a1 ∈ M(h1), it follows that f(a1) = h1 and a1 has priority strictly less than z1.
Moreover, we can repeat the argument to deduce the priority of each agent ai in Π. It is
then straightforward to see that the priority of any agent in Π must be strictly less than
its predecessor so that P (ai+1) < P (ai) for each i ≥ 0.
Let us define the cost of Π to be cost(Π) = w(ax)− w(ax−1)− ...− w(a0) if x > 0. Note
that cost(Π) = w(a0) if x = 0. We now motivate the notion of a PIP as follows. Let us
suppose that there exists some agent ar who prefers h0 to M(ar). The next lemma shows
that any such agent cannot belong to Π. Now, if cost(Π) < w(ar), we can conclude that
the well-formed matching M is not popular because we can promote ar to hj , and use
the PIP to promote each ai to hi+1 for all i < x and demote ax to l(ax) to obtain a new
matching that is more popular than M .
Lemma 5.3.2. Let M be a well-formed matching. Let Π = 〈h0, a0, ..., hx, ax〉 be a PIP
with respect to M leading out of h0 as defined above. Then, any agent a who prefers h0 to
M(a) does not belong to Π.
Proof. Let a have priority z. Since M is well-formed, either (i) M(a) = f(a) or (ii)
M(a) = s(a). It follows in case (i) that
∑z−1
p=1 fp,0 ≥ c0 by definition of f(a). In case
(ii), either (a) h0 = f(a) or (b) h0 is an f -house such that h0 6= f(a) and
∑z
p=1 fp,0 ≥
c0 by definition of s(a). Now, in subcase (a), if
∑z
p=1 fp,0 < c0, then z ≤ d0 so that⋃z
p=1 fp(h0) ⊆
⋃d0
p=1 fp(h0) ⊆ M(h0) since M is a well-formed matching. However, this
implies that a ∈ M(h0), a contradiction. It follows in all cases that
∑z
p=1 fp,0 ≥ c0.
Using a similar argument as in Lemma 5.3.1, we can establish that |M(h0)| = c0 and
M(h0) ⊆
⋃z
p=1 fp(h0). It follows that P (a) ≥ P (a0) and hence, the priority of a must be
greater than the priority of any other agent in Π by Lemma 5.3.1. Since a 6= a0, a cannot
be an agent in Π.
5.3.2 Pruning the graph
Let us now introduce Algorithm Prune-WCHA which will enable us to remove certain
edges in G′ that cannot be part of any popular matching. The algorithm is divided into two
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Algorithm 9 First stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA
1: for each f -house h do
2: λ(h) := w1; {// a suitable upper bound}
3: for z in 1..k do
4: for each a ∈ Pz do
5: Let S contain the set of houses that a prefers to f(a);
6: if S 6= ∅ then
7: λmin(a, f(a)) := min {λ(h) : h ∈ S};
8: else
9: λmin(a, f(a)) :=∞; {// a suitable default value}
10: if λmin(a, f(a)) < wz then
11: return “No popular matching exists”;
12: for each fz-house hj do
13: f ′z(hj) := fz(hj);
14: if z ≤ dj then
15: for each a ∈ f ′z(hj) do
16: Remove (a, s(a)) from G′;
17: else {// z = gj > dj}
18: for each a ∈ f ′z(hj) such that λmin(a, hj) < 2wz do
19: Remove (a, hj) from G′;
20: Remove a from f ′z(hj);
21: if f ′z(hj) = ∅ then { // |f ′z(hj)| < cj −
∑dj
p=1 fp,j}
22: return “No popular matching exists.”;
23: λz(hj) := min(wz,min {λmin(a, hj)− wz : a ∈ f ′z(hj)});{ // λmin(a, hj) ≥ wz}
24: λ(hj) := min(λ(hj), λz(hj));
25: if z > dj and λ(hj) < wz then
26: return “No popular matching exists.”;
stages, with the first stage shown in Algorithm 9 and the second stage shown in Algorithm
10. The first stage is carried out in phases, with each phase corresponding to a priority
level Pz.
Intuitively, in each phase in the first stage, we compute the costs of PIPs and determine
the minimum of these for each f -house hj , and then use these values to identify and remove
certain edges incident to f -houses in G′ that cannot belong to any popular matching.
Based on the minimum values of PIPs calculated for f -houses in the first stage, we then
identify and remove in the second stage edges incident to s-houses in G′ that cannot belong
to any popular matching. Let G′′ denote the graph obtained from G′ once the algorithm
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Algorithm 10 Second stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA
1: for each a ∈ A do
2: Let hl := s(a);
3: Let R contain the set of houses that a prefers to hl;
4: Let S contain the set of houses that a prefers to f(a);
5: R := R− (S ∪ {f(a)});
6: if R 6= ∅ then
7: λmin(a, hl) := min {λ(h) : h ∈ R};
8: else
9: λmin(a, hl) :=∞; {// a suitable default value}
10: if λmin(a, hl) < w(a) or fl ≥ cl then
11: Remove (a, hl) from G′;
terminates (following these edge removals). The removal of these edges will ensure that any
well-formed matching in G′′ is popular. Over the phases of execution, certain conditions
may arise which signal to the algorithm that no popular matching exists.
Recall that hj may be an f -house for more than one priority level, and hj may be
an f -house for more than one agent for each priority level. In the algorithm, we will use
λz(hj) as a variable and its value at the end of the algorithm equals the minimum cost
of a PIP leading out of hj taken over all well-formed matchings in G′′ such that (ar, hj)
is the first edge for some ar ∈ Pz. We will also use λ(hj) to compute the minimum cost
taken over all λz(hj). Note that we initialise λ(h) to w1 for every f -house h at the outset
of the first stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA, for if Π is any PIP leading out of h, then
cost(Π) ≤ w(ax), where ax is the final agent on the path. However, w(ax) ≤ w1. Hence,
w1 is an upper bound for the final computed value of λ(h). Let Πmin(hj) denote a PIP
with minimum cost leading out of hj taken over all well-formed matchings in G′′. Let
cost(Πmin(hj)) denote the cost of this path. Then, as we shall show, the final value of
λ(hj) in the execution of the algorithm gives us the value of cost(Πmin(hj)).
For any agent as ∈ A, let S contain the set of houses on as’s preference list that as
prefers to f(as). Note that S will be empty if f(as) is the first house on as’s preference
list. If S 6= ∅, we will use λmin(as, f(as)) within the algorithm to compute the minimum
cost of a PIP out of hq, taken over all hq ∈ S, and over all well-formed matchings in G′′;
otherwise, the algorithm sets λmin(as, f(as)) to ∞ as a suitable default value. Similarly,
let R contain the set of houses on as’s preference list after f(as) that as prefers to s(as). If
R 6= ∅, we will use λmin(as, s(as)) within the algorithm to compute the minimum cost of a
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PIP out of hq, taken over all hq ∈ R, and over all well-formed matchings in G′′; otherwise,
the algorithm sets λmin(as, s(as)) to ∞ as a suitable default value.
5.3.3 Proof of correctness
The following lemma gives us an important technical result regarding the correctness of
the algorithm.
Lemma 5.3.3. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not terminate during the exe-
cution of its first stage by reporting that no popular matching exists. Let z be an iteration
of the for loop on line 3. Let hj ∈ H be any fz-house. Then, at the end of this iteration:
1. for each a ∈ Pz, if f(a) is not the first ranked house in a’s preference list, then
λmin(a, f(a)) equals the minimum cost of all PIPs among all houses that a prefers
to f(a) taken over all well-formed matchings in G′′; else, λmin(a, f(a)) =∞.
2. λz(hj) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs taken over all well-formed matchings
in G′′ such that (a, hj) is the first edge for some a ∈ Pz.
3. λ(hj) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs taken over all well-formed matchings
in G′′ such that (a, hj) is the first edge for some a ∈ Pq where 1 ≤ q ≤ z.
4. if any edge has been removed from G′, then it cannot be part of any popular matching.
Proof. Given 1 ≤ z ≤ k, we will proceed by induction on z.
For the base case, let z = 1. If a ∈ P1, then clearly S = ∅ for a so that ∞ is assigned
to λmin(a, f(a)) as required in line 9. Now, any PIP leading out of hj and containing the
edge (a, hj) ends at a and has cost w1. Clearly, w1 is assigned to λz(hj) as required at line
23 since λmin(a′, hj) =∞ for each a′ ∈ f ′1(hj). Also, w1 is assigned to λ(hj) at line 24 as
required, since this is the minimum of λz(hj) and the initialised value of λ(hj) which is
also w1. Finally, the only edges removed during this iteration are dealt with at lines 15-16
(as the condition in line 18 is not satisfied). For, clearly if a ∈ P1 and dj ≥ 1, a must
be assigned to f(a) = hj and not s(a) in any well-formed matching M by Condition 1 of
Theorem 5.2.1. Hence, the edge (a, s(a)) cannot belong to any popular matching.
For the inductive case, let us assume that 2 ≤ z ≤ k, and that the result is true for
z − 1. Let a ∈ Pz be any agent. Suppose that S 6= ∅. Choose any hl ∈ S. It follows
that
∑z−1
p=1 fp,l ≥ cl by definition of hj = f(a). Hence, it is impossible that hl can be
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an fp-house for any p ≥ z. By the inductive hypothesis, λ(hl) stores the minimum cost
among all PIPs leading out of hl where (a′, hl) is the first edge for some a′ ∈ Pq where
1 ≤ q ≤ z − 1. Hence, λ(hl) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs leading out of hl at
the end of the iteration z − 1. Thus, if S 6= ∅, then when λmin(a, f(a)) is defined during
iteration z in line 7, it contains the minimum cost of a PIP leading out of any house that
a prefers to f(a); otherwise, S = ∅ and λmin(a, f(a)) is assigned to be ∞ in line 9 as
required.
Now, it follows that the minimum cost of a PIP out of hj for which the first edge
is (a, hj) such that a ∈ fz(hj) either stops at a and has cost wz, or it continues. If it
continues, it must do so with some edge (a, hl) such that a prefers hl to hj . Hence, the
minimum cost of a PIP out of hj for which the first edge is (a, hj) is the minimum of wz
and λmin(a, hj) − wz. Clearly then, this is exactly the value assigned to λz(hj) on line
23 as required. Also, it follows by the inductive hypothesis that λ(hj) should be set at
iteration z to be the minimum of λz(hj) and the value of λ(hj) at the end of iteration
z − 1. This is precisely the value assigned to λ(hj) at line 24.
Finally, it remains to show that any edge removed during iteration z cannot belong
to part of any popular matching. Now, if z ≤ dj , then it follows by Theorem 5.2.1 that
a must be assigned to hj and not s(a) for any well-formed matching M . Hence, the edge
(a, s(a)) cannot belong to any well-formed matching and is deleted in line 16 as required.
Clearly, if fj ≤ cj , then it is bound to be the case that z ≤ dj .
On the other hand, if z > dj , then it follows that in any well-formed matching M ,⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) but only a proper subset of fgj (hj) will be assigned to hj in M .
Now, suppose that a ∈M(hj)∩ fgj (hj). It follows that z = gj . Let hl be any house that a
prefers to hj , supposing that such a house exists. Clearly, if there exists a minimum cost
PIP Π out of hl such that cost(Πmin(hl)) − wz < wz, then Π can be used to promote a
to hl, and in the process, free up a space in hj which can thus be assigned to any agent
a′ in fgj (hj)\M(hj). Clearly, M(a′) = s(a′) since M is well-formed so that a′ improves
as result. It follows that M cannot be popular since we can promote a′ to hj , promote
a to hl and promote along Π to obtain a more popular matching than M . Hence, if
λmin(a, hj) < 2wz, then M is not popular. Since M is arbitrary, the edge (a, hj) cannot
belong to any popular matching so that we delete it in line 19.
Note that Πmin(hl) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M . For, let us
consider the first edge (b, hl) in Πmin(hl). Note that fl ≥ cl and gl < z since hl is a house
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that a prefers to f(a) = hj .
Suppose firstly that b ∈ fgl(hl). Let λdl be the value of λ(hl) at the end of phase
gl − 1. Now, we have that the value of λ(hl) as computed in phase gl by lines 23-24
of the algorithm is equal to min(wgl , λdl ,min
{
λmin(b′, hl)− wgl : b′ ∈ f ′gl(hl)
}
). Let us
suppose that min
{
λmin(b′, hl)− wgl : b′ ∈ f ′gl(hl)
}
< wgl . Then, there exists some agent
b′ ∈ f ′gl(hl) such that λmin(b′, hl)− wgl < wgl , i.e. λmin(b′, hl) < 2wgl . However, such a b′
would have been removed from f ′gl(hl) at line 20, a contradiction. Hence, λmin(b
′, hl) −
wgl ≥ wgl for all b′ ∈ f ′gl(hl). It follows that any minimum cost PIP in G′′ (with respect
to any well-formed matching) with (b′, hl) as its first edge must have cost greater than
or equal to wgl , i.e. cost(Πmin(hl)) ≥ wgl . Now, suppose that λdl < wgl . Then, there
exists a PIP leading out of hl whose first edge is (c, hl) where P (c) ≤ dl, with cost less
than wgl . However, this then contradicts the fact that the PIP with (b, hl) as its first
edge has minimum cost for hl as we supposed. Hence, wgl is a lower bound for the final
computed value of λ(hl). Clearly then, λ(hl) = wgl . Since (b, hl) is the first edge of
Πmin(hl) where b ∈ fgl(hl), then as this path is defined with respect to some well-formed
matching, it follows that (b′, hl) ∈ M for some b′ ∈ fgl(hl) (possibly b = b′), since M
is well-formed. Then, 〈hl, b′〉 is a PIP of cost wgl with respect to M . Moreover, since
wgl = cost(Πmin(hl)) < 2wz as established in the previous paragraph, it follows that we
can promote a to hl, promote a′ to hj and demote b′ from hl so that M is not popular as
shown above.
Hence, b ∈ ⋃dlp=1 fp(hl). Clearly then, (b, hl) must belong to every well-formed matching
by Condition 1(a) of Theorem 5.2.1 so that (b, hl) must belong to M . It follows that we
can repeat the above argument to show that Πmin(hl) is a minimum cost PIP with respect
to M by considering the remaining alternate edges in Πmin(hl). If each alternate edge
(c, hx) satisfies the condition c ∈
⋃dx
p=1 fp(hx), then the result is immediate. Otherwise, it
must be the case that we encounter some edge (c′, hx′) in Πmin(hl) such that c′ ∈ fgx′ (hx′).
Clearly then, (c′, hx′) is the final edge in Πmin(hl) so that we must be able to promote a
to hl, promote a′ to hj and promote along Πmin(hl) to obtain a more popular matching
than M by a similar argument to that in the previous paragraph.
The next three lemmas establish the correctness of the algorithm.
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Lemma 5.3.4. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not terminate during the ex-
ecution of its first stage by reporting that no popular matching exists. Then, any edge
removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA over both stages cannot belong to a popular match-
ing.
Proof. By Lemma 5.3.3, any edges removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA in the first stage
cannot belong to any popular matching. We now show that any edges removed by the
algorithm in the second stage also cannot belong to any popular matching.
Let M be any well-formed matching. Let a be any agent and let P (a) = z. Also, let
R contain the set of houses between f(a) and s(a) on a’s preference list that a prefers to
s(a) (not including f(a) and s(a)). Let s(a) = hl. Suppose that M(a) = hl. Let hj ∈ R
and suppose that cost(Πmin(hj)) < wz. Clearly, Πmin(hj) must be a minimum cost PIP
with respect to M by a similar argument to that used in the proof of Lemma 5.3.3. Then,
Πmin(hj) can be used to free up hj and promote a to hj to obtain a more popular matching
than M . Hence, M cannot be popular. It follows that an edge pruned due to the first
condition in line 10 of the second stage of the algorithm cannot belong to any popular
matching.
Now, if fl ≥ cl and M(a) = hl, then M cannot be popular by Condition 1 of Theorem
5.2.1, since M(hl) 6⊆
⋃gl
p=1 fp(hl). This shows that the edge (a, hl) pruned due to the
second condition in line 10 of the second stage of the algorithm also cannot belong to any
popular matching.
It thus follows that any edges removed by the algorithm cannot belong to a popular
matching.
Lemma 5.3.5. If Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular matching exists, then
there does not exist any well-formed matching in G′ that is popular.
Proof. Let us consider the cases where Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular
matchings exist as a result of some condition being satisfied: (i) lines 10-11 ,(ii) lines 21-22
and (iii) lines 25-26 of the first stage respectively. Let a be any agent and let P (a) = z.
Also, let f(a) = hj .
In case (i), let us suppose thatM(a) = hj for some well-formed matchingM . Let hl be
a house that a prefers to hj such that λmin(a, hj) = cost(Πmin(hl)). It follows by a similar
argument to that used in the proof of Lemma 5.3.3 that Πmin(hl) must be a minimum
cost PIP with respect to M . Now, if λ(hl) < wz, then we can use Πmin(hl) to free hl and
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then promote a to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M . Hence, M cannot be
popular. Since M is arbitrary, it follows that no popular matching exists.
In case (ii), clearly fj > cj . Now, if f ′gj (hj) = ∅ after the removal of edges in lines
18-20, then it follows that no well-formed matching can exist in G′′ since no matching can
satisfy Condition 1(b) of Theorem 5.2.1. Hence, no popular matching can exist.
In case (iii), let us suppose that z = gj . Clearly, only a proper subset of agents in
fgj (hj) can be assigned to hj in M since fj > cj . Let a ∈ fgj (hj)\M(hj). Note that
Πmin(hj) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M using a similar argument in the
proof of Lemma 5.3.3. Now, if λ(hj) < wgj , Πmin(hj) can be used to free up a place in hj
and then promote a (who must be assigned to s(a) in M) to hj to obtain a matching that
is more popular than M . Since M is arbitrary, no popular matching exists.
Lemma 5.3.6. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not state that no popular
matching exists. Let M be a well-formed matching in the pruned graph G′′. Then, M is
popular.
Proof. Now, if M is not popular, it follows that there exists another matching M ′ which
is more popular than M . Let us clone G′′ to obtain a cloned graph C(G′′) as follows. We
replace every house hj ∈ H with the clones h1j , h2j , . . . , hcjj . We then divide the capacity
of each house among its clones by allowing each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if
(a, hj) is an edge in G′′, then we add (a, h
p
j ) to the edge set of C(G
′′) for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj).
Let us then adapt the well-formed matching M in G′′ to obtain its clone C(M) in C(G′′)
as follows. If a house hj in G′′ is assigned to xj agents a1, ...axj in M , then we add (ap, h
p
j )
to C(M) for 1 ≤ p ≤ xj , so that |C(M)| = |M |. We repeat a similar process for M ′ to
obtain its clone C(M ′) in C(G′′).
Let us consider X = C(M) ⊕ C(M ′). Since sat(M ′,M) > 0, let a ∈ A be an agent
who prefers M ′ to M . Let P (a) = z and let M ′(a) = hj . We will show that there exists
a PIP Π leading out of hj with respect to M . Since M is well-formed, we can reuse a
similar argument to the proof of Lemma 5.3.2 to establish that hj is an f -house such that∑z
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj . It follows that hj is full in M and M(hj) ⊆ f(hj) by Theorem 5.2.1.
Let ar ∈ M(hj)\M ′(hj) (ar must exist since hj is full in M) and let P (ar) = z1. Then,
a 6= ar. Also, it follows that f(ar) = hj and z1 ≤ z. If ar does not prefer M ′ to M ,
then we finish tracing Π. Otherwise, we will extend Π to make sure that it ends with
some agent b who prefers M to M ′. It follows by definition of f(ar) that M ′(ar) = hl is
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an f -house that ar prefers to hj such that
∑z1−1
p=1 fp,l ≥ cl and hence by Theorem 5.2.1,
M(hl) ⊆ f(hl). Let as ∈ M(hl)\M ′(hl) and let P (as) = z2. Clearly then, z2 < z1. It
follows by the same argument as for ar that if as does not prefer M ′ to M , then we finish
tracing Π, i.e. Π = 〈hj , ar, hl, as〉. Otherwise, we repeat the argument until we encounter
an agent at who does not preferM ′ toM so that Π terminates. Clearly, this will eventually
happen since all agents in Π are assigned in M to their f -house and the priority levels of
agents are strictly decreasing so that we must eventually reach some agent at ∈ P1 such
that M(at) = f(at). However, it is then impossible that at prefers M ′ to M . Finally, by
construction of Π, it follows that Π belongs to X since Π (with appropriate superscripts
for house clones) consists of alternate edges in C(M)\C(M ′) and C(M ′)\C(M).
We have established that for every a ∈ P (M ′,M), there exists a PIP Π(a) leading
out of hj , where hj = M ′(a). Let Γ = {Π(a) : a ∈ P (M ′,M)} and let Γ′ ⊆ Γ contain
only those maximal PIPs in Γ. We will show that there exists an agent d ∈ A such
that Π(d) ∈ Γ′ and cost(Π(d)) < w(d). For, suppose that cost(Π(a)) ≥ w(a) for every
Π(a) ∈ Γ′. Let Π(a) ∈ Γ′ and let Π(a) = 〈h0, a0, h1, a1, ..., hx, ax〉. We define l(Π(a)) = ax.
Also, cost(Π(a)) = w(ax)−w(ax−1)− ...−w(a0) ≥ w(a), i.e. w(a)+w(a0)+ ...+w(ax−1) ≤
w(ax). Now, {a, a0, ..., ax−1} ⊆ P (M ′,M) whilst ax ∈ P (M,M ′). Let D be the connected
component of X containing Π(a) (with appropriate superscripts for house clones). It
follows that D must be a path or cycle whose edges alternate between C(M) and C(M ′).
Clearly, D cannot be an even-length alternating path with more agents than houses, or
an odd-length alternating path whose end edges belong to C(M ′), for otherwise we have
an agent who is unassigned in C(M) and hence in M , a contradiction to the definition
of a well-formed matching. Hence, D is either an (i) even-length alternating path with
more houses than agents, or (ii) an odd-length alternating path whose end edges belong
to C(M), or (iii) a cycle. It is obvious that D contains distinct agents and so we cannot
have overlapping maximal PIPs. Hence, by construction of Γ′, the agents in Π(a), together
with a, but not including l(Π(a)), taken over all Π(a) ∈ Γ′, form a partition of P (M ′,M).
Moreover, for every such a, we have established the existence of some l(Π(a)) ∈ P (M,M ′).
Hence,
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∑
a∈P (M ′,M)
w(a) =
∑
Π(a)∈Γ′
w(a) +
∑
Π(a)∈Γ′
∑{
w(a′) : a′ ∈ Π(a) ∧ a′ 6= l(Π(a)}
≤
∑
Π(a)∈Γ′
{
w(a′) : a′ = l(Π(a))
}
≤
∑
a∈P (M,M ′)
w(a)
It follows that sat(M ′,M) ≤ 0, a contradiction. As a result, cost(Π(d)) < w(d) for
some Π(d) ∈ Γ′. Let hj =M ′(d). Now, if M(d) = f(d), then lines 10-11 of the first stage
of the algorithm would report that no popular matching exists since λmin(d, f(d)) < w(d),
a contradiction. Hence, M(d) = s(d) and hj is (i) better than f(d), or (ii) equal to f(d),
or (iii) between f(d) and s(d) on a’s preference list. In case (i), we obtain the same
contradiction as when M(d) = f(d) since λmin(d, f(d)) < w(d). In case (ii), f(d) = hj .
Since M(d) = s(d), it must be the case that d ∈ fgj (hj) for otherwise (d, s(d)) would have
been deleted by line 16 of the algorithm. Clearly though, lines 25-26 of the first stage of
the algorithm would report that no popular matching exists, a contradiction. In case (iii),
(d, s(d)) would have been deleted by lines 10-11 of the second stage of the algorithm since
λmin(d, s(d)) < w(d), a contradiction. It follows that we obtain a contradiction in all cases
so that M ′ is not more popular than M .
Finally, the next lemma shows that if there is no well-formed matching in the graph
G′′, then no popular matching exists.
Lemma 5.3.7. Let G′′ be the reduced graph of a given WCHA instance I. If there is no
well-formed matching in G′′, then no popular matching exists in I.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a popular matching M in I. Now, by Theorem 5.2.1, M
is a well-formed matching in G′. Moreover, all edges of M must belong to G′′ by Lemma
5.3.4. However, this implies that M is a well-formed matching in G′′, a contradiction.
We now use the example in Figure 5.1 to illustrate our algorithm. After the first
stage, we have λ(h1) = 7, λ(h3) = 3 and λ(h4) = 2. We remove the edges (a1, h2) in
phase 1, and (a2, h4) and (a3, h5) in phase 2 of the first stage (in line 16 of the first
stage) since a1 belongs to fd1(h1), and a2 and a3 belong to fd3(h3) respectively. We also
remove the edge (a4, h4) in phase 3 of the first stage (in lines 19-20 of the first stage) since
λmin(a4, h4) = 3 < 2w(a4). No further edges are removed in the second stage.
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5.3.4 Finding a popular matching
We are now left with the task of finding a well-formed matching M in G′′ in order to find
a popular matching if one exists. Note that the removal of edges from G′ by Algorithm
Prune-WCHA effectively reduces the problem to that of finding a popular matching in
an instance of CHA. For let us consider the problem of trying to assign agents to each
f -house hj so that hj satisfies Condition 1 of a well-formed matching.
Now, if fj ≤ cj , then ensuring that
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) is equivalent to ensuring
Condition 1(a) of Theorem 4.2.1 on page 47. This work is done by lines 2-8 of Algorithm
Popular-CHA. On the other hand, if fj > cj , we need to ensure that those agents with
the correct priorities are assigned to hj in M , i.e. there does not exist any agent a ∈⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj)\M(hj). Now, since line 16 in the first stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA
ensures the removal of the edge (a, s(a)) of every such a where a ∈ ⋃djp=1 fp(hj), a must
be assigned to f(a) if an agent-complete matching (i.e. a matching in which all agents
are assigned) is to exist. This is equivalent to the work done by lines 10-12 of Algorithm
Popular-CHA on page 48, which tries to find an agent-complete matching and reports that
no popular matching exists if unsuccessful. Furthermore, lines 15-18 of Algorithm Popular-
CHA also ensures that if fj > cj , then |M(hj)| = cj and M(hj)\
⋃dj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj (hj).
Lastly, we need to ensure that each agent is assigned to either f(a) or s(a) and it is evident
that running Algorithm Popular-CHA on G′′ does this. Hence, we can find a popular
matching in WCHA, if one exists, by running Algorithm Popular-CHA on the reduced
graph G′′. As illustration, if we run Algorithm Popular-CHA on the example in Figure 5.1
after edge removals through Algorithm Prune-WCHA, then Algorithm Popular-CHA will
return the following matching M = {(a1, h1), (a2, h3), (a3, h3), (a4, h5), (a5, h4), (a6, h4)}
which may be verified to be popular.
Let us now consider the time taken to find a popular matching in an instance of
WCHA, or to report that no such matching exists. First of all, it takes O(m) time to
define the f - and s-houses. Let us then consider the time complexity of Algorithm Prune-
WCHA. It is clear that the subgraph G′ can be constructed in O(m) time and has O(n1)
edges since each agent has degree 2 in G′. Clearly, in the first stage of the algorithm,
initialising λ(hj) for each f -house takes O(n2) time. Next, we iterate over every agent a
to define λmin(a, f(a)). In order to do so, we traverse the preference list of a to find the
minimum cost of all PIPs among all houses that a prefers to f(a), if such houses exist.
Even though this occurs in phases, with the total number of phases equal to the number of
83
Chapter 5. Popular matchings in WCHA
priority levels, the computation time for this takes O(m) time overall by the total length of
preference lists. Hence, defining λmin(a, f(a)) for every agent a takes O(m) time overall.
In order to define λz(hj) (and hence λ(hj)) for each f -house hj , we need to iterate over
every agent a such that a ∈ fz(hj). Again, the time complexity for this is bounded by the
total length of preference lists so that it takes O(m) time overall to define λz(hj) (and hence
λ(hj)) for each f -house and to remove those edges which cannot belong to any popular
matching (in lines 16 and 19-20 of the first stage of the algorithm). By a similar argument,
the second stage of the algorithm also takes O(m) time so that Algorithm Prune-WCHA
takes O(m) time overall. Now, it takes O(
√
Cn1+m) time, using Algorithm Popular-CHA,
to find a well-formed matching (if one exists) in G′′, where C is the total capacity of the
houses. It follows that we obtain the following results for the time complexity of finding a
popular matching in WCHA.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let I be an instance of WCHA. Then, we can find a popular matching
in I, or determine that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 +m) time.
5.3.5 Finding a maximum popular matching
It remains to consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in WCHA.
Let us run Algorithm Label-f and Algorithm Prune-WCHA as before to define f - and s-
houses and to delete certain edges which cannot belong to any popular matching. We then
adopt a similar algorithm to that in Section 4.2.3 on page 49 for the analogous problem
in CHA as follows.
That is, let A1 be the set of all agents a with s(a) = l(a), and let A2 = A\A1.
Our objective is to find a well-formed matching in G′′ which minimises the number
of A1-agents who are assigned to their last resort house. We let A′ denote the set{
a ∈ ⋃djp=1 fp(hj) : hj ∈ H}. We begin by carrying out a pre-processing step on G′′ to
compute a matching M0 that assigns each agent in A′ to his f -house. We then try to find
a maximum matching M ′ in G′′ that only involves the A2\A′ agents and their incident
edges. If M ′ is not an agent-complete matching of A2\A′ agents, then clearly I admits
no popular matching. Otherwise, we remove all edges in G′′ that are incident to a last
resort house, and try to assign additional A1\A′-agents to their f -houses by repeatedly
finding an augmenting path with respect to M ′ using Gabow’s algorithm [15] in a similar
approach to that for CHA in Section 4.2.3. Let M ′′ be the matching obtained by aug-
menting M ′. If any A1-agent remains unassigned at the end of this step, we simply assign
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him to his last resort house, to obtain an agent-complete matching of A\A′ agents in G′′.
Let M = M0 ∪M ′′. If any agent a belonging to A\A′ is not assigned to his f -house hj
but hj is undersubscribed in M , we promote a from M(a) to hj . Then, clearly M will be
a well-formed matching in G′′, and hence popular by Lemma 5.3.6. It follows that M is a
maximum popular matching, giving the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.2. Given an instance ofWCHA, we can find a maximum popular matching,
or determine that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 +m) time.
5.3.6 “Cloning” versus our direct approach
A straightforward solution to finding a popular matching, given an instance I ofWCHA,
may be to use “cloning” to create an instance J of WHAT, and then to apply the
O(min(k
√
n, n)m) algorithm of [43] to J . Firstly, we create cj clones h1j , h
2
j , ..., h
cj
j of
each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each
occurrence of hj in a given agent’s preference list with the sequence h1j , h
2
j , ..., h
cj
j , the
elements of which are listed in a single tie at the point where hj appears. Let GJ denote
the underlying graph of J . Then, GJ contains n′ = n1 + C nodes. For each ai ∈ A, let
Ai denote the set of acceptable houses for ai, and let cmin = min {cj : hj ∈ H}. Then the
number of edges in GJ is m′ =
∑
ai∈A
∑
hj∈Ai cj ≥ mcmin. Hence, the complexity of ap-
plying the algorithm of [43] to J is Ω(min(k
√
n1 + C, n1+C)mcmin). Now, the complexity
of our algorithm may be rewritten as O(
√
Cn1) or O(m) depending on which component
dominates the running time. If n1 + C ≥ k
√
n1 + C, then the cloning approach takes
Ω(k
√
n1 + Cmcmin)) time which is slower than our algorithm by a factor of Ω(kcmin).
Otherwise, if n1 + C < k
√
n1 + C, then the cloning approach takes Ω(mcmin(n1 + C))
time which is slower than our algorithm by a factor of Ω(
√
n1 + Ccmin). It follows that
the cloning method is slower than our direct approach for all possible cases.
5.4 Open problem
We conclude with the following open problem. Suppose that we are presented with an
instance J of WCHA in which the preference lists of agents are allowed to contain ties,
i.e. an instance of WCHAT. Is the problem of finding a popular matching (or reporting
that none exists) in J then solvable in polynomial time?
85
Chapter 6
Popular matchings in SMTI-SYM
6.1 Chapter overview
The classical Stable Marriage problem and its variants involving ties and incomplete pref-
erence lists were introduced in Section 1.4.1. In this chapter, we study popular matchings
in a special case of SMTI in which preference lists are symmetric (SMTI-SYM). An in-
stance I of SMTI is said to have symmetric preferences when the rank (to be defined
formally later) of each man u on a woman w’s preference list is equal to that of w on u’s
preference list for any (man,woman) pair (u,w). Little is known about how to find max-
imum popular matchings in matching problems where all participants have preferences
(i.e. all participants are agents). This chapter presents the first known characterisation
of popular matchings in the bipartite setting with preferences on both sides. We remark
that our characterisation could form the basis of a polynomial-time algorithm for finding
a maximum popular matching in the context of SMTI-SYM as well as other matching
problems in which all the participating agents involved have preferences, e.g. SMTI and
SRTI.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. We give some
terminology and preliminary results on popular matchings in SMTI-SYM in Section 6.2.
We next present necessary conditions for a matching to be popular given a SMTI-SYM
instance I in Section 6.3. We then develop an insight into the underlying structure of
the problem in Section 6.4 where we introduce what are known as mutually exclusive
edge pairs. Together with the results of Section 6.3, we obtain necessary and sufficient
conditions for a matching to be popular in a given SMTI-SYM instance. Finally, we
show how to use this characterisation to provide an efficient means of testing if a given
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matching is popular in O(
√
nm) time where n is the total number of men and women and
m is the total length of preference lists in I.
6.2 Basic terminology and preliminary results
An instance I of SMTI-SYM comprises two disjoint sets U andW , where U = {u1, ..., un1}
is the set of men and W = {w1, ..., wn2} is the set of women. Each man u ∈ U ranks
(strictly or with ties) a subset of W (the acceptable women for u) represented by his
preference list and vice versa. Let a ∈ U ∪W be any agent. If a’s preference list contains
the agent a′, then we say that a′ is an acceptable partner for a. Let the bipartite graph
G = (U,W,E) be the underlying graph of I, where we let the edge set E of G represent
the acceptable partners of the agents.
Given a man u ∈ U and an acceptable woman w ∈W for u, we define ranku(w) to be
the number of agents that u prefers to w plus 1, and vice versa. If ranku(w) = k, we say
that w is a kth choice of u. Moreover, if ranku(w) = k, then rankw(u) = k, and we say
that the preference lists are symmetric.
We create a unique last resort partner l(a) for each a and append l(a) to a’s preference
list. We let every last resort agent l(a) have a preference list that contains only a. We also
let z be the maximum length taken over all preference lists, including last resorts. Note
that to enforce the symmetry of the preference lists with the introduction of last resort
partners, we let rankl(a)(a) = ranka(l(a)) for each agent a even though the preference list
of l(a) has only size one. We also henceforth assume that G contains the vertex l(a) and
the edge (a, l(a)) for each a ∈ U ∪W , and that U and W contain the respective last resort
men and women. We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
We assume the definition of a matching in I as defined for a given instance of SM in
Section 1.4.1. Given two matchings M and M ′ in I, we say that an agent a prefers M
to M ′ if either (i) a is assigned in M and unassigned in M ′, or (ii) a is assigned in both
M and M ′ and prefers M(a) to M ′(a). Let P (M,M ′) denote the set of non last-resort
agents1 who prefer M to M ′. Then, the satisfaction of M with respect to M ′ is defined as
sat(M,M ′) = P (M,M ′)− P (M ′,M). We say that M is more popular than M ′, denoted
by M M ′, if sat(M,M ′) > 0. Furthermore, a matching M in I is popular if there is no
other matching in I that is more popular than M .
1We do not allow last resort agents to contribute to P (M,M ′) for any two matchings M and M ′.
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w2 w3 w1: (u1 u2 u3)
u2: w1 w2 w3 w2: u4 (u1 u2 u3)
u3: w1 w2 w3 w3: u4 u5 (u1 u2 u3)
u4: (w2 w3 w4) w4: u4
u5: w5 w3 w5: u5
Figure 6.1: An instance I1 of SMTI-SYM
For the remainder of this section, we make several preliminary observations concerning
popular matchings in SMTI-SYM.
First of all, an instance of SMTI-SYM need not admit a popular matching. For,
consider instance I1 in Figure 6.1. In any popular matching M in I1, it must be the case
that (u5, w5) ∈M. For, suppose not. Then, we can promote u5 and w5 to each other (and
demoteM(u5) to l(M(u5)) ifM(u5) 6= l(M(u5))) to obtain a more popular matching than
M , a contradiction. It must also be the case that (u4, w4) ∈ M . For, otherwise suppose
that (u4, w3) ∈ M . Then, it follows that (ui, l(ui)) ∈ M for some i(1 ≤ i ≤ 3). However,
we can then unassign u4 from w3 and promote ui to w3, and promote w4 to u4 to obtain
a more popular matching than M , a contradiction. Note that a similar contradiction is
obtained if (u4, w2) ∈ M instead. Hence, it must be the case that (u5, w5) and (u4, w4)
belong to M . It follows that M can only be one of the following matchings:
M1 = {(u1, w1), (u2, w2), (u3, w3), (u4, w4), (u5, w5)}
M2 = {(u1, w2), (u2, w3), (u3, w1), (u4, w4), (u5, w5)}
M3 = {(u1, w3), (u2, w1), (u3, w2), (u4, w4), (u5, w5)}
However, it is straightforward to verify that none of these matchings is popular since
M1  M2  M3  M1, the problem being that the more popular than relation is not
acyclic. We next note that popular matchings in SMTI-SYM can have different car-
dinalities, as seen in instance I2 in Figure 6.2. Here, M4 = {(u2, w1), (u3, w2)} is a
popular matching of cardinality 2. However, the unique maximum popular matching
is M5 = {(u1, w1), (u2, w2), (u3, w3)} which has cardinality 3.
We also observe that the cardinality of a maximum popular matching can be smaller
than that of a maximum matching. For, consider instance I3 in Figure 6.3. Here, M6 =
{(u1, w1), (u2, w2), (u3, w3), (u4, w4)} is the unique maximum matching in I3 which has
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w1: (u1 u2)
u2: w1 w2 w2: u3 u2
u3: (w2 w3) w3: u3
Figure 6.2: An instance I2 of SMTI-SYM
cardinality 4. However, M6 is not popular because M7 = {(u1, w2), (u2, w3), (u3, w4)} is a
matching that is more popular than M6.
Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: (w1 w2) w1: u1
u2: w3 w2 w2: u1 u2
u3: w4 w3 w3: u2 u3
u4: w4 w4: (u3 u4)
Figure 6.3: An instance I3 of SMTI-SYM
Finally, we remark that in the context of SMI, it may be shown that a stable matching
is also popular [31]. Recall from Section 1.4.1.1 that the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm
always finds a stable matching in any given SMI instance. Hence, the algorithm also
provides a way for finding a popular matching in any given SMI instance I. However,
this is not true in the case of SMTI. First of all, recall from Section 1.4.1.3 that only
weakly stable matchings are guaranteed to exist in any given SMTI instance (as opposed
to strongly stable or super-stable matchings). However, weak stability need not imply
popularity in the context of SMTI. For, consider instance I4 in Figure 6.4. Then, it
may be verified that the matching M8 = {(u1, w2), (u2, w1)} is a weakly stable matching.
However, M8 is not popular because M9 = {(u1, w1), (u2, w2)} is more popular than M8.
Furthermore, weakly stable matchings can have different cardinalities, and a given weakly
stable matching could be smaller than the size of a maximum popular matching. Indeed, as
mentioned in Section 1.4.1.3, the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching
given an SMTI instance is NP-hard. These two issues motivate the need to find an
alternative algorithm if we want to find a popular matching of maximum cardinality given
any SMTI instance.
This chapter provides the first step towards finding an algorithm that will construct
a maximum popular matching given an SMTI instance, if one exists, by providing a
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w2 w1: (u1 u2)
u2: (w1 w2) w2: u2 u1
Figure 6.4: An instance I4 of SMTI-SYM
characterisation of popular matchings that could be used by any approach to solve the
problem in the restricted case of SMTI-SYM.
6.3 Characterising popular matchings
For each agent a ∈ U ∪ W , let f(a) denote the highest ranking set of agents on a’s
preference list. We call any agent belonging to f(a) an f-partner of a. Define E1 =
{(u,w) : u ∈ U ∧ w ∈ f(u)} to be the set of first-choice edges of G. Define also the first-
choice graph of G as G1 = (U,W,E1). Note that it is trivial to find the unique popular
matching given any instance of the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists and
Symmetric Preferences with no ties (SMI-SYM), as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3.1. Let J be an instance of SMI-SYM. Let M be the matching obtained by
assigning each man u to the first woman on his preference list. Then, M is the unique
popular matching in J .
Proof. By symmetry of the preference lists, it is straightforward to see that each woman
also obtains her first-choice man in M . Hence, M is popular.
We now show that M is unique. For, suppose not. Then, let M ′ be another popular
matching. Clearly, there exists some man ui such that M(ui) 6=M ′(ui). Let M ′(ui) = wj
and let M(ui) = wk. It is straightforward to see that wj 6= f(ui) and ui 6= f(wj). Now,
if wj = l(ui), then the matching obtained by (M ′\ {(ui, wj), (M ′(wk), wk)}) ∪ {(ui, wk)}
is more popular than M ′. Hence, wj 6= l(ui). Let M ′(wk) = ux. Now, it must be
the case that either ux 6= l(wk) and ux /∈ f(wk) or ux = l(wk). Let M(wj) = ul and
let M ′(ul) = wy. Similarly, it must be the case that either wy 6= l(ul) and wy /∈ f(ul) or
wy = l(ul). Suppose that ux and wy are both last resort agents. Then, it is straightforward
to verify that the matching obtained by
(M ′\ {(ui, wj), (ux, wk), (ul, wy)}) ∪ {(ui, wk), (ul, wj)}
is more popular than M ′. Suppose that a ∈ {ux, wy} is not a last resort agent. Then, it
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is straightforward to verify that the matching obtained by
(M ′\ {(ui, wj), (ux, wk), (ul, wy)}) ∪ {(ui, wk), (ul, wj), (a, l(a))}
is more popular than M ′. Otherwise, suppose that ux and wy are not last resort agents.
Then, it is straightforward to verify that the matching obtained by
(M ′\ {(ui, wj), (ux, wk), (ul, wy)}) ∪ {(ui, wk), (ul, wj), (ux, l(ux)), (l(wy), wy)}
is more popular than M ′. In all cases, we obtain a contradiction.
The following lemma is a vital first step in characterising popular matchings in any
given SMTI-SYM instance I.
Lemma 6.3.2. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then M ∩E1 is a maximum matching
in G1.
Proof. LetM1 =M∩E1. Suppose for a contradiction thatM1 is not a maximum matching
in G1. Then M1 admits an augmenting path P = 〈u1, w1, ..., uk, wk〉 with respect to G1.
Clearly, in view of last resort agents, u1 and wk must be assigned in M . Let w0 =M(u1)
and let uk+1 =M(wk). Now, if both of w0 and uk+1 are last resort agents, then it follows
that M ⊕ P gives us a new matching that is more popular than M , a contradiction. On
the other hand, if only one of w0 and uk+1 is not a last resort agent, then we can demote
this agent to his/her last resort partner and use M ⊕ P again to obtain a new matching
that is more popular than M , a contradiction.
Hence, w0 and uk+1 are not the last resort partners of u1 and wk respectively. Further-
more, since w0 /∈ f(u1) and uk+1 /∈ f(wk), it follows that u1 /∈ f(w0) and wk /∈ f(uk+1)
respectively. It is clear to see that w0 6= wi (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) since each wi is as-
signed in M to a first-choice man but (u1, w0) ∈ M\E1. Furthermore, w0 6= wk, or
elseM ′ = (M\ {(u1, wk)})⊕P gives us a more popular matching thanM , a contradiction.
By symmetry of the above argument, it is easy to see that uk+1 6= ui (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
Let wk+1 be any woman in f(uk+1). Then, uk+1 ∈ f(wk+1). Suppose firstly that
wk+1 = w0. Then, it is straightforward to verify that the matching obtained by
((M\ {(u1, w0), (uk+1, wk)})⊕ P ) ∪ {(uk+1, w0)}
is more popular thanM , a contradiction. On the other hand, if wk+1 = wi (1 ≤ i ≤ k−1),
let C = 〈wi, ui+1, wi+1, ..., uk, wk, uk+1〉. It is straightforward to verify that the matching
M ′ = M ⊕ C is more popular than M , a contradiction. Hence, wk+1 6= wi (0 ≤ i ≤ k).
91
Chapter 6. Popular matchings in SMTI-SYM
Now, let u0 ∈ f(w0). Then, w0 ∈ f(u0). By symmetry of the above argument, it is
straightforward to show that u0 6= ui (1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1).
Now, let u′ = M(wk+1). If u′ = u0, it is straightforward to verify that the matching
obtained by
((M\ {(u1, w0), (uk+1, wk), (u0, wk+1)})⊕ P ) ∪ {(u0, w0), (uk+1, wk+1)}
is more popular than M , a contradiction. On the other hand, if u′ = ui (1 ≤ i ≤ k),
then (ui, wk+1) ∈ M but since (ui, wi−1) ∈ M , this implies that wk+1 = wi−1, which
contradicts the fact that wk+1 6= wj (0 ≤ j ≤ k) as established above. Hence, the men
vertices u0, u1, ..., uk+1, u′ are all distinct. Let w′ = M(u0). Again, we can reuse the
symmetry of the argument to establish that the women vertices w′, w0, w1, ..., wk+1 are all
distinct. However, it is straightforward to verify that the matching M ′ obtained by
((M\{(u0, w′), (u1, w0), (uk+1, wk), (u′, wk+1)})⊕ P ) ∪ {(u0, w0), (uk+1, wk+1)}
is more popular than M which is a contradiction. (Note that either one of or both w′
and u′ could possibly be non last resort agents but we can reuse arguments from above to
establish that M ′ is more popular than M .)
Let I be an instance of SMTI-SYM. Clearly, the underlying bipartite graph is un-
capacitated. Recall the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition for the case of an uncapacitated
bipartite graph (i.e. Lemma 1.2.1 in Section 1.2). It follows that we can obtain the
following corollary by using the Decomposition in conjunction with Lemma 6.3.2.
Corollary 6.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of SMTI-SYM. Then,
every odd or unreachable agent a ∈ U ∪W satisfies M(a) ∈ f(a).
Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of SMTI-SYM. Then, M1 =M ∩E1 is
a maximum matching in G1 by Lemma 6.3.2. Suppose that we are given an EOU labelling
of the vertices in G1 using M1. Note that all last resort agents must be even. Now, if
an agent a is not assigned to an agent from f(a) in a popular matching M , then we will
show that a can only be assigned to an agent from his/her set of s-partner(s) denoted by
s(a), which is a set of agents on a’s preference list that is disjoint from f(a). Note that it
is easy to see from Corollary 6.3.1 that only even agents should have s-partners. We use
Algorithm Label-s as shown in Algorithm 11 to define s(a) precisely for every even agent
a.
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Algorithm 11 Algorithm Label-s
1: U ′ := {u ∈ U : u is even} and W ′ := {w ∈W : w is even};
2: E′i := {(u,w) ∈ E : u ∈ U ′ ∧ w ∈W ′ ∧ ranku(w) = i};
3: for each a ∈ U ′ ∪W ′ do
4: s(a) := ∅;
5: for i in 2..z do
6: for each edge (u,w) ∈ E′i do
7: s(u) := s(u) ∪ {w};
8: s(w) := s(w) ∪ {u};
9: for each agent a ∈ {u,w} do
10: for each agent b after s(a) from a’s preference list do
11: k := ranka(b);
12: delete (a, b) from E′k;
The algorithm begins by defining U ′ and W ′ to be the respective subsets of U and
W containing only even agents. Then, subsets of E are defined, where each subset E′i
contains only EE edges2 such that if (u,w) ∈ E′i, then u and w are both even agents and
ranku(w) = i. For each even agent a, s(a) is initialised to be the emptyset. The algorithm
then iterates over each i in turn from 2 to z and for each value of i, the algorithm iterates
over the edges in E′i. Now, if (u,w) is an edge belonging to E
′
i, then w is added to s(u)
and vice versa. As with f -partner(s), all s-partner(s) of each agent a are tied with the
same rank in a’s preference list. Hence, when defining s(a), whenever the algorithm has
identified a member c of s(a), it will only consider other candidate agents in a’s preference
list with the same rank as c. As a result, if lines 7-8 are executed in iteration i, the
algorithm removes from consideration certain agents that cannot be a s-partner of a in
lines 9-12. It does this by deleting (a, b) from E′k where ranka(b) = k and k > i. Note that
lines 9-12 can be executed only once for each edge e ∈ E. Since the number of edges in G
are finite, it is clear that the algorithm terminates. When this happens, the s-partner(s)
of each even agent is defined. Note that s(a) can never become empty for any agent a
because of l(a), and in view of the fact that if a′ is added to s(a), then this agent cannot
be deleted from s(a) subsequently.
Instance I5 in Figure 6.5 gives an illustration of the definition of f - and s-partners.
It is straightforward to verify the f -partners for each man and woman. The agents
u1, u2, u3, u8, w2, w5, w9 and w10 can be verified to be even agents inG1 and their s-partners
2Recall that these are edges between any two even vertices
93
Chapter 6. Popular matchings in SMTI-SYM
Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w6 w5 w1: (u1 u2)
u2: w1 w7 w10 w2 w2: u9 u6 u7 u2 u3
u3: w8 w3 w6 w7 w2 w3: u4 (u3 u8)
u4: (w3 w4) w4: (u4 u5)
u5: w4 (w5 w9) w5: u10 u5 u1
u6: w6 w2 w9 w6: u6 u1 u3 u8
u7: w7 w10 w2 w9 w7: u7 u2 u8 u3
u8: w8 w3 w7 w6 w8: (u3 u8)
u9: (w2 w9) w9: u9 u5 u6 u7
u10: (w5 w10) w10: u10 u7 u2
Figure 6.5: An instance I5 of SMTI-SYM.
are defined by Algorithm Label-s as follows. In iteration 2, E′2 = ∅ so no s-partners are
defined. In iteration 3, E′3 contains the edges (u1, w5) and (u2, w10) so that s(u1) = w5
and s(w5) = u1, and s(u2) = w10 and s(w10) = u2. Note that the edges (u1, l(u1)),
(w5, l(w5)), (u2, w2) and (w10, l(w10)) are deleted from E′4 by lines 10-12 of the algorithm
in this iteration so that E′4 = ∅ and no s-partners are defined in iteration 4. The edge
(u2, l(u2)) is also deleted from E′5 in iteration 3. In iteration 5, E′5 contains the edges
(u3, w2), (u8, l(u8)) and (w9, l(w9)). Hence, s(u3) = w2 and s(w2) = u3, s(u8) = l(u8) and
s(w9) = l(w9). The edges (u3, l(u3)) and (w2, l(w2)) are deleted from E′6 by lines 10-12 of
the algorithm so that E′6 = ∅ and no s-partners are defined in the final iteration.
Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of SMTI-SYM. Then, the next two
lemmas show that each agent a can only be assigned to a partner from f(a) ∪ s(a).
Lemma 6.3.3. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent a ∈ U ∪W can be
assigned in M to a partner between f(a) and s(a) on a’s preference list.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that the agent a is a man u; similar
results for the women can be obtained by reversing the roles of the sexes in the following
proof. Now, suppose that u is assigned to a woman w strictly between f(u) and s(u). If w
is odd or unreachable, then by Corollary 6.3.1, w must be assigned to a member of f(w)
in M , a contradiction. Hence, w is even. By the same argument, u is even. Furthermore,
u must be strictly lower than any member of s(w) in w’s preference list. For, suppose
not. Choose any u′ ∈ s(w). Then, u either (a) precedes u′ or (b) is tied with u′ in w’s
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preference list. Let ranku(w) = i = rankw(u), and let rankw(u′) = k. Now, if case (a)
holds, then we have an immediate contradiction since this implies that i < k. For, by
definition of s(w) according to Algorithm Label-s, there cannot have existed an EE edge
(u′′, w) such that rankw(u′′) = i < k, or else all members of s(w) would have been deleted
from consideration by lines 9-12 of the algorithm in iteration i of the for loop in line 5.
On the other hand, if case (b) holds, then i = k so that (u,w) is an edge belonging to E′k,
and hence lines 7-8 of Algorithm Label-s would have resulted in u ∈ s(w) and w ∈ s(u),
a contradiction. Hence, w lies strictly between f(u) and s(u) in u’s preference list, and u
lies after s(w) in w’s preference list. Let us form a new matching M ′ from M by letting
M ′ =M\ {(u,w)}.
Let w′ ∈ f(u). Since u is even, it follows that w′ is odd and hence, it follows by
Corollary 6.3.1 that w′ is assigned in M ′ ∩ E1 to some u′. Clearly, u′ ∈ f(w′) and vice
versa. Let us now consider w and let u0 ∈ s(w). Since w prefers u0 to u, it follows
that u0 cannot be a last resort agent. Clearly, u0 cannot be u′ or else the matching
obtained by (M ′\ {(u′, w′)}) ∪ {(u,w′), (u′, w)} is more popular than M , a contradiction.
Let M ′(u0) = w0. It follows that w0 6= w′, for if so then u0 = u′, a contradiction.
Furthermore, w0 cannot be worse than s(u0) in u0’s preference list, or else let M ′′ =
(M ′\ {(u′, w′), (u0, w0)})∪{(u,w′), (u0, w), (u′, l(u′))} where we demote w0 to l(w0) in M ′′
if w0 6= l(u0) (or unassign w0 from u0 otherwise). It follows that M ′′ is more popular than
M , a contradiction. Hence, it follows that either (i) w0 has the same rank as any member
of s(u0) in u0’s preference list, (ii) w0 ∈ f(u0), or (iii) w0 lies strictly between f(u0) and
s(u0) in u0’s preference list.
In case (i), let u1 ∈ f(w0). It follows that w0 prefers u1 to u0 since u0 /∈ f(w0). It
is straightforward to verify that u1 cannot be u nor u′ or else M cannot be a popular
matching. Let M ′(u1) = w1. Then, let M ′′ be the matching obtained by
(M ′\{(u′, w′), (u0, w0), (u1, w1)}) ∪ {(u,w′), (u0, w), (u1, w0), (u′, l(u′))}
where we demote w1 to l(w1) in M ′′ if w1 6= l(u1) (or unassign w1 from u1 otherwise). It
follows that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction.
In case (ii), since u0 ∈ s(w), it is clear that u0 is even and hence, since w0 ∈ f(u0),
it follows that w0 is odd. Thus, there exists an odd length alternating path P ′ =
〈uj , wj−1, uj−1, ..., w1, u1, w0〉 in G1 to w0 from a man uj who is unassigned in M ′ ∩ E1.
Clearly, uj 6= u0 and uj 6= u′ since these men are assigned to their first-choice women in
M ′. Now, if uj = u, then let M ′′ = ((M ′\ {(u0, w0)}) ∪ {(u0, w)}) ⊕ P ′. It is straightfor-
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ward to verify that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction. Hence, uj is distinct
from all the men agents considered so far. Let M ′(uj) = wj . It follows that wj is also
distinct from all the women agents. Clearly, wj is worse than any member of f(uj) in uj ’s
preference list. Now, if wj = l(uj), then the matching obtained by
((M ′\{(u′, w′), (u0, w0), (uj , wj)}) ∪ {(u,w′), (u0, w), (u′, l(u′))})⊕ P ′
can be verified to be more popular than M , a contradiction. Hence, wj 6= l(uj) and by
symmetry, uj /∈ f(wj). Let uj+1 ∈ f(wj) instead. Let also M ′(uj+1) = wj+1. Now,
if uj+1 is not distinct from any of the above men agents, then we have a cycle C. Let
M ′′ =M ′⊕C. Then,M ′′ is more popular thanM , a contradiction. Hence, uj+1 (and thus
wj+1) are distinct agents from those considered so far. However, let M ′′ be the matching
obtained by
((M ′\ {(u′, w′), (u0, w0), (uj , wj), (uj+1, wj+1)})⊕ P ′)
∪{(u,w′), (u0, w), (uj+1, wj), (u′, l(u′))}
where we demote wj+1 to l(wj+1) in M ′′ if wj+1 6= l(uj+1) (or unassign wj+1 from uj+1
otherwise). It follows that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction.
In case (iii), by analogy with u and w, it follows that w0 lies strictly between f(u0) and
s(u0) in u0’s preference list, and u0 lies after s(w0) in w0’s preference list. Let u1 ∈ s(w0).
It follows by a similar argument to the above that u1 6= u′, or else M cannot be a popular
matching. Furthermore, u1 6= u. For, suppose otherwise. Then, we have the following
chain of inequalities:
rankw(u) > rankw(u0) = ranku0(w)
> ranku0(w0) = rankw0(u0)
> rankw0(u) = ranku(w0)
> ranku(w) = rankw(u)
which is a contradiction. It follows that we can reuse arguments from the previous cases to
build a path P = 〈w, u0, w0, ..., uy, wy〉 starting from w. If case (iii) continues to apply, then
P will not terminate, a contradiction to the finiteness of the number of agents. Otherwise,
either case (i) or (ii) apply and we can obtain a similar contradiction as shown above.
Lemma 6.3.4. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent a ∈ U ∪W can be
assigned in M to a partner worse than s(a) on a’s preference list.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that a man u is assigned to a woman w strictly
worse than s(u). Clearly, u /∈ f(w). By Lemma 6.3.3, u cannot be between f(w) and s(w)
on w’s preference list. Hence, either (i) u has the same rank as any member of s(w) in w’s
preference list, or (ii) u is also worse than s(w) on w’s preference list. Let us form a new
matching M ′ from M by letting M ′ =M\ {(u,w)}.
In case (i), let us consider w first. Let u′ ∈ f(w). Clearly, w must be even in G1, for
if w is odd or unreachable, then M(w) ∈ f(w), a contradiction. It follows that u′ must
be odd in G1, and hence, by Corollary 6.3.1, u′ must be assigned in M ′ to some woman
w′ ∈ f(u′).
Let w0 ∈ s(u). Since u prefers any member of s(u) to w, it follows that w0 6= l(u).
Clearly, w0 6= w′, for otherwise the matching obtained by (M ′\ {(u′, w′)})∪{(u,w′), (u′, w)}
is more popular than M , a contradiction. Let u0 =M ′(w0). It follows that u0 6= u′. Now,
it must be the case that either (a) u0 is worse that any member of s(w0) in w0’s preference
list, or (b) u0 has the same rank as any member of s(w0) in w0’s preference list, or (c)
u0 ∈ f(w0).
In subcase (a), let M ′′ = (M ′\ {(u′, w′), (u0, w0)})∪{(u′, w), (u,w0), (l(w′), w′)} where
we demote u0 to l(u0) in M ′′ if u0 6= l(w0) (or unassign u0 from w0 otherwise). It follows
that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction.
In subcase (b), let w1 ∈ f(u0). It is straightforward to verify through similar arguments
to those used in Lemma 6.3.3 that w1 /∈ {w,w′}, for otherwise M is not popular. By
Corollary 6.3.1, it follows that u0 must be even or otherwise w0 ∈ f(u0), a contradiction.
Hence, w1 is odd and M ′(w1) ∈ f(w1). Let M ′(w1) = u1. Also, let M ′′ be the matching
obtained by
(M ′\{(u′, w′), (u0, w0), (u1, w1)}) ∪ {(u′, w), (u,w0), (u0, w1), (u1, l(u1)), (l(w′), w′)}
It follows that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction.
In subcase (c), clearly w0 must be even (as w0 ∈ s(u)) so that u0 must be odd. Hence,
there exists an odd length alternating path P = 〈wj , ..., u0〉 in G1 from some woman wj
who is unassigned inM ′∩E1 to u0. We can reuse arguments from case (ii) of Lemma 6.3.3
to show that wj must be a distinct woman from those considered so far. Let uj =M ′(wj).
Now, if uj = l(wj), then let M ′′ be the matching obtained by
((M ′\{(u′, w′), (u0, w0), (uj , wj)}) ∪ {(u′, w), (u,w0), (l(w′), w′)})⊕ P
It follows thatM ′′ is more popular thanM , a contradiction. Hence, uj 6= l(wj) and clearly,
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wj /∈ f(uj). Hence, let wj+1 ∈ f(uj) and let M ′(wj+1) = uj+1. It again follows that we
can reuse arguments from case (ii) of Lemma 6.3.3 to show that these agents are distinct
from all agents considered so far. However, this implies that we can then obtain a new
matching M ′′ by
((M ′\ {(u′, w′), (u0, w0), (uj , wj), (uj+1, wj+1})⊕ P )
∪{(u′, w), (u,w0), (uj , wj+1), (l(w′), w′)})
where we demote uj+1 to l(uj+1) in M ′′ if uj+1 6= l(wj+1) (or unassign uj+1 from wj+1
otherwise). It follows that M ′′ is more popular than M , a contradiction.
In case (ii), it is straightforward to verify that we can reuse the proof for case (i) to
show that M must be a popular matching.
Lemmas 6.3.2-6.3.4 give rise to the following characterisation of popular matchings in
any instance I of SMTI-SYM.
Theorem 6.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in any given SMTI-SYM instance I.
Then,
1. M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1, and
2. Every non last-resort agent a is assigned in M to a partner either from f(a) or s(a).
6.4 Structure of popular matchings
Let G = (U,W,E) be the underlying graph of an instance I of SMTI-SYM. We form a
subgraph G′ of G by letting G′ contain only edges from each agent a ∈ U ∪W to those
agents in f(a) ∪ s(a). We say that a matching M is agent-complete in G′ if all those
agents that are not last resort agents are assigned in M . Clearly, G′ need not admit an
agent-complete matching if s(a) 6= {l(a)} for some agent a. It follows by Theorem 6.3.1
that all popular matchings must be contained in G′ . However, Theorem 6.3.1 only gives
us necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in I, since not all matchings in G′
satisfying these conditions are popular. For, let us consider the instance I5 in Figure 6.5.
Then, we can find at least two matchings which satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem
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6.3.1, namely
M =
 (u1, w1), (u2, w10), (u3, w8), (u4, w3), (u5, w4),(u6, w6), (u7, w7), (u9, w2), (u10, w5)

and
M ′ =
 (u1, w5), (u2, w1), (u3, w2), (u4, w3), (u5, w4),(u6, w6), (u7, w7), (u8, w8), (u9, w9), (u10, w10)

However, while M may be verified to be a popular matching as we shall show, M ′ is
not popular because of the cycle C = 〈u1, w1, u2, w2, u3, w3, u4, w4, u5, w5〉. It is straight-
forward to check that M ′ ⊕C gives a more popular matching than M ′. We work towards
a necessary and sufficient condition for a matching in SMTI-SYM to be popular in the
following subsection.
6.4.1 Mutually exclusive edge pairs
Let us define any matching that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 6.3.1 to be well-
formed. Clearly, all well-formed matchings must be contained in G′. Let a be any even
agent in I, and let b be any even agent that precedes the members of s(a) in a’s preference
list. Clearly, b /∈ f(a) for otherwise we have an EE edge in G1, a contradiction by Lemma
1.2.1(c). Then, we define the edge pair {(b, b′), (a′, a)} to be a mutually exclusive edge
pair, or mutex edge pair for short, if b′ ∈ f(b) and a′ ∈ s(a). The next theorem gives us an
important characterisation of popular matchings in SMTI-SYM with respect to mutex
edge pairs.
Theorem 6.4.1. Let M be a well-formed matching in any given SMTI-SYM instance I.
Then, M is popular if and only if M does not contain any mutex edge pairs.
Proof. We first show that if M is popular, then M contains no mutex edge pairs. Suppose
for a contradiction that M contains the mutex edge pair {(ul, wj), (ui, wp)} such that ui is
an even agent, wp ∈ s(ui) and wj is an even agent preceding wp in ui’s preference list and
ul ∈ f(wj). We have that ui prefers wj to wp but wj prefers ul to ui. Since wj is an even
agent and wj is assigned in M , it follows by the definitions of a well-formed matching and
an even vertex that there exists an even length alternating path P in G1 to wj from an
even agent wk who must be unassigned in M ∩E1, i.e. M(wk) ∈ s(wk). Now, if wp = wk,
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it follows that the sequence of agents 〈ui, wj , ..., wk〉 then forms a cycle C such thatM⊕C
gives us a more popular matching than M , a contradiction.
Hence, suppose that wk 6= wp. Let M(wk) = ua. Now, if wp = l(ui) and ua = l(wk),
then we can unassign ui and wk from their last resort partners, and use (M⊕P )∪{(ui, wj)}
to give us a more popular matching than M . Let us thus suppose that wp = l(ui) and
ua 6= l(wk). Let wb ∈ f(ua) and let M(wb) = uc. Now, if wb ∈ P , then the sequence of
agents 〈wb,M(wb), ..., wk, ua〉 form a cycle C such that M ⊕ C gives us a more popular
matching than M . Hence, wb /∈ P . Since wk ∈ s(ua), it follows that ua is an even agent
so that wb is odd. By Corollary 6.3.1, it must then be the case that uc 6= l(wb). Let M ′
be the matching obtained by
((M\ {(ui, wp), (ua, wk), (uc, wb)})⊕ P ) ∪ {(ui, wj), (ua, wb), (uc, l(uc))}
It follows that M ′ is more popular than M . On the other hand, if wp 6= l(ui) and
ua = l(wk), then let uq ∈ f(wp) and let M(uq) = wr. Now, if uq ∈ P , then the sequence of
agents 〈wp, ui, wj , ..., uq〉 form a cycle C such thatM⊕C gives us a more popular matching
than M , a contradiction. Hence, uq /∈ P . Reusing a similar argument to the above, we
have that wr 6= l(uq). However, let M ′ be the matching obtained by
((M\ {(uq, wr), (ui, wp), (ua, wk)})⊕ P ) ∪ {(uq, wp), (ui, wj), (l(wr), wr)}
It follows that M ′ is more popular than M . Hence, suppose that neither wp nor ua
is a last resort agent. Then, let uq, wr, wb and uc be defined as before. Let P ′ =
〈l(wr), wr, uq, wp, ui, wj , ..., wk, ua, wb, uc, l(uc)〉. Then, M ⊕ P ′ gives us a more popular
matching than M . It follows that we obtain a contradiction in all cases so that if M
contains a mutex edge pair, then M cannot be popular.
Conversely, let M be a well-formed matching that contains no mutex edge pairs. Sup-
pose for a contradiction that there exists another matching M ′ = {(u1, w1), ..., (ur, wr)}
such that M ′ is more popular than M . We firstly observe that if, for every agent ai who
prefers M ′ to M (1 ≤ i ≤ r), his partner in M ′ prefers M to M ′, then M ′ cannot be more
popular than M . Hence, there exists at least one ai who prefers M ′ to M and his partner
in M ′ either (i) also prefers M ′ to M or (ii) is indifferent between the two matchings.
Without loss of generality, let ai be a man whom we denote by ui and hence, M ′(ui) = wi
by definition of M ′. By Theorem 6.3.1 and the definition of a well-formed matching, we
can partition the set of agents who are assigned inM into the disjoint sets F and S, where
agents in F are assigned to their f -partners in M , and agents in S are assigned to their
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s-partners in M respectively. It is clear to see that agents in F cannot improve in M ′
relative to M but can either become worse off or remain indifferent. On the other hand,
agents in S can either improve, become worse off inM ′ relative toM or remain indifferent.
In case (i), it must be the case that each of ui and wi can only belong to S. It follows
that ui and wi are both even agents because only even agents have s-partners defined.
However, this gives a contradiction since Algorithm Label-s would have defined ui and wi
to be one of each other’s s-partners because (ui, wi) is then an EE edge such that ui prefers
wi to any member of s(ui) and vice versa.
Hence, it remains to consider case (ii). It is clear that ui ∈ S. Now, if wi ∈ S and
wi is indifferent between ui and M(wi), we obtain a contradiction as in case (i). Hence,
wi ∈ F . Consider H ′ = (M ′ ⊕M) ∩ E1. It follows that the only connected components
of H ′ where an agent in S can become assigned to an agent in F who remains indifferent
between M and M ′ are even length alternating paths. Let ui and wi belong to such a
component P . Since ui improves to wi ∈ F , and wi is indifferent between ui and M(wi),
it follows that ui is the end vertex of the end edge of P that is in M ′. It also follows that
we have a uj who is the end vertex of the end edge of P that is in M . Clearly, uj becomes
worse off in M ′ relative to M . Now, suppose that wj , who is uj ’s partner in M ′, prefers
M ′ to M . By the structure of P , wj /∈ f(uj). Now, if wj also improves in M ′ by becoming
assigned to uj , it follows that wj ∈ S and uj is an even agent who lies between f(wj)
and s(wj) in wj ’s preference list. However then, it follows that {(uj ,M(uj)), (M(wj), wj)}
constitutes a mutex edge pair in M , a contradiction. Hence, wj either becomes worse off
in M ′ relative to M or is indifferent between the two matchings. However, it then follows
that for every edge (ui, wi) where one of the agents improves in M ′ relative to M , exactly
one of these agents prefer M ′ relative to M and the other remains indifferent. Moreover,
we have a unique corresponding edge (uj , wj) in which at least one of the agents prefers
M relative to M ′ and neither agents prefers M ′ to M . It cannot then be the case that M ′
is more popular than M .
What Theorem 6.4.1 thus implies is that a well-formed matching M in G′ is popular if
and only if M contains only one or none of the edges in any mutex edge pair. To illustrate
this concept, let us return to instance I5 in Figure 6.5. Let G′I5 be the underlying graph
of I5 which contain edges incident to only f - and s-partners. Then, it may be verified
that G′I5 contains one mutex edge pair, namely {(u2, w1), (u3, w2)}. Here, w2 and u2 are
even agents, u2 precedes s(w2) = u3 in w2’s preference list, and w1 = f(u2). It is thus
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straightforward to see that the matching M is popular in I5 because it contains no edges
of this mutex edge pair, while M ′ is not popular because it contains both edges of the
mutex edge pair.
6.4.2 Testing a matching for popularity
We remark that Theorem 6.4.1 gives us an O(
√
nm) time algorithm for testing if a given
matching M in an SMTI-SYM instance I is popular by checking whether M is a well-
formed matching that admits no mutex edge pairs as follows.
First of all, we construct the first-choice graph G1 of I containing only edges incident
to f -partners in O(m) time. We then find a maximum matching M1 in G1 using the
Hopcroft-Karp algorithm in O(
√
nm) time. We next use M1 to obtain an EOU labelling
of the vertices in G in O(m) time through a similar approach outlined in Chapter 4 for
the same task in the context of CHAT. It follows that we are then able to identify E , the
set of even agents in I. Now, the f -partners are straightforward to identify. We can then
use Algorithm Label-s, as given on page 93, to identify the s-partners of each agent in
O(m) time (with a suitable choice of data structures such as those described in Section
2.4.3). The search for mutex edge pairs in M can then be done by checking whether the
preference list of each even agent a ∈ E contains an even agent b preceding any member
of s(a) such that M(b) ∈ f(b) whenever M(a) ∈ s(a). Clearly, the complexity of this step
is bounded by the time required for a traversal of all the preference lists. Hence, we have
the following result.
Lemma 6.4.1. Let M be a matching in a given instance of SMTI-SYM. Then we may
test whether M is popular in O(
√
nm) time.
6.4.3 Concluding remarks
We conclude with the following observations on mutex edge pairs with respect to popular
matchings.
Let I be an instance of SMTI-SYM and let G′ be the subgraph of G containing only
edges incident to f - and s-partners constructed as above. Then, it follows by Theorems
6.3.1 and 6.4.1 that the problem of finding a popular matching in I, or reporting that
none exists, becomes the equivalent problem of finding a well-formed matching in G′ that
contains no mutex edge pairs, or reporting that none exists.
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w1: u1 u2 u5
u2: w2 (w1 w4 w5) w2: u2 u5
u3: w3 w3: (u3 u5)
u4: (w4 w5) w4: u4 u2 u6
u5: w3 w2 w1 w5 w5: u4 u2 u6 u5
u6: w6 w7 (w4 w5) w6: (u6 u7)
u7: w6 w7: u8 u6
u8: (w7 w8) w8: u8
Figure 6.6: An instance I6 of SMTI-SYM.
Now, a straightforward approach that identifies and deletes all mutex edge pairs from
G′, and then proceeds to find a well-formed matching in the reduced G′ would not work
as may be seen from Instance I6 as shown in Figure 6.6. Here, as with instance I5, it
is straightforward to identify the f -partners. Using Algorithm Label-s, the s-partners,
where defined, are as follows: s(u3) = l(u3), s(u5) = w5, s(u6) = w7, s(u7) = l(u7),
s(w4) = l(w4), s(w5) = u5, s(w7) = u6, and s(w8) = l(w8). It is straightforward to verify
that we have two mutex edge pairs as follows:
{(u6, w6), (l(w4), w4)} and {(u6, w6), (u5, w5)}
Let us assume that we delete the above edges from G′. Observe that the only edges
incident to w4 and w5 in the reduced G′ are then (u4, w4) and (u4, w5). It follows then
that no agent-complete matching can exist in the reduced G′, causing any such approach
to report that no popular matching exists in I6. However, it may be verified that the
following is a well-formed matching in G′ that contains no mutex edge pairs, and hence is
popular in I6 by Theorem 6.4.1:
M =
 (u1, w1), (u2, w2), (u3, w3), (u4, w4), (u5, w5),(u6, w7), (u7, w6), (u8, w8)

Another possible solution may be to use a similar approach to that for finding a popular
matching in the context of CHA as follows. First, form the subgraph G1 and find a
maximum matching M1 of G1. Then, add the edges that are incident to s-partners in
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G1 to form G′, and augment M1 to find an agent-complete matching M of G′, if such a
matching exists. The objective of these steps are to ensure that M is well-formed. Note
that it is straightforward to identify any mutex edge pair(s) once the f - and s-partners
are defined for all agents as described in Section 6.4.2. Let Mi be the matching that is
obtained from M1 during a particular iteration i of the augmenting step. We could then
try to ensure that M does not contain any mutex edge pair {e1, e2} by forbidding Mi to
be augmented with e2 during iteration i+ 1 of the augmenting step if e1 already belongs
to Mi. However, it is unlikely that such a strategy could be successful in general. In fact,
the problem of deciding whether there exists an agent-complete matching in a bipartite
graph G′ without forbidden edge pairs is known to be NP-complete [32].
It therefore remains open as to whether a polynomial-time algorithm can be found to
determine whether an instance of SMTI-SYM admits a popular matching. In particular,
can we find an efficient way of constructing a well-formed matching without mutex edge
pairs, if such a matching exists? If such an algorithm can be found, then it could form
the basis of an approach to solve the analogous problem in the general SMTI and SRTI
cases.
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Profile-based optimal matchings in
CHAT
7.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 1.3.2, given any matching M in a bipartite matching problem,
various optimality criteria based on the profile of M may be used to determine the quality
of M with respect to other matchings in the same problem instance. In this chapter, we
study several optimality concepts for bipartite matching problems based on the profile
of matchings in the context of CHAT. The three optimality criteria that we study in
this chapter are the notions of a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal matching,
and a generous maximum matching, as introduced in Section 1.3.2. We remark that
these concepts are particularly useful in many practical matching applications where the
foremost goal of the matching scheme is to maximise the number of participating agents
who are assigned, and then subject to this constraint, to optimise the satisfaction of the
agents with respect to their preferences.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. First of all,
Section 7.2 introduces the terminology and notations that will be used for the rest of this
chapter. Next, Section 7.3 presents an O(C2mz) time algorithm (based on a variant of
the Bellman-Ford algorithm [28]) to find a greedy maximum matching given an CHAT
instance, where C is the total capacity of houses, m is the total length of preference lists
and z is the maximum rank respectively in the problem instance. Section 7.4 presents
an O(min(z∗
√
C,C + z∗)m) time algorithm that uses the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
to find a rank-maximal matching given an CHAT instance, where z∗ is the maximal
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rank in an optimal solution. In that section, we also present a number of straightforward
alternative algorithms to solve the problem and show how our direct approach based on
the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition is faster than each of these. Finally, Section 7.5 shows
how the algorithms for finding a greedy maximum matching for a given CHAT instance
can be adapted for finding a generous maximum matching in the same problem instance.
7.2 Basic terminology
Let I be an instance of CHAT as defined in Chapters 1, 2 and 4. Let z be the maximum
rank of a house taken over all agents’ preference lists in I. LetM be the set of all matchings
of A to H. The following definition gives a property of matchings given an instance of
CHAT.
Definition 7.2.1. The profile ρ(M) of a matching M ∈ M is defined to be the z-tuple
(x1, x2, ..., xz) where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ z), xi is the number of agents who are assigned
in M with one of their ith choice houses.
For a given CHAT instance I, a feasible s-profile is a profile X = (x1, ..., xz) such
that there is a matching M for I with profile X where |M | = s. It is immediate that∑
xi = s. To simplify matters, we abbreviate a profile (x1, ..., xz) by (x1, ..., xd) if xd > 0
and xi = 0 for i = d+1, ..., z. We let the empty matching have profile (0). We may define
a total order L on profiles as follows: let Y = (y1, ..., yz) and X = (x1, ..., xz) be any two
profiles. Then, Y L X if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that xi = yi for 1 ≤ i < k
and yk > xk. We say that y left-dominates x. Let O = (o1, ..., oz) be the z-tuple such
that oi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ z. It follows that the profile of any non-empty matching must
left-dominate O.
Alternatively, we may define a second total order ≺R on profiles as follows: X ≺R Y
if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that xi = yi for k < i ≤ z and xk < yk. We
say that the profile X right-dominates profile Y . Let O′ = (o′1, ..., o′z) be the z-tuple such
that o′i = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1 and o′z = C + 1. Then, it follows that the profile of any
non-empty matching must right-dominate O′. It is straightforward to see that each of L
and ≺R is transitive. Let G be the underlying graph of I. Then, we define the profile
of a connected component C in G with respect to a matching M in G to be the z-tuple
ρC(M) = (α1, ..., αz) where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ z), αi is the number of agents in C who
obtain their ith-choice house (in I) in M . Given any two profiles ρ1 = (β1, ..., βz) and
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Algorithm 12 Algorithm Greedy-Max
1: M := ∅;
2: s := 0; {// s is the cardinality of M}
3: loop
4: P := a maximum profile augmenting path for M ;
5: if P exists then
6: M :=M ⊕ P ;
7: else
8: exit;
9: s := s+ 1;
10: return M ; {// a greedy maximum matching}
ρ2 = (γ1, ...γz), we define the sum of ρ1 + ρ2 to be (β1 + γ1, ..., βz + γz). Furthermore,
ρ1 = ρ2 if βi = γi for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ z).
7.3 Greedy maximum matchings
For a given instance I of CHAT, we say that a feasible s-profile X is s-left-maximal if
there is no other s-profile that left-dominates X. We define a matching M whose profile
is s-left-maximal to be a greedy s-matching. When s is the cardinality of a maximum
matching, we say that a greedy s-matching is a greedy maximum matching. Note that
there may be more than one greedy s-matching for any value of s, but it must be the case
that all greedy s-matchings have the same profile, and we call this the greedy s-profile for
the problem instance. When s is the cardinality of a maximum matching, we call this the
greedy maximum profile. Let M+ denote the set of maximum matchings in M. Then,
we may formalise the definition of a greedy maximum matching in a CHAT instance as
follows.
Definition 7.3.1. Given an instance of CHAT, a greedy maximum matching is a maxi-
mum matching that has maximum profile under the order L taken over all matchings in
M+.
7.3.1 Finding a greedy maximum matching
We now introduce our algorithm to find a greedy maximum matching in any given
CHAT instance I. Our algorithm extends an existing approach for finding a greedy
maximum matching, given an instance of the House Allocation problem with Ties, and is
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Agent Pref list House Capacity
a1: h1 h2 h1 : 1
a2: h1 h2 h2 : 1
a3: h4 h3 h3 : 1
a4: h4 h4 : 1
Figure 7.1: An instance I1 of CHAT
based on a variant of the Bellman-Ford algorithm [28]. A pseudocode description of the
main loop of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 12. This adapts the classical augmenting
path algorithm for finding a maximum matching in a graph. That is, we start from the
empty matching, and then repeatedly increase the cardinality of the current matching via
an augmenting path until no such path can be found. In our algorithm, however, we aim to
satisfy the greedy maximum condition by looking for greedy s-matchings, and augmenting
the current (greedy) matching at any stage of the algorithm by using only an augmenting
path which leads to a greedy (s + 1) matching, provided s is not the cardinality of a
maximum matching.
We would like to show that it always suffices to use a single augmenting path at
each stage s of the algorithm to obtain a greedy (s + 1)-matching from a greedy s-
matching. For instance, consider the CHAT example in Figure 7.1. Then, the matching
M1 = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2), (a3, h4)} is a greedy 3-matching. Now, the matchings M2 =
{(a1, h2), (a2, h1), (a3, h3), (a4, h4)} and M3 = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2), (a3, h3), (a4, h4)} are two
possible greedy 4-matchings that could be obtained from M1. However, while it takes an
augmenting path and an alternating cycle to move from M1 to M2, it takes only an aug-
menting path to move from M1 to M3. The next lemma proves that a single augmenting
path always suffices to obtain a greedy (s+ 1)-matching from a greedy s-matching.
Lemma 7.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching in I. Then either M is a greedy maximum
matching or there is a greedy (s + 1)-matching M ′ that can be obtained from M via an
augmenting path.
Proof. Let G be the underlying bipartite graph of I. Suppose that M is not a greedy
maximum matching. Hence, there exists a greedy (s + 1)-matching M1. We clone G to
obtain a cloned graph C(G) as follows. We replace every house hj ∈ H with the clones
h1j , h
2
j , . . . , h
cj
j . We then divide the capacity of each house among its clones by allowing
each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if (ai, hj) ∈ E, then we add (ai, hpj ) to the
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edge set of C(G) for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj). Furthermore, if rankai(hj) = k, then we let
rankai(h
p
j ) = k for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj), so that hpj is a kth-choice house for ai in C(G) for
all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj). Let us then adapt the matching M in G to obtain its clone C(M) in
C(G) as follows. If a house hj in G is assigned to xj agents a1, ...axj in M , then we add
(ap, h
p
j ) to C(M) for 1 ≤ p ≤ xj , so that |C(M)| = |M |. We use a similar process for M1
to obtain its clone C(M1) in C(G). Hence, C(M) is a greedy s-matching and C(M1) is a
greedy (s+ 1)-matching in C(G).
Let us consider X = C(M)⊕C(M1). Then, it follows that each connected component
of X is either (i) an alternating cycle, (ii) an even length alternating path, or (iii) an odd
length alternating path. We will show that there exists a greedy (s+1)-matching M ′ such
that we require only a connected component of type (iii) in order to obtain M ′ from M .
Let D be a connected component of X that is either (i) or (ii). Let ρD(C(M)) =
(a1, ..., az), and let ρD(C(M1)) = (b1, ..., bz). Suppose that ρD(C(M1)) L ρD(C(M)).
Then, we can create a new matching C1 of cardinality s in C(G) by replacing the C(M)-
edges in D by the C(M1)-edges in D, giving ρ(C1) L ρ(C(M)), which is a contradiction
since C(M) is a greedy s-matching in C(G). A similar contradiction arises if ρD(C(M)) L
ρD(C(M1)). Hence, ρD(C(M)) = ρD(C(M1)).
Now, let us form another greedy (s+1)-matching C2 in C(G) from C(M1) by replacing
every C(M1)-edge by the corresponding C(M)-edge in each connected component. Con-
sider each connected component F of Y = C(M)⊕C2. Then, it follows that F can only be
an odd length alternating path. By the existence of C2, there must exist an odd number
of such paths in Y in order for us to be able to augment C(M) to C2. Now, if only one
such path P ′ exists, then it follows that P ′ is an augmenting path and C(M) ⊕ P ′ gives
us the greedy (s+ 1)-matching C2.
Otherwise, there is more than one such path. Let P1 and P2 be any two such paths
which together have the same number of C(M)- and C2-edges; it must be possible to find
such a pair of paths. Let ρP1(C(M))+ ρP2(C(M)) = (α1, ..., αz) and ρP1(C2)+ ρP2(C2) =
(β1, ..., βz). Suppose that (β1, ..., βz) L (α1, ..., αz). Then, we can create a new matching
C3 of cardinality s in C(G) by replacing the C(M)-edges by the C2-edges in P1 and P2
respectively, giving ρ(C3) L ρ(C(M)), which contradicts the fact that C(M) is a greedy s-
matching in C(G). We obtain a similar contradiction if (α1, ..., αz) L (β1, ..., βz). Hence,
ρP1(C(M))+ρP2(C(M)) = ρP1(C2)+ρP2(C2). Let us form another greedy (s+1)-matching
C4 in C(G) from C2 by replacing every C2-edge by the corresponding C(M)-edge in every
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such pair of odd length alternating paths. Then, it follows that C(M) ⊕ C4 contains
only a single alternating path P ′ of odd length. Moreover, P ′ is an augmenting path and
C(M)⊕ P ′ gives us the greedy (s+ 1)-matching C4.
Consider the path P ′. Let C ′ = C(M) ⊕ P ′. Replace each cloned edge (ai, hpj ) in
P ′ by the original edge (ai, hj) in G from which it was derived, where 1 ≤ p ≤ cj . It
follows that P ′ becomes an augmenting path P with respect toM . Perform the same edge
replacements for C ′ to obtain a matching M ′ in G. It follows that M ⊕ P = M ′. Since
ρ(M ′) = ρ(C ′), it must be the case that M ′ is a greedy (s+1)-matching in G. Hence, the
result follows.
Given any greedy s-matchingM in I that is not a greedy maximum matching, the task
at hand now is to be able to identify an augmenting path which will lead us to a greedy
(s+ 1)-matching. To do so, let us introduce the notion of a maximum profile augmenting
path. Let α be an integer such that 1 ≤ α ≤ z. We define X + α to be
X + α = (x1, ..., xα−1, xα + 1, xα+1, ..., xz)
and we define X − α to be
X − α = (x1, ..., xα−1, xα − 1, xα+1, ..., xz)
Let P = 〈a0, h0, a1, h1, ..., ax, hx〉 be an alternating path from an exposed agent vertex
a0 to a house vertex hx, such that (ai, hi−1) ∈M for 1 ≤ i ≤ x. We then define the profile
of P to be
ρ(P ) = O + r(a0, h0) + r(a1, h1) + ...+ r(ax, hx)
– r(a1, h0)− r(a2, h1)− ...− r(ax, hx−1)
It follows that if P is an augmenting path, then ρ(P ) corresponds to the net change in
the profile of M if we augment M along P . For every house vertex hj ∈ H, we define the
L-value of hj relative to M , denoted by L(hj), to be the maximum profile taken over all
alternating paths from an exposed agent vertex ending at hj , where a vertex is defined to be
exposed if it is unmatched in M . We say that an alternating path P is a maximum profile
augmenting path for M if P is an augmenting path, and ρ(P ) = max {L(hj) : hj ∈ H}
where max is with respect to the L order on profiles.
The following lemma shows that we can use the notion of a maximum profile aug-
menting path in tandem with the classical augmenting path algorithm to find a greedy
maximum matching in CHAT.
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Algorithm 13 Algorithm Max-Aug
1: Initialise l(hj) and pred(hj) for each house vertex hj ;
2: for p in 1..s do
3: for each agent vertex ai assigned in M do { // M is the current greedy s-matching}
4: for each edge (ai, hj) /∈M do
5: σ := l(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai));
6: if σ L l(hj) then
7: l(hj) := σ;
8: pred(hj) := ai;
Lemma 7.3.2. Suppose that M is a greedy s-matching which is not maximum. Let P
be a maximum profile augmenting path. Then, augmenting M along P gives a greedy
(s+ 1)-matching.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that M ′ = M ⊕ P does not give us a greedy (s + 1)-
matching. Now, by Lemma 7.3.1, there exists a matching M ′′ of cardinality s + 1 such
that M ′′ L M ′ and M ′′ = M ⊕ P ′ for an augmenting path P ′. Since M ′′ L M ′, it
follows that M ⊕P ′ L M ⊕P , i.e. P ′ L P . However, this gives a contradiction since P
is an augmenting path of maximum profile for M .
Let M be any greedy s-matching that is not a greedy maximum matching for a given
CHAT instance I. It now remains to show how to find a maximum profile augmenting
path with respect toM . We do this using the algorithm shown in Algorithm 13, which is a
variant of the Bellman-Ford algorithm for finding shortest paths. In the algorithm, we will
use l(hj) as described below to compute L(hj) for each house vertex hj . We will also use a
predecessor value pred(hj) to store the agent vertex preceding hj in the alternating path
which has maximum profile among all alternating paths from an exposed agent vertex to
hj found so far by the algorithm. At the start of the algorithm, we initialise l(hj) and
pred(hj) for each house vertex hj as follows. If there is an edge (ai, hj) incident to hj such
that ai is currently exposed, let t be the minimum value of r(ai, hj) taken over all such
edges, where recall that r(ai, hj) = rankai(hj). We then initialise l(hj) to be the t-tuple
(x1, ..., xt) where xp = 0 (1 ≤ p < t) and xt = 1. Furthermore, we initialise pred(hj)
to be ai. If no such edge exists, we initialise l(hj) to be (0) and pred(hj) is undefined.
Intuitively, l(hj) gives the maximum profile of any alternating path of length 1 from an
exposed agent vertex ai to hj at the start of the algorithm, and so pred(hj) is set to be
ai, if such a path exists.
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The algorithm runs in s iterations, where s is the cardinality of the current matching
as constructed by Algorithm Greedy-Max (see Algorithm 12). It uses an edge relaxation
operation similar to that of the Bellman-Ford algorithm, but bases this operation in terms
of the order L on L-values. The edge relaxation operation is defined in line 5 of the
algorithm. Let ai be any agent vertex assigned in the current greedy s-matching M
with (ai, hj) /∈ M . Also, let P = 〈v, ...,M(ai)〉 be an alternating path, starting from an
exposed agent vertex v and ending at M(ai), whose profile is equal to l(M(ai)). The
essence of the edge relaxation operation is the following: if the profile of the alternating
path P ′ = 〈v, ...,M(ai), ai, hj〉 left-dominates l(hj), i.e. P ′ gives a “better profile” than
the alternating path whose profile is equal to l(hj), then we update l(hj) to be the profile
of P ′ and similarly update the predecessor of hj to be ai.
Now, if l(h) = (0) for every house vertex h after execution of Algorithm Max-Aug,
then there is no augmenting path, and M is a greedy maximum matching. Otherwise, we
find an exposed house vertex hj such that l(hj) left-dominates the L-values of all exposed
house vertices. The correctness proof in the next section shows that we can obtain the
maximum profile augmenting path P by alternately tracing the predecessor values and
matched edges starting from pred(hj).
7.3.2 Proof of correctness
Let Y = (y1, ..., yz) and X = (x1, ..., xz) be any two profiles. We introduce a new notation
as follows, that is, Y L X if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that xi = yi for
1 ≤ i < k and yk ≥ xk. Intuitively, this implies that either Y = X or Y L X. The
following lemma shows us that Algorithm Max-Aug correctly computes the L-value of each
house vertex.
Lemma 7.3.3. When Algorithm Max-Aug terminates, l(hj) = L(hj) for each house vertex
hj ∈ H.
Proof. Let hj be an arbitrary house vertex in G. Let also L2p+1(hj) denote the maximum
profile of any alternating path of length ≤ 2p + 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj .
We will prove the following loop invariant: after iteration p of the main for loop, l(hj) is
equal to or left-dominates the maximum profile taken over all alternating paths of length
≤ 2p+ 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj , i.e. l(hj) L L2p+1(hj).
For the base case, let p = 0. Now, L1(hj) is the maximum profile of any alternating
path of length ≤ 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj . This is precisely the value that
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l(hj) is initialised to in line 1 of the algorithm as discussed on the previous page. Hence,
the base case holds.
For the induction step, we assume that 1 ≤ p ≤ s and that the loop invariant is true
for p−1, i.e. lprev(h) L L2p−1(h) after the (p−1)th iteration for all h ∈ H, where lprev(h)
denotes the value of l(h) as computed after the (p− 1)th iteration. We will show that the
loop invariant holds after iteration p, that is l(hj) L L2p+1(hj) where l(hj) is computed
after the pth iteration. Let A′j = {ai ∈ A : (ai, hj) ∈ E\M and ai is assigned in M} where
E is the edge set in G. During each iteration, we perform a relaxation step for every edge
(ai, hj) such that ai ∈ A′j .
By definition, L2p+1(hj) denotes the maximum profile of any alternating path of length
≤ 2p+1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj . Now, if (i) there does not exist any alternating
path from an exposed agent vertex of length ≤ 2p + 1 which gives a better profile than
L2p−1(hj), then it follows that L2p+1(hj) = L2p−1(hj). Otherwise, it must be the case
that (ii) an alternating path of length ≤ 2p + 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj with
profile L2p+1(hj) must contain an alternating path from an exposed agent vertex to h′j
with profile L2p−1(h′j) for some house vertex h
′
j , together with the edges (M(h
′
j), hj) and
(M(h′j), h
′
j). In such a case, it follows that
L2p+1(hj) = max
{
L2p−1(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A′j
}
Now, by inspection of the algorithm, we have that
l(hj) = max
{
lprev(hj),
{
l′(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A′j
}}
where l′(M(ai)) is the most recent L-value of M(ai) when l(hj) is updated by the algo-
rithm; it must be the case that lprev(M(ai)) L l′(M(ai)). By definition of L2p+1(hj), it
follows that
L2p+1(hj)
= max
{
L2p−1(hj),max
{
L2p−1(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A′j
}}
L max
{
lprev(hj),max
{
L2p−1(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A′j
}}
(by the inductive hypothesis)
L max
{
lprev(hj),max
{
lprev(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A′j
}}
(by the inductive hypothesis)
L max
{
lprev(hj),max
{
l′(M(ai)) + r(ai, hj)− r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A′j
}}
= l(hj)
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completing the inductive step.
Thus, after iteration s, we have that l(hj) L L2s+1(hj). However, any alternating
path from an exposed agent vertex to hj with respect to the greedy s-matching can have
length at most 2s + 1. Hence, we have that l(hj) = L(hj) after iteration s, i.e. l(hj)
is equal to the maximum profile taken over all alternating paths from an exposed agent
vertex to hj as required.
LetM be a greedy s-matching that is not a maximum matching. Let hr be an exposed
house vertex whose L-value left-dominates the L−values of all exposed house vertices after
execution of Algorithm Max-Aug. Let P be the sequence of agents and houses obtained
by alternately tracing the predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from hr.
The next lemma shows that P must terminate at some exposed agent vertex.
Lemma 7.3.4. Let P be the sequence of agents and houses obtained by alternately tracing
the predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from hr where hr is defined as
above. Then, P terminates at some exposed agent vertex.
Proof. We wish to show that P cannot cycle, so let us suppose the contrary for a contra-
diction, i.e. P contains some cycle C. Hence, there must have been some point during the
execution of Algorithm Max-Aug when C appeared for the first time. Call this step X.
Suppose that this happened when some house hj ∈ P had its predecessor assigned to the
agent ai ∈ P .
We firstly observe that hj must itself be in C, for otherwise, since none of the other
house vertices had its predecessor changed at step X, and none of the agents had his
assigned house changed at step X, C must have existed before step X, a contradiction to
the fact that C appears for the first time. It follows that we can trace an alternating path
from each of the other house vertices h in C to hj by following the predecessor values and
matched edges in M from pred(h). Hence, immediately prior to step X, hj must itself
have had a defined predecessor, and an existing value for l(hj).
Since pred(hj) was assigned to ai, it must have been the case that σ L l(hj), where
l(hj) was the existing L-value for hj and σ = l(M(ai))+r(ai, hj)−r(ai,M(ai)). However,
it is also the case that σ = l(hj) − ρC(M) + ρC(M ′) where we let M ′ = M ⊕ C. Hence,
we have that ρC(M ′) L ρC(M). However, this implies that M ′ is a matching such that
|M ′| = |M | and M ′ L M , a contradiction.
By Lemma 7.3.4, it follows that we can use the predecessor values to successfully trace
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an augmenting path P with respect toM where P ends at the house vertex hr. By Lemma
7.3.3 and the definition of L(hr), P must be a maximum profile augmenting path with
respect to M if l(hr) left-dominates the L-values over all exposed house vertices. This
gives us the following result.
Theorem 7.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching that is not greedy maximum. Then,
executing Algorithm Max-Aug finds a maximum profile augmenting path with respect to
M .
7.3.3 Time complexity analysis
The time complexity for finding a greedy maximum matching in an instance I of CHAT
may be derived as follows.
Algorithm Greedy-Max performs S calls to Algorithm Max-Aug to find maximum
profile augmenting paths where S is the cardinality of a maximum matching in I. The main
for loop of Algorithm Max-Aug itself is performed O(s) times, where s is the cardinality of
the current matching. Each iteration of the innermost for loop in line 6 makes a comparison
of l-values which takes O(z) time. There can be O(m) such iterations altogether during
a single execution of Algorithm Max-Aug. At the end of Algorithm Max-Aug, O(n2)
comparisons of L-values, each of which takes O(z) time, are made to identify a maximum
profile augmenting path. Hence, each execution of Algorithm Max-Aug takes O(smz +
n2z) = O(smz) time. It follows that the overall time complexity of Algorithm Greedy-
Max is O(C2mz) since the maximum cardinality of a matching in an instance of CHAT
is O(C). In practice, the actual runtime of Algorithm Greedy-Max can be speeded up
through the observation that if no house h that is assigned in the current matching had
l(h) updated in the last iteration of Algorithm Max-Aug, then no further improvement to
an l(h′) for all h′ ∈ H can happen. Hence, we may choose to halt Algorithm Max-Aug at
that point.
7.4 Rank-maximal matchings
Let I be a given instance of CHAT. We formalise the definition of a rank-maximal match-
ing in I as follows.
Definition 7.4.1. Given an instance of CHAT, a rank-maximal matching is a matching
that has maximum profile under the order L, taken over all matchings in M.
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Agent Pref list House Capacity
a1: h1 h2 h1 : 1
a2: h1 h2 : 2
Figure 7.2: An instance I2 of CHAT
For a given CHAT instance, there may be more than one rank-maximal matching, but
all rank-maximal matchings must have the same profile, and hence the same cardinality.
Now, it is straightforward to see that a simple greedy algorithm in which we assign the
maximum number of agents to their first choice house, then the maximum number to their
second choice house, and so on, does not guarantee to find a rank-maximal matching. For
example, Figure 7.2 shows a given CHAT instance I2 in which the greedy algorithm
may either return matching M1 = {(a1, h1)} given the agent ordering 〈a1, a2〉, or M2 =
{(a1, h2), (a2, h1)} given the agent ordering 〈a2, a1〉, each of which maximises the number
of agents assigned to their first choice house. However, M2 is rank-maximal butM1 is not,
since ρ(M1) = (1), but ρ(M2) = (1, 1).
7.4.1 Finding a rank-maximal matching
For the special case where every house has unitary capacity, i.e. the House Allocation
problem with Ties (HAT), Irving et al. [29] give an O(min(z∗
√
n, n + z∗)m) (direct)
combinatorial algorithm for solving the analogous problem, where z∗ ≤ z is the maximal
rank of an edge used in a rank-maximal matching. We will show how to extend this
algorithm to the CHAT case.
Let G be the underlying graph of I. Let Ei denote the set of edges having rank i for
any i (1 ≤ i ≤ z). Then, the edge set of G may be expressed as E = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ Ez.
Our algorithm works in phases. In each phase i (1 ≤ i < z), it constructs a rank-maximal
matching Mi+1 of the subgraph Gi+1 = (A ∪H,E1 ∪E2 ∪ ... ∪Ei ∪Ei+1) so that when it
terminates at the end of phase z − 1, a rank-maximal matching Mz of the subgraph Gz
is a rank-maximal matching for I. Our algorithm begins at the outset by constructing a
maximum matching M1 in G1 = (A ∪H,E1). Note that M1 is a rank-maximal matching
of G1 since it is a maximum matching of E1 edges. For each phase i where i ≥ 1, our
algorithm then constructs a modified subgraph G′i+1 of Gi+1, which reduces the problem
of finding a rank-maximal matching in Gi+1 to the problem of computing a maximum
matching of G′i+1. The modified subgraph G
′
i+1 is constructed from G
′
i by adding only
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Algorithm 14 Algorithm Rank-Max
1: Start with G′1 = G1 and let M1 be a maximum matching in G
′
1.
2: for i = 1 to z − 1 do
3: Obtain an EOU labelling of G′i.
4: Delete all edges in G′i connecting two odd vertices, or connecting an odd vertex with an
unreachable vertex (this step does not delete any edge of Mi).
5: Delete from Ej , for all j > i, all edges incident to an odd or unreachable vertex in G′i.
6: Build subgraph G′i+1 by adding the edges in Ei+1 to G
′
i.
7: Find a maximum matching Mi+1 in G′i+1 by augmenting Mi.
8: return Mz as a rank-maximal matching.
those edges from Ei+1 that can potentially belong to a rank-maximal matching of I.
To help us identify those edges that can potentially belong to a rank-maximal matching
of I, we make use of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition as extended to the capacitated
bipartite graph in Chapter 4. Recall that Lemma 4.3.4 shows that fundamental properties
of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition, as introduced by Lemma 1.2.1 in Section 1.2, also
hold in the capacitated bipartite graph case. Hence, we can reuse Lemma 4.3.4 here for
each subgraph Gi of G, which is essentially a CHAT instance. A pseudocode description
of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 14.
7.4.2 Proof of correctness
Recall that Algorithm Rank-Max constructs a maximum matching Mi for each subgraph
G′i. In order to show the correctness of our algorithm, we require the following technical
results.
Lemma 7.4.1. Suppose that every rank-maximal matching of Gi is a maximum matching
of G′i. Then every rank-maximal matching of Gi+1 is contained in G
′
i+1.
Lemma 7.4.2. For every phase i and j where j > i, the number of edges of rank at most
i is the same in Mi and Mj.
Note that the proofs of the lemmas have been omitted since they may be established
by straightforward extension of the corresponding results for HAT (i.e. Lemmas 2.2 and
2.3 of [29] respectively). What Lemmas 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 show are the following:
(i) suppose that the hypothesis of Lemma 7.4.1 is true. Then, any edge deleted during
phase i of the algorithm does not belong to any rank-maximal matching of Gi+1 so
that every rank-maximal matching in Gi+1 has all of its edges in G′i+1;
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(ii) the algorithm maintains the same number of edges of rank i in each matching Mj
for all i < j.
The above results lead us to the following correctness result for our algorithm, for
which we again omit the proof since it is a straightforward extension of the corresponding
result for HAT (i.e. Theorem 2.4 of [29]).
Theorem 7.4.1. For every 1 ≤ k ≤ z, the following statements hold:
(i) Every rank-maximal matching in Gk is a maximum matching in G′k;
(ii) Every maximum matching Mk in G′k is a rank-maximal matching in Gk.
7.4.3 Time complexity analysis
The following theorem gives us the time complexity of our algorithm.
Theorem 7.4.2. Given a CHAT instance I, a rank-maximal matching can be computed
in O(min(z∗
√
C,C + z∗)m) time, where z∗ is the maximal rank of an edge in an optimal
solution and C is the total capacity of the houses in I.
Proof. Consider phase i of the algorithm. It is straightforward to see that each subgraph
Gi can be constructed in O(m) time. We use Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a
maximum matching Mi in Gi in O(
√
Cm) time. Now, Gabow’s algorithm uses successive
augmentation steps to find a maximum matching for each Gi. It must be the case that
the number of augmentation steps cannot exceed |Mi| − |Mi−1|+1, since each step either
increases the cardinality of the matching by at least 1, or establishes that no further
steps are needed. Hence, the time complexity for Gabow’s algorithm is also bounded by
O((|Mi| − |Mi−1|+ 1)m), giving an overall bound of O(min(
√
C, |Mi| − |Mi−1|+ 1)m).
After finding the maximum matching Mi, it follows that we can obtain an EOU la-
belling by using a similar approach to that described in Section 4.3.2 for CHAT. We first
use a pre-processing step to label each unassigned agent and each undersubscribed house
as even. Clearly, this step takes O(n) time. Next, restricted breadth-first search may be
used on Gi to search for alternating paths with respect to Mi, building up odd or even
labels for every vertex encountered. This step labels all odd and even (assigned) agents,
and all odd and even (full) houses and takes O(m) time. Any remaining unlabelled vertices
must be unreachable and we can directly label these vertices in Gi in O(n) time. Thus,
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the total time complexity of EOU labelling of Gi is O(n +m). The EOU labelling of Gi
is then used to delete certain edges from Ej where j > i which takes O(m) time.
Hence, the time complexity for each phase is O((min(
√
C, |Mi| − |Mi−1| + 1)m). By
summing, we see that the overall running time is O(min(z
√
C,C + z)m).
Now, we show how to replace z by z∗. At the beginning of each phase i, we first check
if Mi is already a maximum matching in G′ which consists of all edges (of all ranks) that
have not been deleted at the start of phase i. This takes O(m) time. If Mi is a maximum
matching in G′, then we stop. Otherwise, we continue as described above. This ensures
that only z∗ phases are executed.
7.4.4 Alternative approaches to finding a rank-maximal matching
Given any CHAT instance I, we give here several alternative approaches for computing
a rank-maximal matching in I. However, we will show that Algorithm Rank-Max, based
on using the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition, offers the fastest algorithm for all cases.
7.4.4.1 Reduction to the Assignment problem
One method for finding a rank-maximal matching in I would be by reduction to the
Assignment problem through the allocation of a suitably steeply decreasing sequence of
weights to the edges of G as follows. For each (agent,house) edge (ai, hj) in the underlying
graph of I, let wt(ai, hj) = (n+ 1)z−k where n is the total number of agents and houses,
z is the maximum length of an agent’s preference list, and rankai(hj) = k. We then find
a maximum weight matching in this weighted graph G′. The following lemma shows that
such a maximum weight matching must be a rank-maximal matching in I.
Lemma 7.4.3. Let M be a maximum weight matching in G′. Then, M is a rank-maximal
matching of I.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists some matching M ′ such that M ′ L M . Let
ρM = (x1, ..., , xz) and ρM ′ = (y1, ..., yz). It follows that for some s(1 ≤ s ≤ z), xi = yi for
each i (1 ≤ i < s) and ys > xs. Now, let wt(M∗) denote the weight of any matching M∗.
Then, it follows that the weight of M is
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wt(M) =
z∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i
=
s∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i +
z∑
i=s+1
xi(n+ 1)z−i
≤
s∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i + (xs+1 + xs+2 + ...+ xz)(n+ 1)z−s−1
<
s∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i + n · (n+ 1)z−s−1
<
s∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i + (n+ 1)z−s
However, we may derive the following inequality relation for the weight of M ′:
wt(M ′) ≥
s−1∑
i=1
yi(n+ 1)z−i + ys(n+ 1)z−s
≥
s−1∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i + (xs + 1)(n+ 1)z−s
(since ys ≥ xs + 1)
=
s∑
i=1
xi(n+ 1)z−i + (n+ 1)z−s
> wt(M)
which contradicts the fact that M is a maximum weight matching in G′.
Hence, Lemma 7.4.3 shows that we can find a rank-maximal matching in I by reduc-
tion to the Assignment problem in the manner described above. Recall (from Section 1.2)
that Gabow’s algorithm for maximum weight DCS [15] solves the Assignment problem
in the capacitated graph in O(Cmin(m log n, n2)) time. In view of the time required to
perform arithmetic operations on steeply decreasing weights [42], the resulting running
time of the algorithm is O(zCmin(m log n, n2)). Recall also that Algorithm Rank-Max
takes O(min(z∗
√
C, z∗ + C)m) time. Now, if m log n ≤ n2, then finding a rank-maximal
matching via reduction to the Assignment problem takes (i) Ω(zCm log n) time. Other-
wise, this takes (ii) Ω(zCn2) time. In case (i), Algorithm Rank-Max is faster by a factor
of Ω(min(
√
C log n, (zC log n)/(z∗+C))). In case (ii), Algorithm Rank-Max is faster by a
factor of Ω(min(
√
C, (zC)/(z∗+C))) under the standard assumption that m ≤ n2 [46]. It
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follows in all cases that Algorithm Rank-Max is faster than by reduction to the Assignment
problem.
We remark that a similar reduction to the Assignment problem can also be used to find
greedy maximum matchings. Here, it is required to adjust the edge weights to ensure that
a maximum weight matching in the weighted graph G′ described above also has maximum
cardinality. In order to do so, we modify the previous reduction by adding a sufficiently
large constant C to each edge weight. This is to ensure that every matching of size s has
weight greater than every matching of size s− 1. Since the largest edge weight we might
have is (n + 1)z−1, adding a constant of C = (n + 1)z is sufficient. Hence, we assign the
weight of each edge (ai, hj) to be wt(ai, hj) = (n+1)z−k+(n+1)z. Let M be a maximum
weight matching in the revised weighted graph G′. Then, the second component of the
edge weights (as created by adding C to the weight of every edge) ensures that M will
have maximum cardinality. Among all such matchings, the first component will ensure
that a matching with maximum weight is a greedy maximum matching using a similar
proof to Lemma 7.4.3.
It follows that such an approach would also take O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time. Recall
that Algorithm Greedy-Max takes O(C2mz) time to find a greedy maximum matching
given a CHAT instance. For most practical applications, it is reasonable to assume that
C/ log n ≥ 1. For example, from the 2006-07 Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme
(SFAS) data [38], there were 781 students, 53 hospitals and the total capacity of the
hospitals was 789, i.e. n = 781 + 53 = 834 and C = 789 so that C/ log n ≈ 117 ≥ 1.
By comparing the time complexities of both approaches, it is straightforward to see that
the reduction method is faster by a factor of Ω(Cmax(1/ log n,m/n2)) for most practical
cases.
7.4.4.2 Adapting Algorithm Greedy-Max
Note that a rank-maximal matching and a greedy maximum matching are conceptually
similar except that the former need not be of maximum cardinality. Now, a rank-maximal
matching M ′ must be a greedy |M ′|-matching. The next lemma shows how to extend the
results of Lemmas 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 to yield an alternative method for finding a rank-maximal
matching in any instance of CHAT.
Lemma 7.4.4. For each i, let Mi be a greedy i-matching with profile ρi. If ρi+1 L ρi
for i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1 and ρk L ρk+1, then Mk is a rank-maximal matching, and ρk is the
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Algorithm 15 Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max
1: M := ∅;
2: M ′ := ∅;
3: s := 0;
4: loop
5: P := a maximum profile augmenting path for M ;
6: if P exists then
7: M :=M ⊕ P ;
8: if ρ(M) L ρ(M ′) then
9: M ′ :=M ;
10: else {//ρ(M) ≺L ρ(M ′) must hold}
11: break;
12: else
13: break;
14: s := s+ 1;
15: M ′ is a rank-maximal matching;
rank-maximal profile.
Proof. Let ρk = (x1, ..., xz) and suppose that Mk is not rank-maximal. Then, there is a
matching M such that M L Mk and M has profile ρ = (x1, ..., xi−1, yi, ..., yz) for some i
wih yi > xi. It follows thatM contains a matchingM ′ with profile ρ′ = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1).
Clearly, M ′ L Mk. Since ρk = (x1, ..., xz), it follows that x1 + ... + xz = k, so that
x1 + ... + xi ≤ k. We then have that |M ′| = x1 + ... + xi + 1 ≤ k + 1. This implies
that we have a matching of cardinality at most k + 1 whose profile left-dominates ρ(Mk).
However, this gives a contradiction since ρk must left-dominate the profiles of all matchings
of cardinality up to k + 1 by the statement of the lemma.
We now introduce Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max which offers an alternative approach
to finding a rank-maximal matching in any given CHAT instance J . A pseudocode de-
scription of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 15. Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max basically
repeats the approach used by Algorithm Greedy-Max. However, the algorithm halts when
it obtains a greedy s-matching that is also rank-maximal. That is, it does so when it finds
a greedy s-matchingM which satisfies the condition in the statement of Lemma 7.4.4. It is
straightforward to verify that Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max has the same time complexity
as Algorithm Greedy-Max, i.e. O(C2mz).
Lemma 7.4.4 shows that we can obtain a rank-maximal matching as a by-product
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of finding a greedy maximum matching in I, and Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max gives an
algorithm for doing this. Let us compare the time complexities of Algorithm Rank-Max
and Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max. Recall Algorithm Rank-Max takes O(min(z∗
√
C,C +
z∗)m) time. It follows that Algorithm Rank-Max is faster than Algorithm Greedy-Rank-
Max by a factor of Ω(min(C3/2, C2z/(C + z∗)).
7.4.4.3 “Cloning”
Another straightforward solution to finding a rank-maximal matching for a CHAT in-
stance I may be to use “cloning” to create an instance J of HAT, and then to apply the
O(min(z∗
√
n, n+ z∗)m) algorithm of [29] to J . Firstly, we create cj clones h1j , h
2
j , ..., h
cj
j of
each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each oc-
currence of hj in a given agent’s preference list by the sequence h1j , h
2
j , ..., h
cj
j , the elements
of which are listed in a single tie at the point where hj appears.
Let us now compare the complexity of our direct approach using Algorithm Rank-Max
to that of the cloning approach. Let GJ denote the underlying graph of J . Then, GJ
contains n′ = n1 +C vertices. For each ai ∈ A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses
for ai. Then, the number of edges in GJ is m′ =
∑
ai∈A
∑
hj∈Ai cj . Hence, the complexity
of applying the algorithm of [29] to J is Ω(min(z∗
√
n1 + C, n1 + C + z∗)m′). It follows
that the cloning approach is slower by a factor of Ω(m′/m).
7.5 Generous Maximum Matchings
For a given CHAT instance I, we say that a feasible s-profile X is s-right-minimal if there
is no other feasible s-profile that right-dominates X. In addition, we define a matching M
whose profile is s-right-minimal to be a generous s-matching. When s is the cardinality of a
maximum matching, we say that a generous s-matching is a generous maximum matching.
As in the case of greedy s-matchings, there may be more than one generous s-matching
for a given value of s, but it is clear that all generous s-matchings have the same profile,
and we call this the generous s-profile for the problem instance. When s is the cardinality
of a maximum matching, the generous s-profile is called the generous maximum profile.
We formalise the definition of a generous maximum matching as follows.
Definition 7.5.1. Given an instance of CHAT, a generous maximum matching is a
maximum matching that has minimum profile under the order ≺R taken over all matchings
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in M+.
7.5.1 Finding a generous maximum matching
We may adapt Algorithm Greedy-Max, designed to find a greedy maximum matching
in I, into an analogous algorithm for finding a generous maximum matching in I. The
remainder of this section will work towards showing this. First of all, we introduce the
following lemma, which is a counterpart to Lemma 7.3.1 for finding generous matchings.
Lemma 7.5.1. Let M be a generous s-matching in I. Then either M is a generous
maximum matching or there is a generous (s+ 1)-matching M ′ that can be obtained from
M via an augmenting path.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if we replace all concepts relating to left-
domination and greedy in the proof of Lemma 7.3.1 by their counterparts for right-
domination and generous respectively, then this establishes the proof for this lemma.
As with finding a greedy maximum matching in CHAT, given any generous s-matching
M , we want to be able to identify an augmenting path with respect to M that will lead
us to a generous (s + 1)-matching. To do so, let us introduce the notion of a minimum
profile augmenting path. Let i be an integer such that 1 ≤ i ≤ z. We assume X + i and
X − i to be those operations on z-tuples and i that were defined previously in the context
of greedy maximum matchings. Then, for every house vertex hj , we define the R-value
of hj with respect to M , denoted by R(hj), to be the minimum profile taken over all
alternating paths from an exposed agent vertex ending at hj . We say that an alternating
path P is a minimum profile augmenting path for M if P is an augmenting path, and
ρ(P ) = min {R(hj) : hj ∈ H} where min is with respect to the ≺R order on profiles.
The following lemma, analogous to Lemma 7.3.2, shows that we can use the notion of a
minimum profile augmenting path in tandem with the classical augmenting path algorithm
to find a generous maximum matching in CHAT.
Lemma 7.5.2. Suppose that M is a generous s-matching which is not maximum. Let P
be a minimum profile augmenting path. Then, augmenting M along P gives a generous
(s+ 1)-matching.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if we replace all concepts relating to left-
domination and greedy in the proof of Lemma 7.3.2 by their counterparts for right-
domination and generous respectively, then this establishes the proof for this lemma.
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Hence, we are able to reuse Algorithm Greedy-Max to find a generous maximum match-
ing for a given CHAT instance I. The difference, in this context, is that we are interested
in finding a minimum profile augmenting path in each iteration of the algorithm instead.
Let M be any generous s-matching that is not a generous maximum matching for a given
CHAT instance I. If we replace all occurrences of L-values in Algorithm Max-Aug by
R-values, and replace the left-domination comparison L by the right-domination com-
parison ≺R in line 6 of the algorithm, then we can reuse Algorithm Max-Aug to find a
minimum profile augmenting path with respect to M . Note that if there does not exist
any alternating path of length 1 from an exposed agent vertex to a house hj in the ini-
tialisation step, then we set r(hj) to be O′ where r(hj) is used to compute R(hj) in the
algorithm. Let us rename Algorithm Max-Aug, after the above transformations, to be
Algorithm Min-Aug. Then, if every house vertex has an R-value that is equal to O′ after
execution of Algorithm Min-Aug, then there is no augmenting path, and M is a generous
maximum matching. Otherwise, we find the house vertex hj with minimum R-value, and
obtain the minimum profile augmenting path P by alternately tracing the predecessor
values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hj).
7.5.2 Proof of correctness
As in the greedy maximum case, we want to show that the augmenting path P obtained
by executing Algorithm Min-Aug is a minimum profile augmenting path with respect to
the current generous s-matching M . The next two lemmas prove results analogous to the
greedy maximum case in the generous maximum context.
Lemma 7.5.3. When Algorithm Min-Aug terminates, r(hj) = R(hj) for each house vertex
hj ∈ H.
Proof. We replace all concepts relating to left-domination and greedy by their counterparts
for right-domination and generous respectively in the proof of Lemma 7.3.3 to obtain our
proof for this lemma.
Lemma 7.5.4. Let P be the sequence of agents and houses obtained by alternately tracing
predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hj) where the R-value of hj
right-dominates the R-values of all exposed house vertices. Then, P terminates at some
exposed agent vertex.
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Proof. We again replace all concepts relating to left-domination and greedy by their coun-
terparts for right-domination and generous respectively in the proof of Lemma 7.3.4 to
obtain our proof for this lemma.
This gives us the following result with respect to generous maximum matchings in
CHAT.
Theorem 7.5.1. Let M be a generous s-matching M that is not generous maximum.
Then, executing Algorithm Min-Aug (adapted from Algorithm Max-Aug as described above)
finds a minimum profile augmenting path with respect to M .
7.5.3 Time complexity analysis
It is straightforward to verify that it takes O(C2mz) time to find a generous maximum
matching using the same arguments as in the greedy maximum case. In practice, as in the
generous maximum case, we can speed up the running time by halting Algorithm Min-Aug
when no house h that is assigned in the current matching had r(h) updated in the last
iteration of the algorithm.
Finally, we remark that we can find a generous maximum matching given an instance I
of CHAT by a reduction to the Assignment problem in a similar way to that for the greedy
maximum case. In the generous maximum case, however, the appropriate weight to assign
to each edge (ai, hj) should be wt(ai, hj) = ((n+1)z−1− (n+1)k−1+1)+ (n+1)z where
(n+ 1)z is again the large constant added to ensure that any maximum weight matching
in the underlying weighted graph has maximum cardinality. As with the greedy maximum
case, such an approach would take O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time. Furthermore, we can
assume that C/ log n ≥ 1 for most practical applications. Hence, the reduction method is
again faster than an augmenting path approach using the Bellman-Ford algorithm by a
factor of Ω(Cmax(1/ log n,m/n2)) for most practical cases.
7.6 Open Problems
We conclude this chapter with the following open problems.
• In this chapter, we have given different efficient algorithms for the individual prob-
lems of finding a greedy maximum, a rank-maximal and a generous maximum match-
ing given an CHAT instance. It was observed in Section 7.4 that an approach util-
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ising the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition gives us a faster algorithm for finding a
rank-maximal matching than several straightforward alternatives such as by an aug-
menting path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the
Assignment problem. We have also shown that the reduction approach gives a faster
algorithm than the augmenting path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm
for constructing greedy and generous maximum matchings for most practical cases.
Hence, the question arises as to whether we can find direct, more efficient algo-
rithms for constructing greedy and generous maximum matchings, given an instance
of CHAT, by also making use of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition.
• For a given instance I of CHAT, and a given profile, can we determine whether I
admits a matching with that profile in polynomial time?
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Profile-based optimal matchings in
HRT
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, we studied three different types of profile-based optimal matchings in the
context of CHAT. These are the concepts of a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal
matching and a generous maximum matching. In this chapter, we extend these results
to the bipartite matching problem model with two-sided preference lists, focusing on the
Hospital-Residents problems with Ties (HRT). The definitions of a greedy maximum,
rank-maximal and generous maximum matching respectively are the same as those given
in Chapter 7. Furthermore, we reuse most of the terminology and notation as defined in
Chapter 7, and we explicitly define here the relevant concepts only where we need to adapt
them to HRT.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. First of all,
Section 8.2 introduces the terminology and notations that will be used for the rest of
this chapter. We then show how to find a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal
matching and a generous maximum matching given an instance of HRT in Sections 8.3,
8.4 and 8.5 respectively. In each of these sections, we give two algorithms, one based on the
augmenting path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm, and the other through
reduction to the Assignment problem (both as described in Chapter 7), to give efficient
solutions to the problem. Finally, since SMTI is a special case of HRT, we remark that
the algorithms described in this chapter can also be used to solve the analogous problems
in SMTI.
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8.2 Basic terminology
Let I be an instance of the Hospitals-Residents problem with Ties (HRT). This comprises
two disjoint sets R and H, where R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} is the set of residents and H =
{h1, h2, ..., hn2} is the set of hospitals. We assume all the terminology and definitions that
were introduced for HR in Chapter 1. Moreover, we now allow the preference list of each
agent to contain ties. Let G = (R,H,E) be the underlying graph of I where E is the
set of edges in G representing the acceptable hospitals of the residents (and vice versa).
Recall that C =
∑n2
j=1 cj denotes the sum of the capacities of the hospitals. We assume
that no resident or hospital has an empty preference list so that m = |E| ≥ max {n1, n2}.
Given a resident ri ∈ R and an acceptable partner hj for ri, we define rankri(hj)
to be the number of hospitals that ri prefers to hj plus 1. If rankri(hj) = k, we say
that hj is a kth choice of ri. In a similar way, we define rankhj (ri) and a kth choice
of hj . Let z be the largest rank of a resident or hospital taken over all preference lists
in I. Let (ri, hj) ∈ E be any edge. Then, we define the rank of (ri, hj) to be the pair
r(ri, hj) = (min
{
rankhj (ri), rankri(hj)
}
,max
{
rankhj (ri), rankri(hj)
}
).
Given a matching M for an instance I of HRT, we define a vertex v in the underlying
graph G of I to be exposed with respect to M , if v is a resident vertex that is unassigned
in M , or if v is a hospital vertex that is undersubscribed in M . An augmenting path in G
is an alternating path both of whose end vertices are exposed.
For a given HRT instance I, the definition of a feasible s-profile X = (x1, ..., xz) is
analogous to that in CHAT. However, in HRT,
∑
xi = 2s. Let M be the set of all
matchings in I. Furthermore, let M+ denote the set of maximum matchings in M.
8.3 Greedy Maximum matchings
Let L be the total order defined on profiles of matchings as in Section 7.2. The following
formalises the definition of a greedy maximum matching with respect to HRT.
Definition 8.3.1. Given an instance of HRT, a greedy maximum matching is a maximum
matching that has maximum profile under the order L taken over all matchings in M+.
8.3.1 Finding a greedy maximum matching
Given any instance I of HRT, we may find a greedy maximum matching in I by using
Algorithm Greedy-Max, which was used to solve the analogous problem in CHAT. We
129
Chapter 8. Profile-based optimal matchings in HRT
first introduce the following lemma, which is analogous to Lemma 7.3.1 for finding greedy
matchings in the CHAT case.
Lemma 8.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching in I. Then either M is a greedy maximum
matching or there is a greedy (s + 1)-matching M ′ that can be obtained from M via an
augmenting path.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.1 may be adapted to prove this lemma.
As with finding a greedy maximum matching in CHAT, given any greedy s-matching
M in I, we want to be able to identify an augmenting path with respect to M that will
lead us to a greedy (s+1)-matching. To do so, we extend the notion of a maximum profile
augmenting path from CHAT to HRT. Recall the concept of left-domination on z-tuples
as defined in Chapter 7. That is, given the z-tuples X = (x1, ..., xz) and Y = (y1, ..., yz),
we say that Y L X, or Y left-dominates X, if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that
xi = yi for 1 ≤ i < k and yk > xk. Let (a, b) be a pair of integers such that 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ z.
We then define the following operations on z-tuples and (a, b). That is, if a < b, we then
define X + (a, b) to be
X + (a, b) = (x1, ..., xa−1, xa + 1, xa+1, ..., xb−1, xb + 1, xb+1, ..., xz)
and we define X − (a, b) to be
X − (a, b) = (x1, ..., xa−1, xa − 1, xa+1, ..., xb−1, xb − 1, xb+1, ..., xz)
Otherwise, a = b, and we define X + (a, b) to be
X + (a, b) = (x1, ..., xa−1, xa + 2, xa+1, ..., xz)
and we define X − (a, b) to be
X − (a, b) = (x1, ..., xa−1, xa − 2, xa+1, ..., xz)
Let P = 〈r0, h0, r1, h1, ..., rx, hx〉 be an alternating path from an exposed resident vertex
r0 to a hospital vertex hx, such that (ri, hi−1) ∈ M for 1 ≤ i ≤ x. We then define the
profile of P to be
ρ(P ) = O + r(r0, h0) + r(r1, h1) + ...+ r(rx, hx)
– r(r1, h0)− r(r2, h1)− ...− r(rx, hx−1)
130
Chapter 8. Profile-based optimal matchings in HRT
where O = (o1, ..., oz) is the z-tuple such that oi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ z. It follows that if
P is an augmenting path, then ρ(P ) corresponds to the net change in the profile of M
if we augment M along P . For every hospital vertex hj , we define the L-value of hj
relative to M , denoted by L(hj), to be the maximum profile taken over all alternating
paths from an exposed resident vertex ending at hj . We say that an alternating path P
is a maximum profile augmenting path for M if P is an augmenting path, and ρ(P ) =
max {L(hj) : hj ∈ H} where max is with respect to the L order on profiles.
Let M be any greedy s-matching that is not a greedy maximum matching for a given
HRT instance I. The following lemma, analogous to Lemma 7.3.2, shows us that we can
use a maximum profile augmenting path to obtain a greedy (s+ 1)-matching from M .
Lemma 8.3.2. Suppose that M is a greedy s-matching which is not maximum. Let P
be a maximum profile augmenting path. Then, augmenting M along P gives a greedy
(s+ 1)-matching.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.2 may be adapted here.
It now remains to show how to find a maximum profile augmenting path with respect
to M . We remark that we may reuse Algorithm Max-Aug from Chapter 7 for this by
making the following changes to the algorithm:
• replace the agent vertices and house vertices in Algorithm Max-Aug by resident and
hospital vertices respectively; and
• replace the arithmetic operations used by the edge relaxtion operation in line 5 of
Algorithm Max-Aug by those defined with respect to z-tuples and integer pairs in
this chapter, instead of those defined in Chapter 7.
As in CHAT, if every hospital vertex has a L-value that is (0) after execution of
Algorithm Max-Aug, then there is no augmenting path, and M is a greedy maximum
matching.
8.3.2 Proof of correctness
Let I be an instance of HRT. Let P be the sequence of residents and hospitals obtained
by alternately tracing predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hr)
where the hospital vertex hr has left-maximum L-value over all exposed hospital vertices
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after an execution of Algorithm Max-Aug (as modified above). As in the CHAT case, we
want to show that the augmenting path P is a maximum profile augmenting path with
respect to the current greedy s-matching M . The next two lemmas prove the analogous
results for the CHAT case in the context of HRT.
Lemma 8.3.3. Let Algorithm Max-Aug (as modified above) be executed. When Algorithm
Max-Aug terminates, l(hj) = L(hj) for each hospital vertex hj ∈ H.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.3 may be adapted here.
Lemma 8.3.4. Let P be the sequence of residents and hospitals obtained by alternately
tracing predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hr) where the hos-
pital vertex hr has left-maximum L-value over all exposed hospital vertices. Then, P
terminates at some exposed resident vertex.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.4 may be adapted here.
Lemmas 8.3.3 and 8.3.4 give us the following result.
Theorem 8.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching M that is not greedy maximum. Let
Algorithm Max-Aug (as modified above) be executed. Then, the algorithm finds a maximum
profile augmenting path with respect to M .
8.3.3 Time complexity analysis
The time complexity for finding a greedy maximum matching in an instance I of HRT
may be easily verified to be the same as that for solving the same problem in any instance
of CHAT, that is O(C2mz), where C is the total capacity of the hospitals, m is the total
length of preference lists and z is the maximum length of any preference list respectively
in I. As with CHAT, we can speed up the actual runtime of Algorithm Greedy-Max
through the observation that if no hospital had its L-value updated in the last iteration
of Algorithm Max-Aug, then no further improvement to an L-value can happen. Hence,
we may choose to halt Algorithm Max-Aug at that point.
Recall that a straightforward approach to constructing a greedy maximum matching
in the setting of CHAT was by reduction to the Assignment problem. We remark that
it is possible to reuse a similar reduction to that described in Section 7.4.4.1 to also find
a greedy maximum matching in the context of HRT as follows. Let (ri, hj) be an edge
where rankri(hj) = k and rankhj (ri) = l. Then, we let wt(ri, hj) = (n+1)
z−k+(n+1)z−l.
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We are then interested in finding a maximum weight matching M in this weighted graph
G′ that has maximum cardinality. To ensure that M has maximum cardinality, we add
a sufficiently large constant to the edge weights as in the context of CHAT. Here, the
largest edge weight that we might have is 2(n + 1)z−1, so adding a constant of 2(n + 1)z
is sufficient. Then, it is straightforward to reuse the arguments for the analogous case
in CHAT to verify that a maximum weight matching M in G′ must be a maximum
cardinality matching, and is a greedy maximum matching for I. Since the underlying
graph of I is capacitated, we require to use Gabow’s algorithm for maximum weight DCS
again to find a maximum weight matching in G′. Hence, we can find a greedy maximum
matching in I in O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time by reduction to the Assignment problem.
Comparing this to the approach using Algorithm Greedy-Max, it is straightforward to see
that the reduction approach is again faster by a factor of Ω(Cmax(1/ log n,m/n2)) for
most practical cases.
8.4 Rank-maximal matchings
Let I be an instance of HRT. We formalise the definition of a rank-maximal matching in
I as follows.
Definition 8.4.1. Given an instance of HRT, a rank-maximal matching is a matching
that has maximum profile under the order L taken over all matchings in M.
8.4.1 Finding a rank-maximal matching
As in the case of greedy maximum matchings, we can find a rank-maximal matching in
a given HRT instance I either by constructing an algorithm based on the augmenting
path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the Assignment
problem. In the former case, the next lemma shows that we can use this approach by
extending the results of Lemmas 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 in a subtle way to obtain the analogue of
Lemma 7.4.4.
Lemma 8.4.1. For each i, let Mi be a greedy i-matching with profile ρi. If ρi+1 L ρi
for i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1 and ρk L ρk+1, then Mk is a rank-maximal matching, and ρk is the
rank-maximal profile.
Proof. Let ρk = (x1, ..., xz) and suppose that Mk is not rank-maximal. Then, there is a
matching M such that M L Mk. Let ρ = (x1, ..., xi−1, yi, ..., yz) be the profile of M . It
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follows that yi > xi for some i. Now, it must be the case that k + 2 ≤ |M | ≤ C since
M L Mk but ρk left-dominates the profiles of all matchings of cardinality 1 to k+1. Let
G be the underlying bipartite graph of I. Let us consider X =Mk ⊕M . Then, it follows
that each connected component of X is either (i) an odd length alternating path, (ii) an
even length alternating path or (iii) an alternating cycle. Since M L Mk, there must
exist at least one connected component C of X such that ρC(M) L ρC(Mk).
Suppose that C is of type (i). Let M ′ = Mk ⊕ C. Clearly, M ′ L Mk. Now, the end
edges of C cannot be in Mk, for otherwise M ′ is a (k − 1)-matching which left-dominates
Mk, a contradiction. Hence, the end edges of C must be inM . It follows that C is then an
augmenting path with respect to Mk. However, this implies that M ′ is a (k+1)-matching
which left-dominates Mk, which is a contradiction by the statement of the lemma.
Hence, suppose that C is of either type (ii) or (iii). Since ρC(M) L ρC(Mk), we
can create a new matching M ′ of cardinality k by replacing the Mk-edges in C by the
M -edges in C, giving ρ(M ′) L ρ(Mk), which is a contradiction since Mk is a greedy
k-matching.
What Lemma 8.4.1 thus implies is that we can reuse the approach of Algorithm Greedy-
Rank-Max to find a rank-maximal matching in O(C2mz) time given an instance I of HRT.
As mentioned above, an alternative approach to find a rank-maximal matching in I may
be by reduction to the Assignment problem. To do so, we reuse the reduction as described
in Section 8.3 for finding a greedy maximum matching by making just one change. Since
we do not require to find a maximum weight matching in the underlying graph that must
be of maximum cardinality, we remove the large constant that was added to the weight
of each edge. Then, it is straightforward to verify that Lemma 7.4.3 also holds in the
HRT case. Hence, any maximum weight matching M in the weighted graph is also a
rank-maximal matching for I. As with the greedy maximum case, it follows that we can
find a rank-maximal matching in I in O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time by reduction to the
Assignment problem.
By comparing the time complexities of the augmenting path approach based on the
Bellman-Ford approach and the reduction to the Assignment problem, it is straightforward
to see that the latter is faster than the former by a factor of Ω(Cmax(1/ log n,m/n2)) for
most practical cases.
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8.5 Generous Maximum Matchings
Given an instance I of HRT, an alternative optimality criteria as opposed to looking
for greedy maximum matchings or rank-maximal matchings may be to look for generous
maximum matchings. Let ≺R be the total order defined on profiles of matchings as in
Section 7.2. We formalise the definition of a generous maximum matching as follows.
Definition 8.5.1. Given an instance of HRT, a generous maximum matching is a maxi-
mum matching that has minimum profile under the order ≺R taken over all matchings in
M+.
8.5.1 Finding a generous maximum matching
Now, as with the greedy maximum and rank-maximal case, we have two possible algorithms
for constructing a generous maximum matching based on the augmenting path approach
utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm and reduction to the Assignment problem.
In the former case, it may be verified that the results of Lemmas 7.5.1-7.5.4 and
Theorem 7.5.1 can be extended fromCHAT toHRT using the same proofs that established
these results in the CHAT case. What this shows is that we can reuse the algorithm for
finding a generous maximum matching in CHAT for the analogous problem in HRT.
That is, we start from the empty matching, and then use Algorithm Greedy-Max, as
transformed for finding a generous maximum matching in CHAT, to repeatedly increase
the cardinality of the current generous matching in stages. In each stage, we use Algorithm
Min-Aug, as transformed for finding a minimum profile augmenting path in CHAT, for
finding a similar type of augmenting path to augment the current generous matching M
in I until no such path can be found. When this happens, M is a generous maximum
matching for I. Since the algorithm for finding a generous maximum matching in HRT is
then the same as that for solving the analogous problem in CHAT, the time complexity
for this is also O(C2mz). As in the CHAT case, we can speed up the runtime by halting
Algorithm Min-Aug when no hospital which is assigned in the current generous matching
had its R-value updated in the last iteration of the algorithm.
To reduce the problem of finding a generous maximum matching to the Assignment
problem, the correct edge weight1 to use for each edge (ri, hj) should be wt(ri, hj) =
(2(n+1)z−1−(n+1)k−1−(n+1)l−1+1)+2(n+1)z. We can then easily extend the results
1The term +1 is to ensure that all edge weights are positive.
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for generous maximum matchings in the CHAT case to show that a maximum weight
matching in the weighted graph as constructed above also gives a generous maximum
matching in O(zCmin(m log n, n2)) time in the context of HRT.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that the reduction approach is again faster by a
factor of Ω(Cmax(1/ log n,m/n2)) for most practical cases.
8.6 Profile-based optimal matchings in SMTI
Since SMTI is a special case of HRT, we observe that each of the algorithms described
above for finding a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal matching and a generous
maximum matching can also be used to find a matching of the same kind given an SMTI
instance I. We remark that in the case of the augmenting path approach based on the
Bellman-Ford algorithm, since the maximum cardinality of a matching in I is O(n), we
only need to replace the C factor in the time complexity of the algorithm in order to obtain
its respective running times in I, i.e. O(n2mz). In the case of reduction to the Assignment
problem, it follows that we can use the fastest algorithm for finding a maximum weight
matching in an uncapacitated bipartite graph since all agents in I have capacity 1. Recall
from Section 1.2 that this takes O(nm+ n2 log n) time [14]. In view of the time required
to perform arithmetic operations on steeply decreasing weights [42], the resulting running
time of the algorithm is Oz(nm + n2 log n). It follows that if nm ≤ n2 log n, then the
reduction gives a faster solution by a factor of Ω(m/ log n). Otherwise, the reduction is
faster by a factor of Ω(n). Hence, as in the case of HRT, reduction to the Assignment
problem gives a faster solution to the problem than an augmenting path approach based
on the Bellman-Ford algorithm in SMTI.
8.7 Open Problems
We conclude this chapter with the following open problems.
• It was observed in Chapter 7 that an approach utilising the Edmonds-Gallai De-
composition led to a faster algorithm for finding a rank-maximal matching given a
CHAT instance than alternatives such as using an augmenting path approach based
on the Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the Assignment problem. This
raises the question as to whether we can also obtain similar results for the case of
HRT.
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• Each of the open problems posed for CHAT at the end of Chapter 7 could be
naturally extended to HRT. Can we then find solutions to these problems in the
context of HRT?
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Conclusion
9.1 Summary of thesis contribution
The contribution of this thesis can be divided into three main classes based on three
different types of optimality criteria that can be applied to a matching in the context of a
bipartite matching problem with preferences. These are the concepts of
1. a Pareto optimal matching
2. a popular matching
3. a profile-based optimal matching, which may be sub-divided into the concepts of
(a) a rank-maximal matching
(b) a greedy maximum matching
(c) a generous maximum matching
For each optimality criterion, we first studied the concept in the setting where pref-
erences are only one-sided (i.e. the cases of CHA, WCHA or CHAT as appropriate),
and then extended the results to allow preferences to be two-sided (i.e. the cases of HR,
SMI, HRT or SMTI as appropriate). Figure 9.1 sumarises the main contributions of
this thesis according to this classification by giving the fastest algorithm for computing
an optimal matching in each case. In the table, the second column indicates the type of
preference lists in the problem instance, by using a ‘s’ to indicate strict preferences and a
‘t’ to indicate that ties are allowed. In addition, we indicate the chapter number of this
thesis in square brackets, where the results of each algorithm can be found. We remark
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that all the results mentioned in Figure 9.1 are new and contained in this thesis. With
reference to this figure, we now present some conclusions regarding the results contained
in this thesis.
9.2 Pareto optimal matchings
1. Figure 9.1 indicates that a maximum Pareto optimal matching can be found in
polynomial time given an instance ofCHA, SMI orHR. The time complexities of our
algorithms are each bounded above by the time taken to find a maximum matching
in the underlying graph of the problem instance. Hence, these algorithms may be
considered efficient in the sense that any improvement to their time complexities
would imply an improved algorithm for finding a maximum matching in a bipartite
graph (capacitated or uncapacitated as appropriate).
2. As can be seen from Figure 9.1, the ties case in HR is still open. Given that a com-
binatorial approach gave a faster solution for finding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in each of the listed problems where preferences are strict, and given the
close relationship of these problems to one another, it is likely that a combinator-
ial approach to one of the problems in the presence of ties would also yield faster
solutions to each of these problems.
9.3 Popular matchings
1. The problem of finding a maximum popular matching, or determining that none
exists, can be solved in polynomial time given an instance of CHAT or WCHA.
2. We remark that it is likely that a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximum
popular matching, or determining that none exists, given an instance of WCHAT,
can be obtained by extending in a natural way the algorithm for WCHA, in much
the same way as our algorithm for CHAT was extended from that for CHA.
3. Finding an algorithm to construct a maximum popular matching in a given bipartite
matching problem with two-sided preferences remains open. However, we can test
whether any matching in a given SMTI-SYM instance is popular using the O
√
nm)
time algorithm described in Chapter 6. Furthermore, it is likely that any combina-
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torial solution to the problem would be required to use our characterisation results
for popular matchings in SMTI-SYM as presented in Chapter 6.
9.4 Profile-based optimal matchings
1. Each of a rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a generous maximum matching can
be found in polynomial time given an instance of CHAT, HRT or SMTI.
2. It is faster to find a rank-maximal matching given an instance of CHAT if the
underlying approach makes use of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition rather than
straightforward alternatives such as an augmenting path approach based on the
Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the Assignment problem. Hence, it is
likely that any combinatorial approach utilising the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
would also offer a faster algorithm for each of the problems of finding a greedy
maximum and a generous maximum matching in an instance of CHAT. Indeed, the
viability of the augmenting path approach based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm sug-
gests such a possibility since the approach using the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
is also inherently based on augmenting paths.
3. The above observations and results are also likely to extend naturally to the problems
of finding a rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a generous maximum matching
in an instance of HRT or SMTI.
9.5 General observations
We make some conclusions here on the results of this thesis in general, in addition to those
specific to each of the optimality criterion studied as above.
1. All the problems that were studied in this thesis turned out to be solvable in polyno-
mial time. The existence of a polynomial-time algorithm is often inherently associ-
ated with establishing some kind of underlying structure for the problem concerned.
For instance, the solution to finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching requires
the identifying and then satisfying of certain types of coalitions in the underlying
graph of the problem instance. To find a maximum popular matching, the identifi-
cation of the f - and s-partners of each participating agent in the problem instance
allows us to restrict our attention to only a subgraph of the underlying graph to
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generate an efficient solution to the problem. In addition, the fastest algorithm for
finding a rank-maximal matching is reliant on utilising the Edmonds-Gallai Decom-
position to label vertices and then identify only those edges that can belong to any
solution.
2. The optimality criteria studied in this thesis can be considered to be superficially
similar in some respects but a simple change to the problem definition often requires
a significant change to the algorithm.
3. The problem of finding a matching of maximum cardinality in the underlying graph
of the problem instance often seems to influence the time complexity of the resulting
algorithm for its solution. This is the case even if the underlying problem seems on
the surface not to be associated with maximum matchings, e.g. popular matchings.
9.6 Future work
There is a wide range of possibilities for future study beyond the problems considered in
this thesis. These include the open problems listed at the end of each of the preceding
chapters, as well as the following.
1. Can we establish any further structural results for the sets of Pareto optimal match-
ings for a given instance of CHA or HR? The same question arises for each of the
other optimality criteria studied in this thesis.
2. For a given bipartite matching problem, there may be many different matchings
of a certain type, e.g. Pareto optimal, popular, rank-maximal etc. However, it is
open as to whether we can find algorithms to efficiently generate all matchings of a
given kind. Towards this, we note that Uno [62] has given algorithms for generating
all the perfect, maximum and maximal matchings in a bipartite graph, so that
any efficient algorithm could possibly extend his approach. As a first step, given
a bipartite matching problem and an optimality criterion to satisfy for a matching
in the problem instance, it would be useful to find efficient algorithms to determine
whether the problem instance admits a unique matching of the required type, and if
not to find a second such matching.
3. From a practical point of view, perform empirical analyses of the algorithms pre-
sented in this thesis in order to gain a greater degree of understanding of their
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behaviour in real-life situations, e.g. how “good” are these different kinds of match-
ings likely to be for a given instance of CHA, HR etc. derived from some practical
application?
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